scholarly journals Non-Cooperative Game in Block Bidding Markets Considering Demand Response

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (13) ◽  
pp. 3322
Author(s):  
Ningxuan Guo ◽  
Yinan Wang ◽  
Gangfeng Yan ◽  
Jian Hou
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Demand Response ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Load Capacity ◽  
Real Data ◽  
Load Curve ◽  
Convergence Performance ◽  
Generation Costs ◽  
Bidding Mechanism ◽  
Market Mode

With the reform of electricity markets, demand response (DR) plays an important role in providing flexibility to the markets. Block bidding market is a new market mode, which is based on the concept of “the same quality, the same price”. The mechanism has great effects in reducing start-stop related costs. In this paper, we propose a double-sided non-cooperative game model in block bidding markets with a DR program. The model combines the advantages of block bidding and the simplicity of hourly bidding. In the model, one side is the non-cooperative game of supply-side power firms, and we propose a novel supply function bidding model based on block duration and load capacity to maximize each firm’s profit. The other side is the demand-side different types of customers, and we propose a DR model that combines hourly-various prices with the block bidding mechanism to maximize each customer’s payoff. The overall market optimization problem is solved by a distributed iterative algorithm, which has great convergence performance. We verify the proposed model on real data, and the results show that the demand load curve becomes flattened with DR, and the total generation costs decrease while the social welfare is significantly improved.

Flexible demand response programs modeling in competitive electricity markets

2011 ◽  
Vol 88 (9) ◽  
pp. 3257-3269 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Parsa Moghaddam ◽  
A. Abdollahi ◽  
M. Rashidinejad
Keyword(s):  
Demand Response ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Demand Response Programs ◽  
Competitive Electricity Markets

A non-cooperative game based energy management considering distributed energy resources in price-based and incentive-based demand response program

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Gaba ◽  
Saurabh Chanana
Keyword(s):  
Energy Management ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Demand Response ◽  
Energy Resources ◽  
Distributed Energy Resources ◽  
Distributed Energy ◽  
Energy Storage Devices ◽  
Electricity Cost ◽  
Distributed Approach ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Demand response (DR), an integral part of the smart grid, has great potential in handling the challenges of the existing power grid. The potential of different DR programs in the energy management of residential consumers (RCs) and the integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) is an important research topic. A novel distributed approach for energy management of RCs considering the competitive interactions among them is presented in this paper. The impact of participation of RC’s in price-based (PB) and incentive-based (IB) DR programs is investigated using game theory. For this, an energy management optimization problem (EMOP) is formulated to minimize electricity cost. The utility company employs electricity price as a linear function of aggregated load in the PB DR program and an incentive rate in the IBDR program. RCs are categorized into active and passive users. Active users are further distinguished based on the ownership of energy storage devices (SD) and dispatchable generation units (DGU). EMOP is modeled using a non-cooperative game, and the distributed proximal decomposition method is used to obtain the Nash equilibrium of the game. The results of the proposed approach are analyzed using different case studies. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated in terms of aggregated cost and system load profile. It has been observed that participation in PB and IBDR program benefits both the utility and the consumers.

Optimal Demand Response Aggregation in Wholesale Electricity Markets

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 1957-1965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masood Parvania ◽  
Mahmud Fotuhi-Firuzabad ◽  
Mohammad Shahidehpour
Keyword(s):  
Demand Response ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Wholesale Electricity Markets

Fundamentals and business model for resource aggregator of demand response in electricity markets

Energy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 204 ◽  
pp. 117885 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoxing Lu ◽  
Kangping Li ◽  
Hanchen Xu ◽  
Fei Wang ◽  
Zhenyu Zhou ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Business Model ◽  
Demand Response ◽  
Electricity Markets

scholarly journals Non-Cooperative Indirect Energy Trading with Energy Storage Systems for Mitigation of Demand Response Participation Uncertainty

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 883 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeseok Ryu ◽  
Jinho Kim
Keyword(s):  
Energy Storage ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Demand Response ◽  
Storage System ◽  
Analytical Data ◽  
Energy Storage System ◽  
Gaussian Mixture ◽  
Energy Trading ◽  
Considerable Uncertainty

This work focuses on the demand response (DR) participation using the energy storage system (ESS). A probabilistic Gaussian mixture model based on market operating results Monte, Carlo Simulation (MCS), is required to respond to an urgent DR signal. However, there is considerable uncertainty in DR forecasting, which occasionally fails to predict DR events. Because this failure is attributable to the intermittency of the DR signals, a non-cooperative game model that is useful for decision-making on DR participation is proposed. The game is conducted with each player holding a surplus of energy but incomplete information. Consequently, each player can share unused electricity during DR events, engaging in indirect energy trading (IET) under a non-cooperative game framework. The results of the game, the Nash equilibrium (N.E.), are verified using a case study with relevant analytical data from the campus of Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology (GIST) in Korea. The results of the case study show that IET is useful in mitigating the uncertainty of the DR program.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document