scholarly journals Contested science: Individuals with higher metacognitive insight into interpretation of evidence are less likely to polarize

Author(s):  
Nadia Said ◽  
Helen Fischer ◽  
Gerrit Anders

AbstractSocietal polarization over contested science has increased in recent years. To explain this development, political, sociological, and psychological research has identified societal macro-phenomena as well as cognitive micro-level factors that explain how citizens reason about the science. Here we take a radically different perspective, and highlight the effects of metacognition: How citizens reason about their own reasoning. Leveraging methods from Signal Detection Theory, we investigated the importance of metacognitive insight for polarization for the heavily contested topic of climate change, and the less heavily contested topic of nanotechnology. We found that, for climate change (but not for nanotechnology), higher insight into the accuracy of own interpretations of the available scientific evidence related to a lower likelihood of polarization over the science. This finding held irrespective of the direction of the scientific evidence (endorsing or rejecting anthropogenicity of climate change). Furthermore, the polarizing effect of scientific evidence could be traced back to higher metacognitive insight fostering belief-updating in the direction of the evidence at the expense of own, prior beliefs. By demonstrating how metacognition links to polarization, the present research adds to our understanding of the drivers of societal polarization over science.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Said ◽  
Helen Fischer ◽  
Gerrit Anders

Societal polarization over contested science has increased in the recent years. To explain thisworrisome trend, political, sociological, and psychological research has identified societal macro-phenomena as well as cognitive micro-level factors that explain how citizens reason about thescience. Here we take a radically different perspective, and highlight the effects of metacognition:How citizens reason about their own reasoning. Leveraging methods from Signal DetectionTheory, we investigated the importance of individual-level metacognitive insight for group-levelpolarization for the heavily contested topic of climate change, and the less heavily contested topicof nanotechnology. We found that, for climate change (but not for nanotechnology), increasedinsight into the accuracy of own interpretations of the available scientific evidence related tolower group-level polarization over the science. This finding held irrespective of the direction ofthe scientific evidence (endorsing or rejecting anthropogenicity of climate change). Furthermore,the polarizing effect of scientific evidence could be traced back to higher metacognitive insightfostering belief-updating in the direction of the evidence at the expense of own, prior beliefs. Bydemonstrating how individual-level metacognition links to group-level polarization, the presentresearch adds to our understanding of the drivers of societal polarization over science.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manos Tsakiris ◽  
Neza Vehar ◽  
Stephen M Fleming ◽  
Sophie De Beukelaer ◽  
Max Rollwage

Updating one’s beliefs about the causes and effects of climate change is crucial for altering attitudes and behaviours. Importantly, metacognitive abilities - insight into the (in)correctness of one’s beliefs- play a key role in the formation of polarized beliefs. We investigated the role of domain-general and domain-specific metacognition in updating prior beliefs about climate change across the spectrum of climate change scepticism. We also considered the role of how climate science is communicated in the form of textual or visuo-textual presentations. We show that climate change scepticism is associated with differences in domain-general as well as domain-specific metacognitive abilities. Moreover, domain-general metacognitive sensitivity influenced belief updating in an asymmetric way : lower domain-general metacognition decreased the updating of prior beliefs, especially in the face of negative evidence. Our findings highlight the role of metacognitive failures in revising erroneous beliefs about climate change and point to their adverse social effects.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Kube ◽  
Julia Glombiewski

People update their beliefs selectively in response to good news and disregard bad news, referred to as the optimism bias. Yet, the precise cognitive mechanisms underlying this asymmetry in belief updating are largely unknown. In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis that cognitive immunisation against new information contributes to optimistic belief updating (e.g. through questioning the reliability of new information). In each study, participants received new information in relation to their prior beliefs, and we examined the influence of cognitive immunisation on belief updating by using a three-group modulation protocol: In one group, cognitive immunisation against new information was promoted; in another group, cognitive immunisation was inhibited; and a control group received no manipulation. This modulation protocol was applied to beliefs about the self, i.e. performance expectations (Experiment 1&2; N=99 and N=93), and beliefs about climate change (Experiment 3; N=227) as an example of factual beliefs. The results of Experiments 1&2 showed that the cognitive immunisation manipulation had no influence on the update of performance-related expectations. In Experiment 3, we did find significant group differences in belief updating, and this effect interacted with participants’ general attitudes towards climate change: people who were sceptical about man-made climate change lowered their estimates of the projected temperature rise particularly if they perceived scientific information on climate change as being fraught with uncertainty. These findings suggest that the importance of cognitive immunisation in belief updating may depend on the content of beliefs (i.e. self-related vs. factual) and participants’ attitudes to the subject in question.


1995 ◽  
Vol 40 (10) ◽  
pp. 972-972
Author(s):  
Jerome R. Busemeyer

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn C. Stafford ◽  
James L. Szalma ◽  
Peter A. Hancock ◽  
Mustapha Mouloua

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