How to Mitigate the Hard Problem by Adopting the Dual Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

Higher Order ◽

Hard Problem ◽

Explanatory Gap ◽

Phenomenal Concepts ◽

Reductive Explanation ◽

David Chalmers ◽

Global Workspace ◽

The Hard Problem ◽

Global Workspace Theory

This chapter shows that global-workspace theory can be developed into a satisfying, fully reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. It shows how globally broadcast nonconceptual content enables higher-order thoughts about that content, where those thoughts can lack conceptual connections with physical, functional, or representational facts. As a result, zombies are conceivable and an (epistemic) explanatory gap is opened up. But the thoughts in question can themselves be given a fully naturalistic explanation. Hence all of the facts involved in consciousness can be fully explained. The chapter defends the reality of the phenomenal concepts needed to make this account work, and replies to a dilemma for the account proposed by David Chalmers.

Perceptual Intentionality. Attention and Consciousness

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement ◽

10.1017/s1358246100004367 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 43 ◽

pp. 181-202 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Naomi Eilan

Keyword(s):

Physical System ◽

Hard Problem ◽

Explanatory Gap ◽

Current Thinking ◽

The Hard Problem ◽

Subjective States

A representative expression of current thinking on the ‘problem of consciousness’ runs as follows. There is one, impenetrably hard problem; and a host of soluble, and in this sense easy problems. The hard problem is: how could a physical system yield subjective states? How could there be something it is like to be a physical system? This problem corresponds to a concept of consciousness invariably labelled ‘phenomenal consciousness’. It is here, with respect to phenomenal consciousness, that we encounter an ‘explanatory gap’, where it is this gap that makes the problem so hard. Nothing we can say about the workings of a physical system could begin to explain the existence and nature of subjective, phenomenal feel.

On the correlation/constitution distinction problem (and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness

Acta Neuropsychiatrica ◽

10.1111/j.1601-5215.2007.00207.x ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 19 (3) ◽

pp. 159-176 ◽

Cited By ~ 39

Author(s):

Steven M. Miller

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Scientific Study ◽

Hard Problem ◽

The Past ◽

Hard Problems ◽

Objective:In the past decade, much has been written about ‘the hard problem’ of consciousness in the philosophy of mind. However, a separate hard problem faces the scientific study of consciousness. The problem arises when distinguishing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and the neural constitution of consciousness. Here, I explain this correlation/constitution distinction and the problem it poses for a science of phenomenal consciousness. I also discuss potential objections to the problem, outline further hard problems in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness and consider the ontological implications of these epistemological issues.Methods:Scientific and philosophic analysis and discussion are presented.Results:The correlation/constitution distinction does indeed present a hard problem in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness. Refinement of the ‘NCC’ acronym is proposed so that this distinction may at least be acknowledged in the literature. Furthermore, in addition to the problem posed by this distinction and to ‘the hard problem’, the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness also faces several other hard problems.Conclusion:In light of the multiple hard problems, it is concluded that scientists and philosophers of consciousness ought to (i) address, analyze and discuss the problems in the hope of discovering their solution or dissolution and (ii) consider the implications of some or all of them being intractable. With respect to the latter, it is argued that ultimate epistemic limits in the study of phenomenal consciousness pose no threat to physicalist or materialist ontologies but do inform our understanding of consciousness and its place in nature.

Phenomenal consciousness: the hard problem

10.1017/upo9781844654802.004 ◽

2013 ◽

pp. 49-64

Author(s):

Dimitris Platchias

Keyword(s):

Hard Problem ◽

Consciousness

The Epistemic Role of Consciousness ◽

10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 3-33

Author(s):

Declan Smithies

Keyword(s):

Research Program ◽

Epistemic Justification ◽

Hard Problem ◽

Easy Problem ◽

Psychological Functions ◽

What is the significance of consciousness? This book argues that consciousness has unique epistemic significance: all epistemic justification ultimately depends on consciousness. Section 1.1 clarifies the concept of consciousness by invoking Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Section 1.2 raises a challenge to the significance of consciousness by arguing that unconscious creatures—zombies—can conceivably do everything conscious creatures can do. Section 1.3 situates this challenge in the context of David Chalmers’s distinction between the hard problem of explaining phenomenal consciousness and the easy problem of explaining its associated psychological functions. Section 1.4 explores the research program of putting phenomenal consciousness first: that is, explaining psychological functions in terms of phenomenal consciousness. Section 1.5 outlines the program developed in this book, which explains epistemic justification in terms of phenomenal consciousness. Section 1.6 concludes with chapter summaries and some guidelines for reading the book.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness and John McDowell’s Epistemological Disjunctivism

Вопросы философии ◽

10.31857/s004287440007357-7 ◽

2019 ◽

Keyword(s):

Hard Problem ◽

Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽

Zombies and Dolls

10.1093/oso/9780198728443.003.0002 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Marcello Massimini ◽

Giulio Tononi

Keyword(s):

Body Problem ◽

Thought Experiments ◽

Turing Test ◽

Hard Problem ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Hard Problem ◽

The Mind ◽

The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.