scholarly journals Animal Rights: A Philosophical Evaluation

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (Issue 4) ◽  
pp. 119-124
Author(s):  
Innocent Sanga

Animal right is one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary world. A number of scholars have been discussing on whether the animals have rights like human beings or not. Through this debate, their opinions can be put into three groups; those who deny animal moral status, those who give some moral considerations to animals but deny them a fuller moral status, and those who extend rights to animals. This paper then gives a general overview on ‘Do Animals have Rights?’ It gives the meaning of the term “right” and explains whether the term right applies to animals too. It also portrays a drama whereby animals complain against sufferings imposed on them by human beings and a response given by a human being. It is also followed by philosophical debate on animal rights: pro and cons arguments. The Christian perspective is not left out. Finally, the paper ends with critical evaluations and conclusion. In evaluation of the debate on animal rights, the study found that, animals deserve to be treated well based on the argument that they have rights as animals. The main recommendation is that human beings should change their perception concerning animals by respecting animal.

Etyka ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 177-197
Author(s):  
Bernard Rollin

A much neglected question in the foundations of ethics concerns the moral status of non-human beings. Our intuitions are equivocal, and various theories have been advanced to distinguish between men and animals with regard to inclusion in the scope of moral concern. Various ground for drawing the distinction such as evolutionary supremacy, can be rejected as morally irrelevant. The key distinction historically employed for effecting a demarcation is rationality, which has been linked with the possession of language. The most systematic attempt to link language, rationality, and moral status is that of Kant, who can be seen as attempting to prove that only rational, linguistic, beings – and thus only human beings – fall within the scope of moral concern. This intricate argument can be criticized in a variety of ways. lf correct, it would exclude children, the retarded, the insane, the comatose, etc. from moral concern. More important, is follows from Kant’s argument that rationality is the only morally relevant feature of a rational being, in which case it is difficult to see why features of a human being which are or may be irrelevant to rationality – fur example pleasure or pain – are worthy of moral attention. Clearly morality encompasses more than rationality; in fact, rationa1ity is morally relevant only because it is an interest for a rational being. It is the presence of interest, and needs, wants, desires, etc., which are subject to fulfilment, nurture, and impediment which makes a being an object of moral attention. Language is relevant as a vehicle for conveying needs and interests, but natural signs serve just as well. Thus if men are objects of moral concern, animals are also, since no morally relevant distinction can be drawn between men and animals, and because animals display the same morally relevant features that humans do.


Author(s):  
John Tasioulas

This chapter investigates whether or not human rights are grounded in human dignity. Starting from an interest-based account of human rights, it rejects two objections to that account that have been pressed in the name of human dignity: the deontological and the personhood objections. More positively, it contends that human dignity is the equal moral status possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their possession of a human nature, and that so understood, it has an essential role to play in grounding human rights, but that it can only play this role in tandem with universal human interests. In particular, human dignity is central to explaining both why humans can possess rights and why these rights are resistant to trade-offs. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the implications of this view for whether each and every human being possesses all of the standard human rights.


1970 ◽  
pp. 351-364
Author(s):  
Dorota Probucka

The article concerns a new educational theory based on the idea of animal rights. It was presented and developed by the American ethicist Tom Regan, which drifted its axiological base and was the initiator of socio-educational movement called Animal Rights Movement, to which joined other ethicists, educators, layers, veterinarians, and even theologians. The article contains analysis of Tom Regan's views on the issue of moral status of non-human beings, and consists of two parts. The first part concerns the criticism of ethical theories based on the idea of direct and indirect moral duties to animals. In the second part are discussed the main concepts and principles of a new way of thinking such as: inherent value, a subject of a life criterion, the respect principle and its derivatives.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Ebert

