The Theory of Extension

This chapter explores the connections between Whitehead’s metaphysical theory and contemporary cosmology by examining his theory of extension. This involves the most general features of structure in the universe that are addressed in his later process ontology. The chapter also continues to explore the issue raised in chapter 4 concerning the emergence of gross physical bodies and the entire extended universe from the foundation of events. As Whitehead’s theorizing becomes increasingly general, his account for how our universe began provides a basic framework for a comparison with contemporary multiverse speculation. This then raises the question about the scientific status of this hypothesis.

Descriptive Metaphysics

Strawson’s famous distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics describes two different methodological approaches to the question of fundamental ontology. This chapter focuses mainly on the origin of the descriptive enterprise in Aristotle’s metaphysics and examines Whitehead and Quine’s criticisms of this approach to the formulation of a viable conceptual scheme for modern physics. The project of descriptive metaphysics and the concept of substance are rejected on both scientific and philosophical grounds.

Philosophical Implications

An event ontology has been proposed by various philosophers as a solution to certain philosophical problems. This chapter therefore explores briefly its implications for the mind-body problem, perception and causation, free will, personal identify and moral agency. An event ontology provides a consistent framework for addressing these problems.

The Problem of Time

This chapter examines the problem of time with regard to the unification of general relativity and quantum mechanics and advances in broad outline one direction that this unification might potentially follow, namely, a version of Broad’s growing block universe consistent with Whitehead’s late metaphysics and relativistic quantum field theory. The theories of time – eternalism, presentism and the growing block theory – are discussed in connection with three and four dimensional views of reality.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the main theses of this book: to defend an event ontology in the fashion of Whitehead, Russell and Quine against the traditional substance ontology, and to examine the plausibility of this theory within the contemporary quest for a unified theory of physics.

The Revisionary Theory of Events

This chapter examines the affinities and contrasts in the event theories advanced by Whitehead, Russell and Quine, all of which originate from the revolution in twentieth-century physics. The revisionary theory of events overthrows the descriptive theory, according to which events are dependent on substances. Events, under this new theory, are basic and substance, as an ontological category, is eliminated.

The Influence of Modern Physics

This chapter investigates the influence of Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, Einstein’s relativity theory and the early quantum theory on the development of the event ontology in the 1920s with particular focus on Whitehead’s view. These were the three key ideas that led to a transformation of our view of reality as comprised fundamentally of energy events. The two main themes of this chapter include: (1) physical evidence in support of an ontology of events, and (2) the increasing unification of physical theory until we arrive at the current state of two highly successful, unified theories that are presently disunified within the search for a comprehensive, unified theory.