scholarly journals Designing Online Marketplaces: Trust and Reputation Mechanisms

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Luca
Keyword(s):  
Trust And Reputation ◽  
Online Marketplaces ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms

Improving Trustworthiness in E-Market Using Attack Resilient Reputation Modeling

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 57-82
Author(s):  
Neeraj Kumar Sharma ◽  
Vibha Gaur ◽  
Punam Bedi
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Reputation Systems ◽  
Trust And Reputation ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms ◽  
Reputation Building ◽  
Building Parameters

Asymmetric information is a major problem in e-commerce transactions as it gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Reputation mechanisms provide a solution to this problem by discouraging fraudulent behavior and encouraging honest behavior of participants in the uncertain and un-trusted environment of e-market. This paper discusses trust and reputation relationships, and highlights the importance of key reputation building parameters to enhance trustworthiness of participants. Finally, it proposes reputation metrics that guard reputation systems from various attacks by malicious participants to improve the quality of e-market and presents a working prototype.

Designing Reputation and Trust Management Systems

2010 ◽  
pp. 202-218
Author(s):  
Roman Beck ◽  
Jochen Franke
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Support ◽  
Trust Management ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Customer Complaints ◽  
Business Partners ◽  
Trust Management System ◽  
Trust And Reputation ◽  
High Fraction ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms

This article analyzes the handling of customer complaints after shipping ordered goods by applying automated reputation and trust accounts as decision support. Customer complaints are cost intensive and difficult to standardize. A game theory based analysis of the process yields insights into unfavorable interactions between both business partners. Trust and reputation mechanisms have been found useful in addressing these types of interactions. A reputation and trust management system (RTMS) is proposed based on design theory guidelines as an IS artifact to prevent customers from issuing false complaints. A generic simulation setting for analysis of the mechanism is presented to evaluate the applicability of the RTMS. The findings suggest that the RTMS performs best in market environments where transaction frequency is high, individual complainthandling costs are high compared to product revenues, and the market has a high fraction of potentially cheating customers.

scholarly journals Sharing by proxy: Invisible users in the sharing economy

First Monday ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gemma Newlands ◽  
Christoph Lutz ◽  
Christian Pieter Hoffmann
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Data Driven ◽  
Data Driven Decision Making ◽  
Future Of Work ◽  
Trust And Reputation ◽  
The Future ◽  
User Data ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms ◽  
Definition Of

With the future of work increasingly data-driven, platforms automate decisions based on the collection of vast quantities of user data. However, non-users constitute a challenge as they provide little to no data for either platforms or other users. We focus on a category of (non-)users that has not received any attention in research: users-by-proxy. Users-by-proxy make use of sharing services but they are not themselves part of the sharing transaction. Platforms cannot analyze their behavior to tailor services or allocate labor most effectively. Users-by-proxy also have significant implications for trust and reputation mechanisms. In this conceptual contribution, we provide a definition of users-by-proxy as a third category between users and non-users, developing a typology of users-by-proxy based on motives of non-/use. We focus on the ramifications of users-by-proxy for the future of work and their significance for the limits of data-driven decision-making.

Designing Reputation and Trust Management Systems

2010 ◽  
pp. 118-135
Author(s):  
Roman Beck ◽  
Jochen Franke
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Trust Management ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Customer Complaints ◽  
Business Partners ◽  
Trust Management System ◽  
Trust And Reputation ◽  
Complaint Handling ◽  
High Fraction ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms

This article analyzes the handling of customer complaints after shipping ordered goods by applying automated reputation and trust accounts as decision support. Customer complaints are cost intensive and difficult to standardize. A game theory based analysis of the process yields insights into unfavorable interactions between both business partners. Trust and reputation mechanisms have been found useful in addressing these types of interactions. A reputation and trust management system (RTMS) is proposed based on design theory guidelines as an IS artifact to prevent customers from issuing false complaints. A generic simulation setting for analysis of the mechanism is presented to evaluate the applicability of the RTMS. The findings suggest that the RTMS performs best in market environments where transaction frequency is high, individual complaint-handling costs are high compared to product revenues, and the market has a high fraction of potentially cheating customers.

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