scholarly journals Pengungkapan Kuantitatif dan Kualitatif Segmen Operasi Berdasarkan PSAK 5 Revisi 2009 (Penyesuaian 2015) di Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Dewi Diah Fakhriyyah ◽  
Irma Hidayati
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Information ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Customer Information ◽  
Compliance Level ◽  
Ifrs 8 ◽  
Segment Disclosure ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

Reporting of operating segments has become an important concern, therefore there is a PSAK 5 regulation which is continuously updated based on IFRS 8 to improve operating segment reporting. This study aims to examine the application of operating segment disclosure and its determinants in public companies in Indonesia.This research method is quantitative method. The operating segment in the financial statements of the LQ 45 Index’s Company in 2016 is analyzed by scoring to the items required by PSAK 5 Revised 2009 (Amandement 2015). The results showed that the majority cozmpany's compliance level of quantitative information is medium level of compliance,. Quantitative disclosure shows the most reported items are profit loss and total assets, meanwhile the least reported item is other non current assets and main customer information . Meanwhile, the most reported item of qualitative disclosure is the main products and services which generate revenues for the operating segments. This study shows that companies disclose more quantitative information than qualitative. In addition, the good corporate governance mechanism that determines the extent of disclosure of operating segments is institutional ownership and the board of directors. This research has implications for operating segment regulators to do better and contribute to the agency theory and signaling theory.

scholarly journals The controlling power of royal family members on the board of directors and audit committee effectiveness

Accounting ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 987-992
Author(s):  
Khaled Salmen Aljaaidi ◽  
Abdulaziz Alothman ◽  
Raj Bahadur Sharma ◽  
Omar Ali Bagais
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Royal Family ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Relationship Of

This paper examines the association of the presence of royal family members on the board of directors with audit committee effectiveness. The sample of this study consists of 444 listed manufactured firms in Saudi Arabia for the period 2012-2019. Using the Pooled OLS regression, the result of the study shows that royal family ownership is associated with audit committee effectiveness, giving support to the substitution hypothesis. The result indicates that members from the royal families are good monitors imposed into the companies' managements as both taking the role of decision makers and owners who may substitute the effectiveness of the audit committee. The presence of royal family members on the board has an alternative for the effectiveness of the audit committee. The marginal effect of audit committee effectiveness as an internal corporate governance mechanism is substituted by the presence of royal family members on the board. This study provides insightful evidence to regulators and policy makers at the company and country levels on the relationship of royal family ownership and audit committee effectiveness.

Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks

2021 ◽  
pp. 322-337
Author(s):  
Sami Ben Mim ◽  
Yosra Mbarki
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Transmission Channels ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

This study investigates the efficiency of the Shariah supervisory board as a corporate governance mechanism in Islamic banks. The authors mainly seek to examine the effect of the Shariah board's composition (size and academic background of its members) on the performance of Islamic banks. They also try to highlight the transmission channels explaining this effect, and compare the efficiency of the Shariah board with that of traditional corporate governance mechanisms, namely the board of directors. The empirical investigation is based on a sample of 72 Islamic banks from 19 countries. Estimation results suggest that the Shariah board positively affects the Islamic banks performance through the number of Islamic Shariah scholars. This effect is mainly due to the size and cost transmission channels. These results are robust to different performance measures. On the other hand, results show that the board of directors' size produces a positive effect on a bank's performance, offering evidence for complementarity between traditional and Islamic governance mechanisms.

scholarly journals The Effect of Good Corporate Governance Mechanism On The Financial Performance of Banking Companies Listed In Stock Exchange Indonesia 2012-2016

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-287
Author(s):  
Desi Pipian Pujakusum
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

This study aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance mechanism on the financial performance of banking companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange 2012-2016 period. The corporate governance mechanism is proxied by the size of the board of directors, the size of the board of commissioners, audit committee size, the board of director's education, and the board of commissioner’s education. The company's financial performance is proxied by return on assets (ROA). Samples were taken by using purposive sampling. The total number of samples used in this study amounted to 180 research samples. This study was tested with SPSS 20 program. Data analysis technique used in this research is simple regression analysis.  The results showed that the size of the board of directors, the size of the board of commissioners, and audit comitee size have a significant effect on return on assets. These three factors have a significant effect on return on assets, while the board of commissioners education and the board of director's education have no significant effect on return on assets.

scholarly journals Effect of Corporate Governance Mechanism on Company Value with Company Performance as Intervening Variable

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
NUR ADILA ◽  
Zaenal Arifin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Company Value ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

Corporate Governance is a system that regulates and controls a company which expected to give and increase Company Value to investors. With the existence of Corporate Governance, it is expected that Company Performance will give a good influence on the company. One of the cases is after Indonesia went through a prolonged crisis since 1998, the repairing process in the companies took a long time and it is caused by the weakness of Corporate Governance application in the companies, which will affect the companies’ performance and decrease the companies’ values. The purpose of this research is to analyze the effects of the Corporate Governance mechanism on Company Value with Company Performance as an intervening variable. The case study used in this research is the companies included in IDX BUMN 20 Tahun 2020 list. The result of this study is that Independent Commissioner doesn’t affect values and Company Performance, the board of directors affects Company Value positively, the board of directors doesn’t affect Company Performance. The Audit Committee doesn’t affect the Company Value. The Audit Committee affects the Company Performance positively. The Company Performance is not capable to mediate the independent commissioner’s effect on Company Value. The Company Performance can mediate the effect of the Board of Directors on the Company Value, the Company Performance can’t mediate the effect of Audit Committee on the Company Value.

Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings

2007 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Ferris ◽  
Tomas Jandik ◽  
Robert M. Lawless ◽  
Anil Makhija
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

AbstractLegal rights of investors are recognized as an essential component of corporate governance. We assess the efficacy of these rights by examining board changes surrounding the filings of shareholder derivative lawsuits. We find that the incidence of derivative lawsuits is higher for firms with a greater likelihood of agency conflicts. We also find that derivative lawsuits are associated with significant improvements in the boards of directors. In particular, the proportion of outside representation on the board of directors increases. There is also some evidence that other board characteristics change favorably. These findings suggest that shareholder derivative lawsuits are not frivolous as is often claimed, but rather that they can serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism.

scholarly journals Pengaruh Mekanisme Good Corporate Governance Dan Struktur Kepemilikan Terhadap Pengungkapan Sustainability Report

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-138
Author(s):  
Masiyah Kholmi ◽  
Muhammad Nizzam Zein Susadi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Sustainability Reports

This research has a purpose to analysis the effect of good corporate governance mechanism and ownership structures on the disclosure of sustainability reports. Purposive sampling method was applied sampling technique certain of criteria. The sample is 47 companies from a population of 627 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2018. Data collection techniques used the documentation method. This research uses data analysis tools with the Smart PLS 3 application to test hypotheses. The results showed that the variables of good corporate governance mechanisms that were proxied by the audit committee, the independent board of commissioners, and the board of directors had a significant effect on the disclosure of sustainability reports, ownership structure variables that were proxied with managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership also affected the disclosure of sustainability reports

scholarly journals The Impact of the Board of Directors Characteristics on the Risk of IPO Earnings Forecasts Errors

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Abdulaziz Mohammed Alsahlawi ◽  
Mohammed Abdullah Ammer
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This paper aimed to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanism on the risk of IPO earnings forecasts errors. It focuses on the relationship between the board of directors characteristics and the risk of earnings forecasts errors. Required data was gathered from 190 Malaysian IPO prospectuses for the year 2002 to 2012, after which data was analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Based on the obtained findings, the earnings forecasts of Malaysian IPO reflected a pessimistic picture with unsatisfactory percentage of accuracy. In particular, the findings of multiple regression analysis of the relationships between the size, independence and CEO duality of the board of directors, and the risk of earnings forecasts errors were negative and insignificant. The study findings have several implications for relevant individuals, including regulators, investors, financial analysts and financial statements users.

scholarly journals Directors' Monitoring Role, Ownership Concentration and Audit fees

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 3-25
Author(s):  
Rabih Nehme ◽  
Amir Michael ◽  
Jim Haslam
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Corporate Executives ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

The research objective is to analyse different factors potentially involved in influencing the size of audit fees. The association between the Board of Directors and the shareholders of listed companies should be effectively developed and there should be a higher spirit of compliance with the governance code. The empirical model is constructed to assess the theoretical and statistical relationship between audit fees and corporate governance characteristics over a period of four years (for FTSE 350 companies excluding financial institutions between 2012 and 2015). Different testing techniques are used for robustness reasons. We found that Board of Directors' characteristics are significant in relation to audit fees. Some of the Audit Committee characteristics are affected by the collegiality principle in relation to the Board of Directors' characteristics. The consultative role of audit committee directors is dominated by the role of the Board of Directors. Mandatory audit fees, and not total auditors' remuneration is included in this study. While other studies assess mainly one corporate governance mechanism in relation to audit fees, we include the corporate governance mechanisms that are directly related to auditors' scope. This paper can be used as a tool for audit practitioners and corporate executives to seek a better auditor-client relationship.

scholarly journals The effects of board characteristics on earnings management

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 96-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lanfeng Kao ◽  
Anlin Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Group Affiliation ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
The Relationship

This paper examines the relationship between board characteristics and earnings management. Management of a firm may engage in earnings management for his own benefit. However, under proper corporate governance mechanism, the board of directors might be able to monitor the firm and prevent the management from engaging in earnings management. We find that when the board size is large, the higher the extent of earnings management. However, when there are more outside directors in the board, the extent of earnings management is lower. The effects of board characteristics on earnings management are significant only for group affiliation firms or non-electronic firms.

Triggering changes in corporate governance: before and after external whistleblowing

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Smaili ◽  
Paulina Arroyo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Financial Statement Fraud ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Crimes ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a change of corporate governance occurs after financial crimes in Canada revealed through external whistleblowing. Design/methodology/approach Based on the methodology of Smaili and Arroyo (2019), the authors implement a qualitative research framework to examine 11 alleged Canadian corporate financial statement fraud cases publicly exposed during the 1995–2012 period. Findings The analysis suggests that firms had a weak traditional corporate governance mechanism before the external whistleblowing occurred. In almost every case, the chief executive officer (CEO) was also the chair of the board of directors. Although the reports by Dey and Saucier recommend that independent directors make up at least 75% of Canadian boards, we note that the percentage of independent directors was under 70% in six cases. Moreover, only two firms had a whistleblowing policy in place, and seven firms had a major shareholder. Regarding the consequences for corporate governance after whistleblowing, the analysis shows that the companies that survived the whistleblowing had enhanced their internal corporate governance by the third year after the whistleblowing. In fact, at all the surviving companies, the CEO was no longer the chair, and the percentage of independent directors had increased to 80%. However, for those survival companies that did not have a whistleblowing policy before the event, the situation did not change quickly, and they only implemented a policy after the enforcement of the new regulation in the year 2003. Originality/value This paper adds new insights to the research on financial crime by investigating the relation between corporate governance and whistleblowing.

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