Schelling and the Metaphysics of Evil
This chapter examines Schelling’s 1809 essay Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom to argue that it contains one of the most sophisticated challenges to Kant’s theory. Schelling criticises Augustine’s insistence that evil entails a privation of being by developing an original account of metaphysics and, by extension, evil that maintains that being entails an autopoietic process whereby a dark, chaotic, differentiating abyss expresses itself in actual, empirical being. By associating evil with this dark abyss, Schelling holds that ‘evil’ not only has actual being, but forms the differentiating foundation of actual existence. This brings Schelling to engage with the question of why some individuals choose to actualise this dark abyss while others do not. In contrast to Kant’s appeal to an unknowable noumenal decision orientated to the good that can be subsequently overcome, Schelling suggests that the choice of evil is an unconscious one that cannot subsequently be altered. The chapter concludes by raising two critical questions regarding Schelling’s analysis.