The Incompatibility of Intra-EU Investment Treaty Arbitration With European Union Law – Assessing the Scope of the ECJ's Achmea Judgment

2021 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 475-504
Author(s):  
Julian Scheu ◽  
Petyo Nikolov

Abstract: In March 2018, the European Court of Justice rendered its Achmea judgment, by which the Court considered the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) clause contained in the Dutch-Slovakian investment treaty to be incompatible with EU law. Even though the judgment is considered to be a landmark decision, its potentially far-reaching consequences remain, due to a rather obscure legal reasoning, difficult to assess. The aim of the present contribution is to assess the scope of the Achmea judgment in order to shed light on its relevance for pending and future intra-EU investment arbitrations. In view of the ECJ's Opinion 1/17 rendered in April 2019 and in consideration of recent arbitral practice it is concluded that the scope of the Achmea judgment concerns the incompatibility of intra-EU investment treaty arbitration with EU law. This means on the one hand that the reasoning in Achmea is transferrable not only to ISDS clauses in other intra-EU BITs, but also to Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty. On the other hand, the analysis shows that contract-based investment arbitrations are not concerned by the ECJ's findings. Finally, and in view of its clarified scope of application, the relevant factors for analysing the consequences of the Achmea judgement are identified.

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-274
Author(s):  
Julian Scheu ◽  
Petyo Nikolov

Abstract By rendering its preliminary ruling in Achmea v Slovakia, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared intra-EU investment treaty arbitration to be incompatible with fundamental principles of the European legal order. This decision does not only illustrate the challenge of regime interaction in international economic law but is also of highest practical relevance. Diverse and critical reactions from arbitral practice and legal scholarship suggest that it will ultimately be up to the courts within and outside of the EU to clarify how the ECJ’s findings in Achmea relate to the legal fate of arbitral awards. Against this background, the aim of the present contribution is to shed light on the judgment’s legal consequences on the post-award phase. As a starting point, an analysis of the judgment finds that the ECJ’s reasoning in Achmea is applicable to investor–State dispute resolution (ISDS) clauses contained in all intra-EU investment treaties, including the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) when applied in an intra-EU context (Section 2). Based on these findings, we evaluate how the incompatibility of intra-EU investment treaty arbitration with the law of the European Union (EU law) affects setting aside proceedings (Section 3) and applications for recognition and enforcement of awards (Section 4) within and outside of the EU. We show that possible solutions may range from fully enforcing intra-EU investment awards to completely disregarding any legal effect. Evaluating the complex legal landscape applicable to both types of proceedings clearly illustrates that there is no simple ‘yes-or-no’ rule. Instead, factors such as the applicability of the ICSID Convention, the seat of the arbitral tribunal or the jurisdiction in which enforcement is sought are relevant but should not be considered in isolation. Instead, it is concluded that these factors must be considered as inter-related aspects of an analytical framework which may lead to a coherent understanding of the relationship between the European legal order and the settlement of intra-EU investment disputes (Section 5).


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


Author(s):  
Wojciech Sadowski

AbstractInvestment treaty law and EU law began to develop in the same era and share some important philosophical and axiological foundations. The pressure on the CEE countries to enter into numerous bilateral investment treaties in late 80s and early 90s, in the context of the EU accession aspirations of the former communist countries, was likely to result, eventually, in a conflict between EU law and investment treaty law. The conflict could have been managed in three different ways, yet the CJEU decided in Achmea to declare an undefined volume of intra-EU arbitrations to be incompatible with EU law. This important judgment, which delivered an outcome desired by the European Commission and a number of Member States, is based on questionable legal reasoning that creates high uncertainty in this area of law. The doubts include the scope of application of Achmea, which is now a highly debatable issue. The CJEU itself saw it necessary to limit the scope of Achmea by declaring in Opinion 1/17 (CETA) that the legal reasoning of Achmea did not apply to investment protection treaties with third countries. The Member States of the EU remain politically divided in their views as to whether Achmea applies to the Energy Charter Treaty. And while the problems with the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in certain Member States continue to grow, Achmea has left an important gap for which there is no substitute in the current architecture of the EU legal system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-41
Author(s):  
Roman Kwiecień

