An Alternative Correct Answer to the Cognitive Reflection Test

Abstract Intelligence is the traditional element of interest when measuring the human cognitive abilities. However, intelligence is complex and researchers are constantly finding new angles of looking at it. One such angle is reflective reasoning. Sometimes individuals choose to override the intuitive answer and by engaging in further reflection they reach the correct answer. The cognitive reflection test (CRT) measures a person’s ability to suppress their incorrect intuitive answer in favor of reflection that should then lead to the correct response. The test contains three short mathematically based problems, which measure, among others, cognitive ability, mathematical abilities and cognitive reflection. Using a sample of 195 students from a state university, one of the largest universities in Romania, we explore the extent to which a variety of phenomena and trends identified by previous findings on CRT show similar results on our sample.

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Cognitive Reflection Effects on Time Discounting

Journal of Individual Differences ◽

10.1027/1614-0001/a000254 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 39 (2) ◽

pp. 99-106 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Michał Białek ◽

Przemysław Sawicki

Keyword(s):

Individual Differences ◽

Individual Difference ◽

Delay Discounting ◽

Reference Point ◽

Reference Points ◽

Cognitive Reflection Test ◽

Process Information ◽

Time Discounting ◽

Cognitive Reflection ◽

The Way

Abstract. In this work, we investigated individual differences in cognitive reflection effects on delay discounting – a preference for smaller sooner over larger later payoff. People are claimed to prefer more these alternatives they considered first – so-called reference point – over the alternatives they considered later. Cognitive reflection affects the way individuals process information, with less reflective individuals relying predominantly on the first information they consider, thus, being more susceptible to reference points as compared to more reflective individuals. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that individuals who scored high on the Cognitive Reflection Test discount less strongly than less reflective individuals, but we also show that such individuals are less susceptible to imposed reference points. Experiment 2 replicated these findings additionally providing evidence that cognitive reflection predicts discounting strength and (in)dependency to reference points over and above individual difference in numeracy.

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The cognitive reflection test and regional pathogen load

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e512142015-078 ◽

2014 ◽

Author(s):

Kilian James Garvey ◽

Laura Folse ◽

Crystal Curry

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Reflection Test ◽

Cognitive Reflection ◽

Pathogen Load

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Assessing the Reliability of Frederick's (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e520862008-001 ◽

2008 ◽

Author(s):

Ian R. Wells ◽

Susanna Berry

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Reflection Test ◽

Cognitive Reflection

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Effect of response format on cognitive reflection: Validating a two- and four-option multiple choice question version of the Cognitive Reflection Test

Behavior Research Methods ◽

10.3758/s13428-018-1029-4 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 50 (6) ◽

pp. 2511-2522 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Miroslav Sirota ◽

Marie Juanchich

Keyword(s):

Multiple Choice ◽

Multiple Choice Question ◽

Response Format ◽

Cognitive Reflection Test ◽

Cognitive Reflection

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EXPRESS: Fooling System 1 in the field of perception: Failure to Intuitively Detect Attribute Substitution in the Flushtration Count Illusion

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology ◽

10.1177/17470218211069381 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 174702182110693

Author(s):

Cyril Thomas ◽

Marion Botella ◽

André Didierjean

Keyword(s):

Human Brain ◽

Cognitive Style ◽

Cognitive Reflection Test ◽

Substitution Error ◽

Perceptual Illusion ◽

Cognitive Reflection ◽

Ball Problem ◽

Perceptual Attribute ◽

System 1 ◽

The Relationship

To facilitate our interactions with the surroundings, the human brain sometimes reshapes the situations that it faces in order to simplify them. This phenomenon has been widely studied in the context of reasoning, especially through the attribute substitution error. It has however been given much less attention in the field of perception. Recent research on the bat-and-ball problem suggests that reasoners are able to intuitively detect attribute substitution errors. Using a perceptual illusion drawn from the field of magic, we investigate the extent to which a perceptual form of attribute substitution depends on executive resources and can be detected. We also investigate the relationship between susceptibility to attribute substitution error in the flushtration count illusion and in a French adaptation of the bat-and ball problem. Finally, we investigate the link between the intuitive cognitive style (assessed by the Cognitive Reflection Test) and the susceptibility to the flushtration count illusion. Our results suggest that participants do not detect perceptual attribute substitution error, that this phenomenon could be independent of the executive resources allocated to the task, and could rest on mechanisms distinct from those that produce errors in reasoning. We discuss differences between these two phenomena, and factors that may explain them.

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