scholarly journals Individual Concepts and Attitude Reports

1998 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 233
Author(s):  
Yael Sharvit
Keyword(s):  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
De Re ◽  
Individual Concept ◽  
Individual Concepts ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Complement Clauses ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The Individual

This paper argues that <it>de dicto</it> reports of the form 'x believes [that ....[<sub>DetP</sub> the [<sub>NP</sub>...]] . . . . . ]' are <it>de re</it> reports where the <it>res</it> is the individual concept which corresponds to '[<sub>DetP</sub> the [<sub>NP</sub> . . . ]'. This claim is based on the observation that definite descriptions project existence from complement clauses of attitude reports, even in those cases where the reporter and the bearer of the attitude do not have the same description "in mind."

scholarly journals Individual Concepts and Attitude Reports

2015 ◽  
pp. 233
Author(s):  
Yael Sharvit
Keyword(s):  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
De Re ◽  
Individual Concept ◽  
Individual Concepts ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Complement Clauses ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The Individual

This paper argues that <it>de dicto</it> reports of the form 'x believes [that ....[<sub>DetP</sub> the [<sub>NP</sub>...]] . . . . . ]' are <it>de re</it> reports where the <it>res</it> is the individual concept which corresponds to '[<sub>DetP</sub> the [<sub>NP</sub> . . . ]'. This claim is based on the observation that definite descriptions project existence from complement clauses of attitude reports, even in those cases where the reporter and the bearer of the attitude do not have the same description "in mind."

Reference, De Re Belief and Rigidity

1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 677-692
Author(s):  
D.A. Griffiths
Keyword(s):  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
De Re ◽  
Sentence Meaning ◽  
Propositional Structure ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
Philosophical Questions ◽  
Semantic Significance

Both the distinction between de re and de dicto beliefs, and the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions have seemed, to some philosophers, to be of somewhat dubious status. While admitting that there is, in each case, some sort of distinction to be drawn, they have been inclined to think that these distinctions are not relevant to the philosophical questions being asked about beliefs and descriptions. Philosophers have, for example, been concerned with the structure of beliefs, where this can be understood to mean the structure of believed propositions; and they have been concerned with the analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions. But, it is thought, these two distinctions have no bearing on propositional structure or on sentence meaning. They have, in short, no semantic significance.

Substance and first-order quantification over individual-concepts

1980 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bacon
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Free Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Individual Concept ◽  
The Past ◽  
Individual Concepts ◽  
The World ◽  
Ordinary Usage

An individual-concept, hereinafter “individuation”, is a function from possible worlds to individuals. Constant individuations I will call “subsistents” (the notion will presently be generalized). A “substance”, after Thomason [35], is a subsistent whose value exists for the world at hand. In the systems of quantified modal logic developed over the past twenty years, the tendency has been to restrict the range of quantifiers to substances (often represented technically by the simple individuals that would be the values of the constant individuations), while allowing constant terms (particularly descriptions) to express arbitrary individuations. One result is to invalidate unrestricted universal instantiation (and existential generalization), rather as in free logic. Such systems approximate some features of ordinary usage rather nicely, e.g. the behavior of quantifiers and definite descriptions in tensed discourse. Stalnaker and Thomason's Q3r [34], based on the latter's Q3 [35], [36], is exemplary of this approach.The suggestion has repeatedly been considered to quantify over individuations in general (Kanger [14], Kaplan [17], Hughes and Cresswell [12, p. 196], Thomason [35, p. 136], Pollock [30]).

