Understanding Bayesianism: Fundamentals for Process Tracers

Bayesian analysis has emerged as a rapidly expanding frontier in qualitative methods. Recent work in this journal has voiced various doubts regarding how to implement Bayesian process tracing and the costs versus benefits of this approach. In this response, we articulate a very different understanding of the state of the method and a much more positive view of what Bayesian reasoning can do to strengthen qualitative social science. Drawing on forthcoming research as well as our earlier work, we focus on clarifying issues involving mutual exclusivity of hypotheses, evidentiary import, adjudicating among more than two hypotheses, and the logic of iterative research, with the goal of elucidating how Bayesian analysis operates and pushing the field forward.

Bayesian Reasoning with Trained Neural Networks

We showed how to use trained neural networks to perform Bayesian reasoning in order to solve tasks outside their initial scope. Deep generative models provide prior knowledge, and classification/regression networks impose constraints. The tasks at hand were formulated as Bayesian inference problems, which we approximately solved through variational or sampling techniques. The approach built on top of already trained networks, and the addressable questions grew super-exponentially with the number of available networks. In its simplest form, the approach yielded conditional generative models. However, multiple simultaneous constraints constitute elaborate questions. We compared the approach to specifically trained generators, showed how to solve riddles, and demonstrated its compatibility with state-of-the-art architectures.

Tversky and Kahneman’s Cognitive Illusions: Who Can Solve Them, and Why?

In the present paper we empirically investigate the psychometric properties of some of the most famous statistical and logical cognitive illusions from the “heuristics and biases” research program by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who nearly 50 years ago introduced fascinating brain teasers such as the famous Linda problem, the Wason card selection task, and so-called Bayesian reasoning problems (e.g., the mammography task). In the meantime, a great number of articles has been published that empirically examine single cognitive illusions, theoretically explaining people’s faulty thinking, or proposing and experimentally implementing measures to foster insight and to make these problems accessible to the human mind. Yet these problems have thus far usually been empirically analyzed on an individual-item level only (e.g., by experimentally comparing participants’ performance on various versions of one of these problems). In this paper, by contrast, we examine these illusions as a group and look at the ability to solve them as a psychological construct. Based on an sample of N = 2,643 Luxembourgian school students of age 16–18 we investigate the internal psychometric structure of these illusions (i.e., Are they substantially correlated? Do they form a reflexive or a formative construct?), their connection to related constructs (e.g., Are they distinguishable from intelligence or mathematical competence in a confirmatory factor analysis?), and the question of which of a person’s abilities can predict the correct solution of these brain teasers (by means of a regression analysis).