Do you remember Harambe, the 17-year-old silverback who was shot dead after a boy fell into the gorilla enclosure at the Cincinnati Zoo, Cecil, the lion who was shot with an arrow by an American dentist in Zimbabwe, and Marius, the giraffe who was killed and fed to other animals at the Copenhagen Zoo?Every once in a while, a news story about the human-caused death of an animal sparks global outrage, briefly lights up the comments sections on the internet, and reminds us of the inconsistency in how think about non-human animals. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, we kill approximately two thousand animals for food per second, not including fish and other marine animals. All of these animals have rich emotional lives that matter to them, and what we do to them is as bad, and often much worse, than what was done to Harambe, Cecil, and Marius. Most farm animals are raised in filthy and unnatural conditions, and are subject to routine mutilations and other mistreatment. They are transported in ways that are at best unpleasant and at worst horrific, and they die violent deaths. Yet, most of us – while expressing our moral indignation about the treatment of Harambe, Cecil, and Marius – rarely spare a thought for the animals we eat.Morally speaking, there does not seem to be much of a difference between what happened in Cincinnati, Zimbabwe, and Denmark and what happens in factory farms and slaughterhouses in every part of the world, every day. If anything, there was a better reason to kill Harambe – namely, to avert danger from a child – than there is to kill animals for food. We do not need to consume animal products to live a healthy and fulfilled life. In fact, careful studies have found that a well-balanced plant-based diet decreases the chances of suffering from diseases such as diabetes, heart disease, stroke, and some cancers, and benefits the environment.The way we think about and treat non-human animals is deeply confused, and scholars are in a unique position to provide some clarity. The Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics hence decided to dedicate two special issues to the relationship between human beings and other animals, and asked me to be the guest editor. This is the second of the two special issues, and contains the following five articles:The number of fish killed annually by the fishing industry, even on the most conservative estimate, is more than ten times larger than the number of terrestrial animals killed annually for food, and yet animal advocates largely focus on the latter in their efforts to reduce animal suffering. Bob Fischer (“Wild Fish and Expected Utility”) does the math and argues that considerations of expected utility call that focus into question. He concludes that animal advocacy organizations owe an explanation of why they are not directing more of their resources to fish.Akande Michael Aina and Ofuasia Emmanuel (“The Chicken Fallacy and the Ethics of Cruelty to Non-Human Animals”) challenge the common view that non-human animals are mere resources that we can use as we please, and ask whether Peter Singer’s ethics of animal liberation is a plausible alternative. They think it is not, in part because it denies moral status to non-sentient life, and take another approach that draws from Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. They argue that cruelty to non-human animals, with whom they claim we are on an equal moral footing, betrays our trusting and neighborly relationship with them.Iván Ortega Rodríguez (“Animal Citizenship, Phenomenology, and Ontology: Some reflections on Donaldson’s & Kymlicka’s Zoopolis”) provides a brief summary of the position Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka defend in their ground-breaking book Zoopolis, and argues that they are mistaken in failing to consider an important metaphysical difference between human beings and other animals. While human and non-human animals share a common environment, only human interaction constitutes what he calls a “world.” That difference, however, does not undermine the case for animal rights but rather strengthens it.Rhyddhi Chakraborty (“Animal Ethics and India: Understanding the Connection through the Capabilities Approach”) takes a critical look at a wide range of legal provisions in Indian law designed to protect non-human animals. She argues that, despite such provisions, nonhuman animals continue to suffer greatly at the hands of human beings in India, which is partly due to the lack of a comprehensive ethical vision. She suggests that the capabilities approach can provide such a vision, and concludes by making a number of policy recommendations to improve animal welfare in India.Robin Attfield and Rebekah Humphreys (“Justice and Non-Human Animals”) complete their argument for the claim that our treatment of non-human animals is a matter of justice, the first part of which can be found in the previous issue of this journal.I thank the contributors for choosing this journal to share their exciting ideas, and the reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions. I am also indebted to Professor Shamima Parvin Lasker and Ms. Tahera Ahmed for their cooperation and trust.If you, dear reader, are new to the academic debate over the moral status of non-human animals, and if the two Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics special issues on animal ethics have made you curious, as I hope they did, I would like to recommend to you two classics of the animal ethics literature: Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review/Random House, 1975); and Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).I hope you will enjoy reading through this issue, and I am sending you my warm regards.Rainer Ebert Guest Editor, Bangladesh Journal of BioethicsDepartment of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, South AfricaEmail: [email protected] Webpage: http://www.rainerebert.com


1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-705
Author(s):  
Phillip Montague

A little-discussed aspect of the “conservative” position on abortion involves the claim that human beings exist at all stages of gestation — that even the human fertilized ovum (zygote) is a human being. There are good reasons of both a practical and theoretical nature why this particular idea has received so little attention in the abortion controversy. On the practical side there is the fact that zygotes are rarely if ever the subjects of abortion decisions; and on the theoretical side, there is the prima facie implausibility of the idea itself — an implausibility stemming from the fact that human zygotes possess none of the features that distinguish clear-cut examples of human beings from other living things.I would like to suggest, however, that there are good reasons — again both practical and theoretical — for examining with some care the idea that human zygotes are human beings. For even if this idea is not central to the abortion controversy, it has clear relevance to the morality of using intrauterine devices (I.U.D.'s) as a means of procreation control.


