scholarly journals David DeGrazia on Animal Rights: A Critical Analysis

Author(s):  
Michał Pełka

The article aims to critically discuss the theory of animal rights developed by American social philosopher David DeGrazia. It consists of two parts. The first one describes the main elements of DeGrazia’s approach, namely his views on animal minds, the principle of equal consideration, the idea of unequal moral status, the concept of border persons, and practical remarks concerning improving the treatment of animals by humans. The second part presents remarks about the points where DeGrazia’s proposals should be supplemented and corrected so as to make them more convincing and widely accepted. The conclusion of the essay is the proposal of a cultural revolution for the benefit of animals, which should be initiated by famous people, like actresses, actors, sportswomen and sportsmen, because of their influential position in contemporary societies.

Author(s):  
Michał Pełka

The article aims to critically discuss the theory of animal rights developed by American social philosopher David DeGrazia. It consists of two parts. The first one describes the main elements of DeGrazia’s approach, namely his views on animal minds, the principle of equal consideration, the idea of unequal moral status, the concept of border persons, and practical remarks concerning improving the treatment of animals by humans. The second part presents remarks about the points where DeGrazia’s proposals should be supplemented and corrected so as to make them more convincing and widely accepted. The conclusion of the essay is the proposal of a cultural revolution for the benefit of animals, which should be initiated by famous people, like actresses, actors, sportswomen and sportsmen, because of their influential position in contemporary societies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (Issue 4) ◽  
pp. 119-124
Author(s):  
Innocent Sanga

Animal right is one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary world. A number of scholars have been discussing on whether the animals have rights like human beings or not. Through this debate, their opinions can be put into three groups; those who deny animal moral status, those who give some moral considerations to animals but deny them a fuller moral status, and those who extend rights to animals. This paper then gives a general overview on ‘Do Animals have Rights?’ It gives the meaning of the term “right” and explains whether the term right applies to animals too. It also portrays a drama whereby animals complain against sufferings imposed on them by human beings and a response given by a human being. It is also followed by philosophical debate on animal rights: pro and cons arguments. The Christian perspective is not left out. Finally, the paper ends with critical evaluations and conclusion. In evaluation of the debate on animal rights, the study found that, animals deserve to be treated well based on the argument that they have rights as animals. The main recommendation is that human beings should change their perception concerning animals by respecting animal.


Author(s):  
Jan-Harm De Villiers

This article undertakes a critical analysis of subjectivity and exposes the metaphysical and anthropocentric quasi-transcendental conditions that give rise to the construct(ion) of the Subject. I locate a critical moment for the metaphysical Subject in the work of Martin Heidegger which, whilst sadly not sustained in his later writings, provides a point of departure for an examination of the significance that animality plays in the metaphysical tradition and its constitutive relation to the construct of subjectivity. I discern this relation to be violent and sacrificial and draw on Jacques Derrida's nonanthropocentric ethics against the background of Drucilla Cornell's ethical reading of deconstruction to construct a critique of approaches that assimilate animals to the traditional model of subjectivity in order to represent their identity and interests in the legal paradigm. The main argument that I seek to advance is that such an approach paradoxically re-constructs the classical humanist subject of metaphysics and re-establishes the subject-centred system that silences the call of the animal Other, thereby solidifying and extending the legitimacy of a discourse and mode of social regulation that is fundamentally anthropocentric. I examine how we can address, incapacitate and move beyond this schemata of power through a rigorous deconstruction of the partitions that institute the Subject and how deconstruction clears a space for a de novo determination of the animal "subject" that can proceed from different sites of nonanthropocentric interruption. What follows is a call to refuse the mechanical utilisation of traditional legal constructs and I argue in favour of an approach to the question of the animal (in law) that identifies and challenges anthropocentrism as its critical target. I ultimately propose a critical engagement with the underlying metaphysical support of animal rights at a conceptual level, rather than simply utilising the law pragmatically as an instrument of immediate resolution.    


Author(s):  
Sue Donaldson ◽  
Will Kymlicka

Western political theorists have largely ignored the animal question, assuming that animals have no place in our theories of democracy, citizenship, membership, sovereignty, and the public good. Conversely, animal ethicists have largely ignored political theory, assuming that we can theorize the moral status and moral rights of animals without drawing on the categories and concepts of political theory. This chapter traces the history of this separation between animals and political theory, examines the resulting intellectual blind spots for animal ethics, and reviews recent attempts to bring the two together. Situating animal rights within political theory has the potential to identify new models of justice in human-animal relations, and to open up new areas of scholarship and research.


2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
TOM BULLER

Abstract:As Colin Allen has argued, discussions between science and ethics about the mentality and moral status of nonhuman animals often stall on account of the fact that the properties that ethics presents as evidence of animal mentality and moral status, namely consciousness and sentience, are not observable “scientifically respectable” properties. In order to further discussion between science and ethics, it seems, therefore, that we need to identify properties that would satisfy both domains.In this article I examine the mentality and moral status of nonhuman animals from the perspective of neuroethics. By adopting this perspective, we can see how advances in neuroimaging regarding (1) research into the neurobiology of pain, (2) “brain reading,” and (3) the minimally conscious state may enable us to identify properties that help bridge the gap between science and ethics, and hence help further the debate about the mentality and moral status of nonhuman animals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 231-249
Author(s):  
Rachell Powell ◽  
Irina Mikhalevich ◽  
Allen Buchanan

Moral reasoning is modulated by emotions and other cognitive biases. How do these covert biasing mechanisms shape perceptions of more fundamental moral categories, such as moral standing and moral status (together, “MSS”), out of which specific moral attitudes and behaviors flow? This chapter explains the centrality of MSS to human evolution, and examines several evolved biases that distort MSS ascription. These include tendencies to deny moral standing, or to attribute lower moral status, to beings that elicit feelings of disgust or fear, as well as to those that are perceived as less similar, less attractive, less individualized, and less disposed toward reciprocal cooperation. These adaptive mechanisms may have served human groups well in the evolutionary past, but in the modern world they pose an obstacle to moral progress and play a key role in moral regression. The chapter argues that these biases have also influenced philosophical and scientific research on animal minds. The aim is to develop a richer, biocultural understanding of how conceptions of the moral community evolve.


1983 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 87-88
Author(s):  
Gary E. Jones ◽  
Clifton Perry ◽  

Think ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (47) ◽  
pp. 33-43
Author(s):  
Ronald A. Lindsay

Many philosophers maintain that a being's moral status depends on its capacities, for example, whether the being is rational or sentient. In the notorious ‘argument from marginal cases’, animal rights advocates make use of this received view by arguing that because infants and the severely cognitively disabled have no more capacities than many animals, animals have status equivalent to humans and are entitled to equal moral consideration. But although capacities may be relevant to moral status, they do not determine it. Ultimately, we need to consider the objectives of morality in determining what obligations we have towards any group of beings, whether they are aliens, humans, or animals.


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