scholarly journals Incentive Contract Design for the Water-Rail-Road Intermodal Transportation with Travel Time Uncertainty: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
Wenying Zhang ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Kai Yang
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Travel Time ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Optimal Time ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Intermodal Transportation ◽  
The Impact

In the management of intermodal transportation, incentive contract design problem has significant impacts on the benefit of a multimodal transport operator (MTO). In this paper, we analyze a typical water-rail-road (WRR) intermodal transportation that is composed of three serial transportation stages: water, rail and road. In particular, the entire transportation process is planned, organized, and funded by an MTO that outsources the transportation task at each stage to independent carriers (subcontracts). Due to the variability of transportation conditions, the travel time of each transportation stage depending on the respective carrier’s effort level is unknown (asymmetric information) and characterized as an uncertain variable via the experts’ estimations. Considering the decentralized decision-making process, we interpret the incentive contract design problem for the WRR intermodal transportation as a Stackelberg game in which the risk-neutral MTO serves as the leader and the risk-averse carriers serve as the followers. Within the framework of uncertainty theory, we formulate an uncertain bi-level programming model for the incentive contract design problem under expectation and entropy decision criteria. Subsequently, we provide the analytical results of the proposed model and analyze the optimal time-based incentive contracts by developing a hybrid solution method which combines a decomposition approach and an iterative algorithm. Finally, we give a simulation example to investigate the impact of asymmetric information on the optimal time-based incentive contracts and to identify the value of information for WRR intermodal transportation.

scholarly journals Assessment of Spatiotemporal Peak Shift of Intra-Urban Transportation Taking a Case in Bangkok, Thailand

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (12) ◽  
pp. 6777
Author(s):  
Masanobu Kii ◽  
Yuki Goda ◽  
Varameth Vichiensan ◽  
Hiroyuki Miyazaki ◽  
Rolf Moeckel
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Travel Time ◽  
Demand Management ◽  
Likelihood Estimation ◽  
Road Transport ◽  
Peak Shift ◽  
Time Shift ◽  
Peak Time ◽  
Management Scenarios ◽  
The Impact

Reducing congestion has been one of the critical targets of transportation policies, particularly in cities in developing countries suffering severe and chronic traffic congestions. Several traditional measures have been in place but seem not very successful. This paper applies the agent-based transportation model MATSim for a transportation analysis in Bangkok to assess the impact of spatiotemporal transportation demand management measures. We collect required data for the simulation from various data sources and apply maximum likelihood estimation with the limited data available. We investigate two demand management scenarios, peak time shift, and decentralization. As a result, we found that these spatiotemporal peak shift measures are effective for road transport to alleviate congestion and reduce travel time. However, the effect of those measures on public transport is not uniform but depends on the users’ circumstances. On average, the simulated results indicate that those measures increase the average travel time and distance. These results suggest that demand management policies require considerations of more detailed conditions to improve usability. The study also confirms that microsimulation can be a tool for transport demand management assessment in developing countries.

scholarly journals Information Acquisition and Its Incentives in an E-Commerce Supply Chain under the Offline Showroom Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1791-1804
Author(s):  
Mengli Li ◽  
Xumei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Optimal Information ◽  
Acquisition Strategy ◽  
The One ◽  
The Impact

Recently, the showroom model has developed fast for allowing consumers to evaluate a product offline and then buy it online. This paper aims at exploring the optimal information acquisition strategy and its incentive contracts in an e-commerce supply chain with two competing e-tailers and an offline showroom. Based on signaling game theory, we build a mathematical model by considering the impact of experience service and competition intensity on consumers’ demand. We find that, on the one hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to obtain demand information directly or indirectly, which leads to forecast revenue. On the other hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to distort optimal decisions, which results in signal cost. The optimal information acquisition strategy depends on the joint impact of forecast revenue, signal cost and demand forecast cost. Notably, in some conditions, the offline showroom will not acquire demand information even when its cost is equal to zero. We also design two different information acquisition incentive contracts to obtain Pareto improvement for all supply chain members.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

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