scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

scholarly journals An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 3433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arshad ◽  
Qazi Khalid ◽  
Jaime Lloret ◽  
Antonio Leon
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer’s direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality.

scholarly journals Managing Supplier-Manufacturer Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Product Design and Take-Back Legislation

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yue Wang ◽  
Baoying Xin ◽  
Zhe Wang ◽  
Bangyi Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Economic Implications ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Green Product Design ◽  
The Impact

Facing a growing amount of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), a recent recast of the WEEE directive has put a specific reuse target for manufacturers, aiming to reduce environmental pollution and incentivize a green product design. In this paper, in order to examine whether the above two goals can be achieved by setting a specific reuse target, we have modelled a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a supplier (the leader) and a manufacturer (the follower) with the constraint of a mandated remanufacturing target. In this model, the supplier determines the level of interchangeability in product design and the wholesale price of the key component. The manufacturer buys the key components from the supplier and makes production and remanufacturing decisions under the requirement of a mandated remanufacturing target. We have investigated the supply chain’s members’ optimal decisions and analyzed the impact of the mandated remanufacturing target on the optimal profits of the supply chain’s members and consumer surplus, and finally, we have explored the environmental implications of the mandated remanufacturing target. We found that the supply chain’s members’ optimal decisions are affected by the mandated remanufacturing target and the cost of the new component. In terms of the economic implications of the mandated remanufacturing target, we have demonstrated that the increase in the mandated remanufacturing target has negative effects on the profits of the supply chain’s members and consumer surplus. Regarding the goal of incentivizing green product design, we found that the mandated remanufacturing target cannot always incentivize the supplier to implement product design that is beneficial to remanufacturing. From the perspective of the environment, we further indicate that more stringent mandated remanufacturing targets may bring an undesirable environmental outcome.

Carbon emission reduction and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain with outsourcing remanufacturing

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Wang ◽  
Yulin Zhang ◽  
Jing Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Impact

PurposeOutsourcing remanufacturing is a major form of remanufacturing, and emission reduction is an important part of a manufacturer's production. This paper aims to investigate carbon emission reduction strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with outsourcing remanufacturing and design a contract to coordinate the CLSC.Design/methodology/approachThe authors establish two-period game models between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and third-party remanufacturer (TPR) in different scenarios, including decentralized decision, centralized decision and coordinated decision. Furthermore, the authors study the optimal decisions by maximizing the profit model. The authors also investigate the impact of a carbon tax and emission reduction on the optimal decisions through comparative analysis.FindingsEmission reduction increases the quantity of new products and the OEM's profit. However, emission reduction decreases the outsourcing fee, which is not conducive to remanufacturing; thus, the TPR's profit does not necessarily increase. Compared with a decentralized scenario, the output of remanufactured products and the total profit increase. When the acceptance level of remanufactured products is high enough or when emissions from remanufacturing are low enough, the total carbon emissions are reduced in the centralized scenario. For the coordination of the CLSC, the OEM needs to increase the outsourcing fee and the TPR needs to share part of the emission reduction costs.Research limitations/implicationsThe TPR can choose three different remanufacturing strategies, namely, no remanufacturing, partial remanufacturing or full remanufacturing. For the majority of firms, it is difficult to remanufacture all used products. Therefore, the analysis is based only on partial remanufacturing.Practical implicationsThe results provide insights for remanufacturing and emission reduction decisions, as well as a decision basis for the cooperation between the OEM and TPR.Originality/valueThe authors combine the OEM's carbon emission reduction with outsourcing remanufacturing, and investigate the impact of technological spillover on the TPR's profit.

scholarly journals Government incentive mechanism of closed-loop supply chain based on information asymmetry

