scholarly journals Phenomenal awareness can emerge without attention

Author(s):  
Jaan Aru ◽  
Talis Bachmann
Keyword(s):  
1987 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald R. Gorassini

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasmus Eklund ◽  
Billy Gerdfeldter ◽  
Stefan Wiens

Theories disagree as to whether it is the early or the late neural correlate of awareness plays a critical role in phenomenal awareness. According to recurrent processing theory, early activity in primary sensory areas should correspond closely to phenomenal awareness. In support, research with electroencephalography found that in the visual and somatosensory modality, an early neural correlate of awareness is contralateral to stimulation, whereas a late neural correlate of awareness does not appear to be lateralized. Thus, early activity is sensitive to the perceived location of visual and somatosensory stimulation. Critically, it is unresolved whether this is true also for hearing. In the present study (N = 26 students), we found that the early neural correlate of awareness (auditory awareness negativity, AAN) was contralateral to auditory stimulation, whereas the late (late positivity, LP) was not. Because these findings match those in the visual and somatosensory modalities, they suggest that recurrent processing theory is valid across modalities.


2003 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-165
Author(s):  
H. Schärli ◽  
P. Brugger ◽  
M. Regard ◽  
C. Mohr ◽  
Th. Landis

We developed two experiments on normal subjects to simulate “blindsight”, i.e., above chance localization performance of visual stimuli without phenomenal awareness. In both experiments, visual targets were presented on a computer screen at one of six possible locations, followed by a metacontrast mask. Subjects (1) indicated whether they had seen the target stimulus or not, and (2) guessed at which location the stimulus had been presented. Fifty percent were blank trials. We found that even when subjects did not acknowledge the presence of a stimulus, they nevertheless guessed its location with above chance accuracy. Apparent motion improved both detection and localization performance. Subjective confidence was related to stimulus presence and localisation performance. Thus, simulated blindsight appeared to be based on residual conscious awareness.


2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-583
Author(s):  
Wolf Singer

Phenomenal awareness, the ability to be aware of one’s sensations and feelings, emerges from the capacity of evolved brains to represent their own cognitive processes by iterating and self-reapplying the cortical operations that generate representations of the outer world. Search for the neuronal substrate of awareness therefore converges with the search for the neuronal code through which brains represent their environment. The hypothesis is put forward that the mammalian brain uses two complementary representational strategies. One consists of the generation of neurons responding selectively to particular constellations of features, and is based on selective recombination of inputs in hierarchically structured feed-forward architectures. The other relies on the dynamic association of large numbers of distributed neurons into functionally coherent cell assemblies which as a whole represent a content of cognition. Arguments and data are presented in favor of the second strategy as the one according to which meta-representations that support awareness are established. My hypothesis is that such distributed representations self-organize through transient synchronization of the oscillatory activity. Evidence showing that similar brain states are required both for the occurrence of these synchronization phenomena and for awareness is provided.


1998 ◽  
Vol 353 (1377) ◽  
pp. 1829-1840 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
W. Singer

The hypothesis is defended that brains expressing phenomenal awareness are capable of generating metarepresentations of their cognitive processes, these metarepresentations resulting from an iteration of self–similar cortical operations. Search for the neuronal substrate of awareness therefore converges with the search for the nature of neuronal representations. It is proposed that evolved brains use two complementary representational strategies. One consists of the generation of neurons responding selectively to a particular constellation of features and is based on selective recombination of inputs in hierarchically structured feedforward architectures. The other relies on the dynamic association of feature–specific cells into functionally coherent cell assemblies that, as a whole, represent the constellation of features defining a particular perceptual object. Arguments are presented that favour the notion that the metarepresentations supporting awareness are established in accordance with the second strategy. Experimental data are reviewed that are compatible with the hypothesis that evolved brains use assembly codes for the representation of contents and that these assemblies become organized through transient synchronization of the discharges of associated neurons. It is argued that central states favouring the formation of assembly–based representations are similar to those favouring awareness.


1999 ◽  
Vol 354 (1387) ◽  
pp. 1295-1305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude Tomberg ◽  
John E. Desmedt

Brain mechanisms involved in selective attention in humans can be studied by measures of regional blood flow and metabolism (by positron emission tomography) which help identify the various locations with enhanced activities over a period of time of seconds. The physiological measures provided by scalp–recorded brain electrical potentials have a better resolution (milliseconds) and can reveal the actual sequences of distinct neural events and their precise timing. We studied selective attention to sensory inputs from fingers because the brain somatic representations are deployed over the brain convexity under the scalp thereby making it possible to assess distinct stages of cortical processing and representation through their characteristic scalp topographies. In the electrical response to a finger input attended by the subject, the well–known P 300 manifests a widespread inhibitory mechanism which is released after a target stimulus has been identified. P 300 is preceded by distinct cognitive electrogeneses such as P 40 , P 100 and N 140 which can be differentiated from the control (obligatory) profile by superimposition or electronic subtraction. The first cortical response N 20 is stable across conditions, suggesting that the first afferent thalamocortical volley is not affected by selective attention. At the next stage of modality–specific cortex in which the sensory features are processed and represented, responses were enhanced (cognitive P 40 ) only a very few milliseconds after arrival of the afferent volley at the cortex, thus documenting a remarkable precocity of attention gain control in the somatic modality. The physiology of selective attention also provides useful cues in relation to non–target inputs which the subject must differentiate in order to perform the task. When having to tell fingers apart, the brain strategy for non–target fingers is not to inhibit or filter them out, but rather to submit their input to several processing operations that are actually enhanced when the discrimination from targets becomes more difficult. While resolving a number of such issues, averaged data cannot disclose the flexibility of brain mechanisms nor the detailed features of cognitive electrogeneses because response variations along time have been ironed out by the bulk treatment. We attempted to address the remarkable versatility of humans in dealing with their sensory environment under ecological conditions by studying single non–averaged responses. We identified distinct cognitive P 40 , P 100 , N 140 and P 300 electrogeneses in spite of the noise by numerically assessing their characteristic scalp topography signatures. Single–trial data suggest reconsiderations of current psychophysiological issues. The study of non–averaged responses can clarify issues raised by averaging studies as illustrated by our recent study of cognitive brain potentials for finger stimuli which remain outside the subject'sawareness. This has to do with the physiological basis of the ‘cognitive unconscious’, that is, current mental processes lying on the fringe or outside of phenomenal awareness and voluntary control, but which can influence ongoing behaviour. Averaged data suggest that, in selective auditory attention, the subject may not notice mild concomitant finger inputs. The study of non–averaged responses documents the optional and independent occurrence of the cognitive P 40 , P 100 and N 140 (but not P 300 ) electrogeneses while the finger inputs remain outside phenomenal awareness. These results suggest that the subject unconsciously assigns limited cognitive resources to distinct somatic cortical areas thereby submitting finger inputs to an intermittent curtailed surveillance which can remain on the fringe or outside consciousness. The study of cognitive electrogeneses in single non–averaged responses is making possible a neurophysiology of cognition in real time.


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