The paper addresses the issue of a judicial forum entitled to resolve conflicts between European Union law and national constitutional rules. First and foremost, the issue is discussed under the old primacy/supremacy of EU law controversy. The author seeks to answer whether the national law, including constitutional rules, of a Member State can be ineffective owing to being contradictory to EU law. If so, by whom can national laws be held ineffective? In other words, which of the two judicial fora (national and European) have the last word in these conflicts or who is the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of law within the European legal space? The author argues that legal reasoning should reconcile, on the one hand, the specificity of the EU’s unique legal order and effective application of its provisions and, on the other hand, the international legal status of the Member States and their constitutions. This approach leads to the conclusion that there is no ultimate judicial arbiter within the European legal space.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 249-267
Author(s):  
Miłosz Malaga ◽  
Anna Wilińska-Zelek

In this article we examine the notion of ‘harmonisation’ in its interplay with the application of provisions on the free movement of goods. Due to the introduction of the European unitary patent protection system, we are witnessing the first cases of adopting enhanced cooperation in the internal market. This fact raises new, systemic questions concerning the concept of ‘harmonisation’ in European Union law. Are only legal, substantive aspects covered by its definition or should the territorial range of a legal act be taken into account? If yes – to what extent? Since the adoption of enhanced cooperation covers the field of intellectual property rights, the above questions concern the relationship between exercising those rights on the one hand and the principle of free movement on the other. A closer look at this matter leads to the conclusion that the unitary patent might not provide the solution to one of the problems that created for. More generally, in this article we conclude that when defining the concept of ‘harmonisation’, one should take its territorial scope into account narrowly, so as not to infringe the principles of EU law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Marija Daka

The paper presents some of the most relevant aspects of European nondiscrimination law established th rough European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights, looking also at the evolution of the norms and milestones of case-law on equal treatment within the two systems. The paper gives an overview of the non-discrimination concept as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and by the European Court of Human Rights. We examine the similar elements but also give insight into conceptual differences between the two human rights regimes when dealing with equal treatment. The differences mainly stem from the more complex approach taken by EU law although, based on analysed norms, cases, and provisions, the aspects of equal treatment in EU law are largely consistent with the practice of the ECtHR. Lastly, the paper briefl y places the European non-discrimination law within the multi-layered human rights system, giving some food for thought for the future potential this concept brings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Riffel

Abstract In Opinion 1/17, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found the investment court system compatible with European Union (EU) law. The ruling concerned the mechanism in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) but the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to other investment courts as established, for example, in the EU’s investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. This outcome was far from clear, given that in the past the accession to international dispute settlement bodies regularly foundered on the autonomy of the EU legal order. The present article parses the CETA Opinion and explores its implications. It particularly focuses on autonomy as a constitutional principle and its advancement in Opinion 1/17. Importantly, the ECJ accepted the superiority of a court created by international agreement in relation to the said agreement. Furthermore, it clarified that it is not prerequisite for the Court to rule first on the meaning to be given to an act of EU law before that act can be the subject matter of an investment dispute. Finally, the pdrerogative of the EU to autonomously set the level of protection of a public welfare goal must be secured in a treaty for the EU to join it.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHAN W. SCHILL

AbstractInvestment treaty arbitration, unlike commercial arbitration, is not a purely private dispute settlement mechanism that is entirely subject to party autonomy and limited in its effects to the parties to the proceedings. Rather, it fulfils a public function in influencing the behaviour of foreign investors, states, and civil society more generally by crafting and concretizing international standards of investment protection. Investment treaty arbitration thus implements and operates as part of a public system of investment protection. Arbitrators, as a result, incur obligations not only towards the parties to the proceedings, but vis-à-vis the whole system of investment protection. These obligations can be conceptualized as part of the public law implications of investment treaty arbitration and affect, inter alia, the role and status of arbitrators in investment treaty disputes, the procedural maxims that such arbitrations should follow, and the way arbitral awards should be crafted.


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