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qunli Wu ◽  
Xinxin Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Scientific Policy ◽  
Recovery Efficiency ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Aimed at the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of the manufacturer, the retailer and consumers in the waste products market, this paper studies how the government handles the adverse selection problem on the hidden recovery costs of the retailer and deals with the moral hazard problem on the level of retailer's hidden efforts. A government incentive regulation aiming at maximizing social welfare has been established based on the incentive theory in this paper. A list of contracts with transfer payments is presented to reveal the retailer's collection efficiency and motivate the retailer to make the optimal investment. Further, the impact of related factors on the recovery cost and social welfare level according to the numerical simulation are verified. The results show that under the government regulation, only by reporting the true recovery technology type information to the government can the retailer maximizes the profit. In addition, the retailer with high recovery efficiency can obtain both retained profit and additional information rent. Finally, as the retailer makes efforts to improve the recovery level, it also increases investment cost, which affects the enthusiasm of enhancing the retailer's recovery efficiency. Therefore, the government should not blindly pursue the improvement of recycling efficiency regardless of the cost, but should pay more attention to the control of recycling equipment and technology cost.The results facilitate scientific policy development, and provide a reference for promoting closed-loop supply chain operations.

scholarly journals The Impact of Warranty Efficiency of Remanufactured Products on Production Decisions and Green Growth Performance in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: Perspective of Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Green Growth ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Warranty Service ◽  
The Impact

Consumers cannot fully assess the quality of remanufactured products prior to purchase. To reduce consumer risk, closed-loop supply chains adopt a warranty strategy to enhance perceived value among customers and stimulate green growth. Based on Stackelberg game theory and considering consumers’ low-carbon and remanufactured product preferences, this paper aims to explore the decision-making efficiency of closed-loop supply chains with warranty services. The results of the study show that consumers’ confidence in purchasing remanufactured products has increased the demand for new products and remanufactured products, in turn also increasing the interest of the member companies of the supply chain, and stimulating the realization of the potential value of remanufacturing, which is conducive to green growth. When a remanufactured product warranty period meets certain conditions, the member companies of the supply chain can obtain optimal profit. The optimal warranty entity selection of a closed-loop supply chain with a warranty service depends on the warranty efficiency of each entity, thus making it necessary to examine the products of each warranty party.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zi-yuan Zhang ◽  
Duan-xiang Fu ◽  
Qing Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Preference Behavior ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors.

scholarly journals Dilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (S1) ◽  
pp. 291-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Improvement ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Product Return

AbstractThe government organizations grant incentives to promote green product consumption, improve green product quality, boost remanufacturing activities, etc. through various policies. The objective of this study is to highlight pros and cons of two incentive policies, namely (1) incentive on manufacturer’s R&D investment and (2) direct incentive to consumer based on greening level of the product on the optimal pricing and investment decisions in improving used product return and greening level decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). Optimal decisions are derived under manufacturer and retailer-Stackelberg games, and results are compared to explore characteristics of optimal decisions, consumer surplus, and environmental improvement under two marketing strategies of a manufacturer. It is found that the greening level and used product return rate in a CLSC are always higher under retailer-Stackelberg game. If the manufacturer sets a target for greening level, the CLSC members may receive higher profits if consumer receives incentive because of higher consumer surplus. However, environmental improvement may be lower. If the manufacturer sets a product return goal, then CLSC members may compromise with consumer surplus or environmental improvement for receiving higher profits. In the presence of direct incentive to consumers, CLSC members can trade with product at lower greening level for higher profits. Moreover, investment in improving used product return is always less compared to the investment in improving greening level.

scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8602
Author(s):  
Haitao Chen ◽  
Zhaohui Dong ◽  
Gendao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Collection Rate ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punishes manufacturers on the basis of the collection rate of used products. This paper analyzes the influence of government RPM on the optimal decisions, the relationship between the two sales channels, and the total social welfare of the supply chain system. We find that the government RPM can improve the stability of the dual-channel supply chain and the collection rate of the used products. Moreover, we are the first to provide a method of deriving the optimal government RPM through a numerical example.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

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