The Ayatollah in the Cathedral
"The Ayatollah in the Cathedral," to borrow the term coined by ThomasKuhn, is a book that opens the gateway to paradigmatic tranformations in thetheory of international relations and the art of effectively handling foreignaffairs. Dr. Kennedy was one of the 50 hostages who went through the 444days' ordeal in Iran. He gives a detailed account of the events witnessed andexperienced by him as a hostage.The traumatic psychological impact of being a hostage in a revolution isnot easy for others fully to understand as outsiders; still the reader is able tosee that there were many occasions when Dr. Kennedy, as a hostage, thoughtthat his death was imminent.A mediocre author would easily have made his story of captivity a "bestseller' by capitalizing on hatred and by saying what the domestic opinionmakers in the United States want to hear. Instead, Dr. Kennedy defies thiscommon heritage of American scholarship on the Middle East. In this book,he emerges as a serious thinker with an outstanding ability to analyze the factswith scientific objectivity. What makes this book a remarkable multidisciplinarymasterpiece is Mr. Kennedy's professionally skillful and scientificanalysis of the process and factors that shape U. S. foreign policy at theState Department; the weaknesses of U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East;the causes of the U. S. failure to understand the Third World in general and theMuslim world in particular; and an alternative to U. S. foreign policy makingthat would ensure mutual respect and trust not only in the Middle East but inthe Third World in general, thereby restoring the effectiveness of the UnitedStates as a world leader.This book is unique and pivotal in the area of international relationsbecause Dr. Kennedy attempts to provide an alternative approach for U. S.foreign policy. This approach would enable policymakers to protect U. S. interestswhile at the same time winning mutual trust in the Muslim world; goalswhich, under present policy, seem to be mutually exclusive.The basic flaw in American foreign policy making, as pointed out by Dr.Kennedy, is that "our analyses of over-seas problems are too often based onabstraction - what the problem should be rather than what really is. We indulgeourselves in the luxury of seeing what we want to see and denying whatwe do not want to see." (p. 196). Elaborating on the dangers of this approachto foreign policy, he says: "The problem is not professional but cultural. And ...