scholarly journals Does a Firm’s Corporate Governance Enhance the Beneficial Effect of IFRS Adoption?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 885 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaeyon Chu ◽  
Kyongsun Heo ◽  
Jinhan Pae

Prior literature suggests that the effect of adopting the International Financial ReportingStandards (IFRS) could vary by country-specific or firm-specific factors. In particular, we focus onthe effect of the strength of corporate governance of a firm, a firm-specific characteristic, prior tothe adoption of IFRS. Specifically, we use the Korea Corporate Governance Stock Price Index, ametric for the corporate governance structure in Korea, to examine whether the corporategovernance structure influences the effect of IFRS adoption on the analyst’s earnings forecasts inKorea. We find that the beneficial effect of IFRS adoption on analyst forecast errors is observed forfirms with moderate corporate governance prior to IFRS adoption, but not for firms with superioror inferior corporate governance. We interpret our findings such that firms with strong or weakcorporate governance do not benefit from IFRS adoption, because firms with strong corporategovernance already had transparent information system prior to IFRS adoption and firms withweak corporate governance failed to implement IFRS properly.

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khawla Hlel ◽  
Ines Kahloul ◽  
Houssam Bouzgarrou

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption and corporate governance attributes increase the management earnings forecasts’ accuracy disclosed in prospectuses for French Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Design/methodology/approach The analysis is based on cross-sectional regression explaining the absolute forecast errors by using 45 French firms that made IPOs between 2005 and 2016 in two French financial markets: Euronext and Alternext. Findings In agreement with the agency theory and the signaling theory, the authors find that the IFRS adoption and the effective corporate governance, proxied by the board characteristics, increase the accuracy of management forecasts. As a result, this latter gives a credible signal in constructing and sustaining shareholders’ trust on the transparency and the reliability of such financial information. Research limitations/implications It is plausible that the limited size of the sample represents a limitation of this study. Another limitation is that no other corporate governance attributes such as board meeting frequency, audit committee measures and ownership structure are used. Practical implications Shareholders can take benefit from management forecasts accuracy to structure their investment portfolios efficiently to allocate their funds more effectively and mitigate the costs of adverse selection that they have to face. Furthermore, the authors expect the findings to be interesting to IPO firms, as this study highlights the efficiency of larger and independent boards in decreasing managerial discretion, increasing disclosure quality and supervising management. The results could encourage GAAP-adopters countries to move toward IFRS, as this research reinforces the role of IFRS in enhancing the quality of financial disclosure by offering the required information for shareholders. Originality/value This study is important because the potential investors should assess management earnings forecasts accuracy before they consider it when evaluating IPO firms. Also, this paper has some implications for the financial market. It is recommended that future investors pay more attention, when assessing the accuracy of management earnings forecasts, to the accounting regulations of the financial reporting along with the corporate governance mechanisms. Moreover, this study could incite French regulators to revise the AFEP-MEDEF code. Under this code, it could insist that larger and independent boards are more effective in performing their governing roles than smaller boards.


2022 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 469
Author(s):  
Jihwan Choi ◽  
Hyungju Park

This study examines the association between the effective corporate tax rate and the volatility of future effective corporate tax rates in Korean companies. We analyzed the effect of corporate governance on the association between tax avoidance and tax risk. Our sample is comprised of all the firms listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index market. We measure each firm’s tax avoidance as GAAP ETR, Cash ETR, and BTD, and use the corporate governance rating of the Korea Corporate Governance Service to measure corporate governance. Our results show that the volatility of the effective corporate tax rate and the effective corporate tax rate would have a significant negative association. Our results show that tax risk decreases when the corporate tax avoidance level increases and the tax risk increases when the corporate tax avoidance level decreases. In addition, we find that the better the corporate governance structure, the higher the level of supervision and control of managers, thereby mitigating the impact of tax evasion on future corporate tax risk. The findings of this study regarding tax avoidance and corporate governance are important for investors because tax risk can significantly affect investor welfare.


2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russ ◽  
Gary John Previts ◽  
Edward N. Coffman

Presenting evidence from a 19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), the paper shows that issues of corporate governance have existed since the first corporations were established in the U.S. The C&O used a stockholder review committee to review the annual report of the president and directors. The paper shows how the C&O stockholders used this committee to supplement the corporate governance structure. The corporate governance structure of the C&O is also viewed from a theoretical structure as espoused by Hart [1995].


2006 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russ ◽  
Gary J. Previts ◽  
Edward N. Coffman

Canal companies were among the first enterprises to be organized in the corporate form and to require large amounts of capital. This paper examines the stockholder review committee of a 19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), and discusses how the C&O used this corporate governance structure to monitor and improve financial management and operations. A major strength was the concern and dedication of the stockholders to the company, while a major weakness was the political control exerted by the State of Maryland. The paper provides an historical perspective on corporate governance in the 19th century. This research contributes to the literature by providing detailed workings and practices of a stockholder review committee. The paper documents corporate governance efforts in archival sources that provide an early example of accountability required in a corporate charter and the manner in which the stockholders carried out this responsibility.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document