Philosophical Implications

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leemon B. McHenry
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Problem Perception ◽  
Event Ontology ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

An event ontology has been proposed by various philosophers as a solution to certain philosophical problems. This chapter therefore explores briefly its implications for the mind-body problem, perception and causation, free will, personal identify and moral agency. An event ontology provides a consistent framework for addressing these problems.

An Argument for Optimism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stoljar
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Boundary Problem ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Boundary Problems ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
The Past ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Over Time

This chapter formulates an argument for the main thesis that focuses on a particular type of problem, called a boundary problem. Roughly, a boundary problem is a logical problem involving independently plausible but mutually inconsistent theses, each of which concerns what it takes for a claim, or a certain class of claims, to be true or knowable or understood. Topics identified in this chapter as raising boundary problems include the mind–body problem, the problem of free will, the indeterminancy of meaning, identity over time (or persistence, as it usually called), and the impenetrability of matter. The key idea of the argument is that we can and have solved boundary problems in the past.

In Support of Whitehead’s Time

KronoScope ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Rémy Lestienne
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Alfred North Whitehead ◽  
Philosophy Of Nature ◽  
New Concepts ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Deterministic Behavior

Abstract In 1911, Alfred North Whitehead has a brainstorm: if we deny the reality of the instant, many problems of the philosophy of nature seem solved. His metaphysics, however, will wait until his moving to Harvard, in 1924, to mature. Besides his denial of the instants of time and the replacement of the concept of time by that of “process,” Whitehead articulates new concepts (concrescence, prehension) to account for the crystallization of successive empirical realities, the solidarity between events, the permanence of objects, and their deterministic behavior altogether. His views of nature fit well with both quantum mechanics and relativity theories, although not in the details of the latter. But one of his largely unnoticed merits, in my view, is to reopen the question of free will in the mind-body problem.

The Mind-Body Problem Revisited

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 660-660
Author(s):  
MADGE SCHEIBEL ◽  
ARNOLD SCHEIBEL
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

Brute Necessity and the Mind–Body Problem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Van Cleve
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

In a growing number of papers one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. For short, they imply that there are brute necessities. Therefore, the arguments conclude, the views in question should be rejected in favor of rival views under which the necessities would be explained. This style of argument raises a number of questions. Do necessary truths really require explanation? Are they not paradigms of truths that either need no explanation or automatically have one, being in some sense self-explanatory? If necessary truths do admit of explanation or even require it, what types of explanation are available? Are there any necessary truths that are truly brute? This chapter surveys various answers to these questions, noting their bearing on arguments from brute necessity and arguments concerning the mind–body problem.

Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. Michael E. Levin

Ethics ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-176
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind
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