2021 ◽  
pp. 173-176
Author(s):  
Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo

AbstractRobots are instruments of the human being who is intelligent and free. Aristotle defines being free as the one that is cause of himself or exists on his own and for himself (causa sui or causa sui ipsius). By contrast, the instrument is not a cause of itself and does not work by the power of its entity, but only by the motion imparted by the principal agent, so that the effect is not likened to the instrument but to the principal agent. From the Christian perspective, for a being to be free and a cause of himself, it is necessary that he/she be a person endowed with a spiritual and incorruptible soul, on which his or her cognitive and free activity is based. An artificially intelligent robotic entity does not meet this standard. As an artefact and not a natural reality, the AI/robotic entity is invented by human beings to fulfil a purpose imposed by human beings. It can become a perfect entity that performs operations in quantity and quality more precisely than a human being, but it cannot choose for itself a different purpose from what it was programmed for by a human being. As such, the artificially intelligent robot is a means at the service of humans.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora S. Eggen

In the Qur'an we find different concepts of trust situated within different ethical discourses. A rather unambiguous ethico-religious discourse of the trust relationship between the believer and God can be seen embodied in conceptions of tawakkul. God is the absolute wakīl, the guardian, trustee or protector. Consequently He is the only holder of an all-encompassing trusteeship, and the normative claim upon the human being is to trust God unconditionally. There are however other, more polyvalent, conceptions of trust. The main discussion in this article evolves around the conceptions of trust as expressed in the polysemic notion of amāna, involving both trust relationships between God and man and inter-human trust relationships. This concept of trust involves both trusting and being trusted, although the strongest and most explicit normative claim put forward is on being trustworthy in terms of social ethics as well as in ethico-religious discourse. However, ‘trusting’ when it comes to fellow human beings is, as we shall see, framed in the Qur'an in less absolute terms, and conditioned by circumstantial factors; the Qur'anic antithesis to social trust is primarily betrayal, ‘khiyāna’, rather than mistrust.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 182-188
Author(s):  
Eva Nurhaeny

This essay discusses based on Qur’anic value and character education. In gobalization era, it has great impact on young behaviour change such as fighting, free sex, drug and other delinquencies. The occurred result is serious enough and it cannot be assumed just as a simple matter again, mainly that the subjects and the victim are young people whose have professions as students. The fact indicates that education world has to give an important role toward preventing national moral decadency in the effort of preparing the better future young generation. In this regard, we are aware that the education goal, basically, is to build better morality of human being or in another term is to “humanize the human being”. An idea regarding the significance of character education was appeared as a given solution in answering the morality problem in Indonesian education world. Character education is part of value education. That why, looking for the character education concept has been very urgent in the effort of preparing excellent, faithful, professional and personalized leaner as being asked by the education goal. The essence of characterized behavior actually is the psychological totality form which includes the whole human individual potency of cognitive, affective and psycho-motoric aspects, and also socio-cultural totality function in the context of interaction with God, him or herself, other human beings and the environment in his or her long life. Furthermore, in Qur’an’s teaching, the figure of the Messenger Peace be upon him (PBUH) is viewed as “the model human being”. In this context, the concept of Qur’anic charactereducation can be found through three moral dimensions that should be actualized in human being personality. They are the morality toward Allah (spiritual quotient/ intelligence), the morality toward our self (emotional quotient) and the morality toward Allah’s creatures, human being and environment (social quotient). Then, school should make the Holy Qur’an as the foundation of character education’s implementation whereas the implementation form in the school can be developed through intra-curricular, extra-curricular or personality and school culture development.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (5) ◽  
pp. 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gitali Choudhury

Education is the backbone of a civilized society. Values have an important role in education system of any society. Most important thing is that, education should be based on some core values of human being like truthfulness, honesty, justice, good behavior etc. Only this can help a society to maintain a peaceful atmosphere. As all human beings are social animals, so this is the duty of every human being to obey their social responsibility. Mahamana Malaviyaji is one of those great personalities who felt his social responsibility very well and established Banaras Hindu University to bring people out from the mode of ignorance. He values our Indian culture and tradition, which is based on Bhagavat Gita and Srimad Bhagavatam. His genuine effort was to build the character of new generations, so that they can be a good citizen of the country and thus can serve the country. This paper intends to focus on Mahamana’s practical thoughts and applications to contribute to the value-based education system.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Luis Sepúlveda Ferriz

Freedom and Justice have always been challenged. Since the most remote times, and in the most varied circumstances of places and people, human beings have tried to clarify and put into practice these two controversial concepts. Freedom and Justice, in effect, are words, but also dreams, desires and practices that, not being imperfect, are less sublime and ambitious. Reflecting on them on the basis of an ethics of development and socioenvironmental sustainability is still a great challenge in our contemporaneity. This book is born from the need that we all have to reflect, understand what our role is in relation to the OTHER, understood as the other as Environment. Doing this from such disparate areas and at the same time as current as Economics, Philosophy and Ecology, is still a great opportunity to discuss complexity, transdisciplinarity and the inclusion of diverse themes, but which all converge in the Human Being and its relationship with the world. Endowing human beings with Freedom and a sense of Justice means RESPONSIBILITY. To be free and to want a better and fairer world is to endow our existence with meaning and meaning. Agency, autonomy, functioning, dignity, rights, are capacities that must be leveraged individually and collectively for authentic development to exist. Development as Freedom is a valid proposal for thinking about a socio-environmental rationality that interferes in the controversial relations between economics, ethics and the environment.


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