scholarly journals Theological Compatibilism and Essential Properties

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Ciprotti
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
De Re ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Individual Entity ◽  
De Dicto

Alvin Plantinga defends Theological Compatibilism (TC) and Essentialism about property possession (E). TC is the claim that human freedom to act otherwise and God's essential omniscience are compatible, while E is the claim that every individual entity whatsoever has a modal profile consisting in having both essential and accidental properties. I purport to show that, if E is assumed in the argument for TC, then the latter leads to a very puzzling upshot. I also intend to show that, even if TC is suitably fixed in order to avoid that upshot, TC is still unconvincing in that it merges into one the de re and the de dicto rendering of 'human freedom to act otherwise'; I end up by briefly sketching why the two renderings should instead be kept well apart.

Norman Malcolm e Alvin Plantinga - Duas Versões Analíticas do Argumento do Proslogionde Santo Anselmo

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (34) ◽  
pp. 333-355
Author(s):  
Maria Helena Reis Pereira ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
The Sixties ◽  
De Dicto

The purpose of this work is to show some aspects which characterized the way analytical philosophers in the sixties and seventies (last Century) have read Saint Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion, thereby bringing its problematic into a new light. And had the virtue to begin the question of the existence of God in the heart of the analytical philosophy which up to the date was concerned by atheism. In the Introduction, we will point out the most frequent analytical objections to the argument - (i) existence is not a predicate (ii) the concept of God is incoherent (iii) existence is not perfection. Anscombe - an exception in this analytical context - has defended and supported the thesis that the argument is not an ontological one. Malcolm discovered two arguments in the Proslogion: one in chapter II which he considers invalid, another one in Chapter III considered valid and interpreted as modal by him. Plantinga was one of the first critics of the modal proof because there was - according to him - a confusion between necessity de dicto and necessity de re. Plantinga thought that the two arguments implied and/or complemented each other and developed a theory of modal realism in which he explains the nature and divine necessity in terms of possible worlds. Based on this concept he has rewritten a new modal proof considered “victorious” by him but that was later refuted by Mackie, Tooley and Davis (amongst others) and accused of circularity. Plantinga didn’t accept his proof to be considered fallacious and Oppy didn’t also recognize the same claim made by Fergie. However, Plantinga has rephrased his proof and summarized it in just one premise: “maximal greatness is possibly instantiated”. More than a proof of God’s existence, this is a defense of the acceptance of theism, a justification of the rationality of belief. And the possibility of existence of a metaphysically necessary being drives us to a deepest reflection from where every cognitive potentiality from the labor of the philosopher can be taken.

Necessary Properties And Linnaean Essentialism

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berent Enç
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Subjunctive Conditionals ◽  
De Re ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
De Dicto

Quine's arguments against the attribution of essential properties de re to individuals have been the motivation for attempts at reinstating essentialism as a respectable metaphysical thesis and at defending the coherence of modal logic in general.I shall argue here along somewhat different lines, that the particular version of essentialism Quine objects to is in fact untenable but that this conclusion is far from entailing a commitment to some version of conventionalism, and in particular that it does not entail the view that the only kind of necessity that is coherent is de dicto necessity.In what follows, I shall assume, without arguing for it, that de re essentialism and subjunctive conditionals are intimately related, and in particular, that any version of de re essentialism which conflicts with our basic intuitions about subjunctive conditionals is untenable.

scholarly journals Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Field
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
De Re ◽  
Moral Appraisal ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The Right

AbstractDe Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.

scholarly journals De Re MEDIJI : POLITIKA MEDIJA

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Misko Suvakovic
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto

Namera mi je da dijagramski postavim jednu moguću potencijalnu teoriju De-Re medija lociranu u savremenosti globalnih ekoloških, ekonomskih, ratnih i, svakako, klasnih kriza. Razmatrana je piosebna situacija transformacije slike sveta u događaj sveta, drugim rečima, načinjen je obrt od prikazivanja sveta do izvođenja sveta ili izvođenja u svetu. Postavljena je rasprava o sredstvima medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja, tj. o instrumentima i njihovim konstruktivnim funkcijama. Analiziran je kontekst medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja posredstvom modela dispozitiva/aparatusa. Reinterpretirana je iz agrarne nauke i ratne terminologije teorija rojeva te primenjna na novi pojam medijuma/medija. Preuzeta je i primenjena tradicionalna i moderna rasprava razlike De Dicto i De Re sudova. Postavljena je teorija De Re medija u odnosu na koncepte medijuma i medija, postmedijuma i postmedija, digitalnih i postdigitalnih medija.

Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
De Dicto

This chapter explores philosophical issues in metaphysics. It begins by distinguishing between de re and de dicto necessity. All necessity is uniformly de re; there is simply no such thing as de dicto necessity. Indeed, in the glory days of positivism, all necessity was understood as uniformly the same: a necessary truth was always an a priori truth, while contingent truths were always a posteriori. The chapter then assesses the concept of antirealism. Antirealism is always an error theory: there is some sort of mistake or distortion or sloppiness embedded in the usual discourse. The chapter also considers paradoxes, causation, conceptual analysis, scientific mysteries, the possible worlds theory of modality, the concept of a person, the nature of existence, and logic and propositions.

The Problem of de re Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 234-246
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Kit Fine ◽  
Singular Terms ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
De Re Modality ◽  
Basic Argument ◽  
De Dicto

The problem of de re modality is how, if at all, one can make sense of it. Most who have discussed this problem have assumed that modality de dicto is relatively unproblematic. It is, rather, the interpretation of sentences involving, within the scope of modal operators, singular terms or free variables which is thought to give rise to grave—and in the view of some, insuperable—difficulties. Quine has two arguments against the intelligibility of de re modality: a “logical” and a “metaphysical” one. That the “logical” argument is central to Quine’s attack is surely indisputable. But my claim that it is his basic argument is, in effect, denied by Kit Fine. I can (and do) agree with Fine that there are some significant differences between the two arguments. The most important question, for my purposes, is whether he is right to claim that the two arguments have force independently of one another.

Names and the ?de re ? De dicto? distinction

1981 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. W. Fitch
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto

Phenomenology and De Re Interpretation: A Critique of Brandom's Reading of Hegel

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 30-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Houlgate
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Reference Dependence ◽  
De Re ◽  
Philosophical Text ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
Gilbert Harman ◽  
Made In

At first sight Robert Brandom's two essays on Hegel in his book Tales of the Mighty Dead appear barely to be about Hegel at all. The first essay on holism and idealism, for example, talks of ‘sense dependence’ and ‘reference dependence’, and even invokes a point in logic made by Gilbert Harman (TMD 191-2, 194). Scarcely normal fare for the average commentator on Hegel. Brandom himself is acutely conscious of the impression his work on Hegel (and on the other philosophers discussed in Tales of the Mighty Dead) might have on his readers. ‘I am aware’, he writes, ’that the relations between the stories told here and my own philosophical views [ … ] may seem to some particularly problematic’ (TMD 90). In the section of his book called ‘Pretexts’, however, Brandom provides a subtle defence of his approach and makes it clear that he is by no means simply ‘foisting’ his ideas on the helpless dead (TMD 91; see also 389). He does so by distinguishing between two different modes of interpretation: de dicto and de re.Brandom states that interpretation of a philosophical text seeks to establish the claims made in it and to determine what follows from them. This task, however, presupposes a ‘context’ of interpretation (TMD 95).When a text is given a de dicto interpretation, the context is supplied by the author's own commitments. The aim is thus to determine what the author himself would have said in response to questions of clarification, given those commitments (TMD 99).

Semantic concept of existential presupposition

Human Affairs ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiří Raclavský
Keyword(s):  
Present Author ◽  
Semantic Concept ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
De Re ◽  
Existential Presupposition ◽  
Semantic Concepts ◽  
De Dicto

AbstractStrawson’s work seems to contain both pragmatic and semantic concepts of presupposition. The former concept has largely been studied by many philosophers and linguists, while the latter has not been properly investigated (van Fraassen being an exception). The present author explicates the semantic concept of existential presupposition in relation to deriving existential statements and distinguishing their de dicto/de re variants (in the rather generalized sense following Tichý).

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