scholarly journals What facilitates Bayesian reasoning? A crucial test of ecological rationality versus nested sets hypotheses

Author(s):  
Gary Brase
2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aron K. Barbey ◽  
Steven A. Sloman

AbstractThe phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of judgment, which attributes base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in terms of nested sets of individuals.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 264-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerd Gigerenzer ◽  
Ulrich Hoffrage

AbstractThe terms nested sets, partitive frequencies, inside-outside view, and dual processes add little but confusion to our original analysis (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; 1999). The idea of nested set was introduced because of an oversight; it simply rephrases two of our equations. Representation in terms of chances, in contrast, is a novel contribution yet consistent with our computational analysis – it uses exactly the same numbers as natural frequencies. We show that non-Bayesian reasoning in children, laypeople, and physicians follows multiple rules rather than a general-purpose associative process in a vaguely specified “System 1.” It is unclear what the theory in “dual process theory” is: Unless the two processes are defined, this distinction can account post hoc for almost everything. In contrast, an ecological view of cognition helps to explain how insight is elicited from the outside (the external representation of information) and, more generally, how cognitive strategies match with environmental structures.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Cohen ◽  
Adrian Staub ◽  
Jade Hedrick

Author(s):  
Peter M. Todd ◽  
Gerd Gigerenzer

The study of situations involves asking how people behave in particular environmental settings, often in terms of their individual personality differences. The ecological rationality research program explains people’s behavior in terms of the specific decision-making tools they select and use from their mind’s adaptive toolbox when faced with specific types of environment structure. These two approaches can be integrated to provide a more precise mapping from features of situation structure to decision heuristics used and behavioral outcomes. This chapter presents three examples illustrating research on ecological rationality and its foundations, along with initial directions for incorporating it into an integrated situation theory.


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