Gender Differences in Firm-specific Human Capital Investment Decisions and Tenure-Wage Profiles

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 3121-3137
Author(s):  
Chan-young Lim ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Waldman ◽  
Ori Zax

In a world characterized by asymmetric learning, promotions can serve as signals of worker ability, and this, in turn, can result in inefficient promotion decisions. If the labor market is competitive, the result will be practices that reduce this distortion. We explore how this logic affects human capital investment decisions. We show that, if commitment is possible, investments will be biased toward the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. We also consider what happens when commitment is not possible and show a number of results including that, if investment choices are not publicly observable, choices are frequently efficient. (JEL D82, J24, J31, M12, M51)


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Akresh ◽  
Emilie Bagby ◽  
Damien de Walque ◽  
Harounan Kazianga

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marvin L. Bouillon ◽  
B. Michael Doran ◽  
Peter F. Orazem

This paper demonstrates that two measures of firm investment in specific human capital are significantly and positively correlated with long-term rates of return on investment. The final sample of 260 firms is a subset of the 805 firms included in the June 1984 edition of Forbes survey of executive compensation. We utilize two proxies for firm return-net income and cash flow. The return measures are scaled by both book value of total assets and market value of common stock yielding four alternative specifications of the rate of return measure. The firm investment in specific human capital measures are generally found to be significant explanatory variables in the regressions that have returns scaled by book value of assets. These measures of investment are insignificant when market value of common stock outstanding is used to scale the return measures. We interpret these findings to imply that a public or regulatory policy needs to be established to require firms to include at least some basic rudimentary information regarding their human capital investment, such as turnover rates and training cots, in their annual reports.


1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith I. Stallmann ◽  
Thomas G. Johnson ◽  
Ari Mwachofi ◽  
Jan L. Flora

AbstractHuman capital theory suggests that job opportunities will create incentives for human capital investment. If job information does not flow freely, or if they prefer not to move, students will make investment decisions based upon local job markets. Communities with a high percentage of low-skill jobs which do not reward high school and higher education do not create incentives for students to finish high school or continue beyond high school. Data from Virginia support this hypothesis. Targeted job creation, and improved labor market information may create incentives for increased human capital investment in many rural communities.


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Akresh ◽  
Emilie Bagby ◽  
Damien de Walque ◽  
Harounan Kazianga

Author(s):  
Richard Akresh ◽  
Emilie Bagby ◽  
Damien de Walque ◽  
Harounan Kazianga

2015 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Papay ◽  
R. J. Murnane ◽  
J. B. Willett

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