The AP1000 plant is an 1100-MWe class pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, and safety with reduced plant costs. The AP1000 passive nuclear power plant is uniquely equipped to withstand an extended station blackout scenario such as the events following the earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station without compromising core and containment integrity. Without AC power, using passive safety technology, the AP1000 plant provides cooling for the core, containment and spent fuel pool for more than 3 days without the need for operator actions. Following this passive coping period, minimal operator actions are needed to extend the operation of the passive features to 7 days using installed equipment. With the re-supply of fuel oil the coping time may be extended for an indefinite time. Connections for a few, small, easily transportable components provide a diverse backup means of extending passive system operation after the first 3 days. As a result, the AP1000 design provides very robust protection of public safety and the utility investment.
Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station in Japan, several initiatives were launched worldwide to assess the lessons learned. These include, but are not limited to, the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) stress tests, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Final Report, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Expert Mission Report, and the U.S. NRC Near-Term Task Force Recommendations. The AP1000 design has been assessed against these initiatives and lessons learned.
The purpose of this paper is to describe:
• How the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station was evaluated and translated into conclusions and recommendations for nuclear power plants worldwide
• How the AP1000 plant was evaluated in light of the recommendations resulting from the various post-Fukushima assessments
• The key conclusions resulting from the post-Fukushima evaluation of the AP1000 design
Improved Nuclear Emergency Management System Reflecting Lessons Learned from the Emergency Response at Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station after the Great East Japan Earthquake