De re/de dicto

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Gallois
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The Individual

‘De re’ and ‘de dicto’ have been used to label a host of different, albeit interrelated, distinctions. ‘De dicto’ means ‘of, or concerning, a dictum’, that is, something having representative content, such as a sentence, statement or proposition. ‘De re’ means ‘of, or concerning, a thing’. For example, a de dicto belief is a belief that a bearer of representative content is true, while a de re belief is a belief concerning some thing, that it has a particular characteristic. Consider the following example: - John believes his next-door neighbour is a Buddhist. This statement is ambiguous. Construed de dicto, it is true in the following circumstance. John has never had any contact with his next-door neighbour. Nevertheless, John believes that his next-door neighbour is bound to be a Buddhist. Construed in this de dicto fashion, the statement does not attribute to John a belief that is distinctively about a particular individual. In contrast, construed de re, it does attribute to John a belief that is about a particular individual. For example, construed de re, the statement is true in the following circumstance. John encounters his next-door neighbour, Fred, at a party without realizing that Fred is his next-door neighbour. On the basis of his conversation with Fred, John forms a belief about the individual who is in fact his next-door neighbour to the effect that he is a Buddhist.

scholarly journals Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Field
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
De Re ◽  
Moral Appraisal ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The Right

AbstractDe Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.

scholarly journals De Re MEDIJI : POLITIKA MEDIJA

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Misko Suvakovic
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto

Namera mi je da dijagramski postavim jednu moguću potencijalnu teoriju De-Re medija lociranu u savremenosti globalnih ekoloških, ekonomskih, ratnih i, svakako, klasnih kriza. Razmatrana je piosebna situacija transformacije slike sveta u događaj sveta, drugim rečima, načinjen je obrt od prikazivanja sveta do izvođenja sveta ili izvođenja u svetu. Postavljena je rasprava o sredstvima medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja, tj. o instrumentima i njihovim konstruktivnim funkcijama. Analiziran je kontekst medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja posredstvom modela dispozitiva/aparatusa. Reinterpretirana je iz agrarne nauke i ratne terminologije teorija rojeva te primenjna na novi pojam medijuma/medija. Preuzeta je i primenjena tradicionalna i moderna rasprava razlike De Dicto i De Re sudova. Postavljena je teorija De Re medija u odnosu na koncepte medijuma i medija, postmedijuma i postmedija, digitalnih i postdigitalnih medija.

scholarly journals Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism versus Millianism

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 465
Author(s):  
João Branquinho
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Cognitive Significance ◽  
De Re ◽  
General Conception ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Reference Theory ◽  
Careful Assessment

This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a neo-Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain senselike entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a neo-Fregean theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a Millian one by showing that De Re senses are theoretically superfluous and hence eliminable. The question how many accounts of singular reference and content are we confronted with here — Two different (and mutually antagonistic) theories? Or just two versions of what is in essence the same theory? — is surely of importance to anyone interested in the topic. And this question should be answered by means of a careful assessment of the soundness of each of the above claims. Before trying to adjudicate between the two accounts, one would naturally want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially disparate accounts. Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we would have a single general conception of singular reference to deal with, viz. Fregeanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim were sound we would be facing a single general conception of singular reference, viz. Millianism. My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim and its Millian counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different grounds. I have argued elsewhere that the Fregean Notational Variance Claim - considered in its application to the semantics of propositional-attitude reports involving proper names — is unsound. I intend tosupplement in this paper such a result by trying to show that the Millian Claim - taken in its application to the semantics of indexical expressions — should also be rated as incorrect. I focus on a certain set of arguments for the Millian Claim, arguments which I take as adequately representing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with respect to neo-Fregeanism about indexicals and which involve issues about the cognitive significance of sentences containing indexical terms.

Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
De Dicto

This chapter explores philosophical issues in metaphysics. It begins by distinguishing between de re and de dicto necessity. All necessity is uniformly de re; there is simply no such thing as de dicto necessity. Indeed, in the glory days of positivism, all necessity was understood as uniformly the same: a necessary truth was always an a priori truth, while contingent truths were always a posteriori. The chapter then assesses the concept of antirealism. Antirealism is always an error theory: there is some sort of mistake or distortion or sloppiness embedded in the usual discourse. The chapter also considers paradoxes, causation, conceptual analysis, scientific mysteries, the possible worlds theory of modality, the concept of a person, the nature of existence, and logic and propositions.

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