scholarly journals Exploring the space of cognitive architectures

1983 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pat Langley
Author(s):  
Paul F. M. J. Verschure

This chapter introduces the “Capabilities” section of the Handbook of Living Machines. Where the previous section considered building blocks, we recognize that components or modules do not automatically make systems. Hence, in the remainder of this handbook, the emphasis is toward the capabilities of living systems and their emulation in artifacts. Capabilities often arise from the integration of multiple components and thus sensitize us to the need to develop a system-level perspective on living machines. Here we summarize and consider the 14 contributions in this section which cover perception, action, cognition, communication, and emotion, and the integration of these through cognitive architectures into systems that can emulate the full gamut of integrated behaviors seen in animals including, potentially, our own capacity for consciousness.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-72
Author(s):  
Lauren Olin

Abstract Despite sustained philosophical attention, no theory of humor claims general acceptance. Drawing on the resources provided by intentional systems theory, this article first outlines an approach to investigating humor based on the idea of a comic stance, then sketches the Dismissal Theory of Humor (DTH) that has resulted from pursuing that approach. According to the DTH, humor manifests in cases where the future-directed significance of anticipatory failures is dismissed. Mirth, on this view, is the reward people get for declining to update predictive representational schemata in ways that maximize their futureoriented value. The theory aims to provide a plausible account of the role of humor in human mental and social life, but it also aims to be empirically vulnerable, and to generate testable predictions about how the comic stance may actually be undergirded by cognitive architectures.


2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 622-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prasad Tadepalli

Cognitive architectures, like programming languages, make commitments only at the implementation level and have limited explanatory power. Their universality implies that it is hard, if not impossible, to justify them in detail from finite quantities of data. It is more fruitful to focus on particular tasks such as language understanding and propose testable theories at the computational and algorithmic levels.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darryl N. Davis

1995 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 447-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Johnston ◽  
Hadyn D. Ellis

Two experiments exploring the differential processing of distinctive and typical faces by adults and children are reported. Experiment 1 employed a recognition memory task. On three out of four dimensions of measurement, children of 5 years of age did not show an advantage for distinctive faces, whereas older children and adults did. In Experiment 2, however, subjects of all ages classified typical faces faster than distinctive ones in a face/non-face decision task: the 5-year-olds performed exactly as did adults and older children. The different patterns in performance between these two tasks are discussed in relation to possible cognitive architectures for the way young children represent faces in memory. Specifically, we examine two alternative architectures proposed by Ellis (1992) as precursors for Valentine's (1991a) multidimensional adult face-space and discuss whether implementations of these spaces should be based on a norm-based or an exemplar-based framework.


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