The Relative Effectiveness of the Fed Funds Futures and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Dot Plots in Predicting the Future Federal Funds Rate

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 73-83
Author(s):  
John Burke ◽  
Andreas Christofi
Author(s):  
Edward S. Knotek ◽  
Saeed Zaman

The Federal Open Market Committee has been providing guidance to help markets anticipate when it will begin raising the federal funds rate target. The most recent guidance suggests that the target will not change at least until after an unemployment or inflation threshold is breached. We use a forecasting model to estimate when these thresholds are likely to be breached. We also consider how an inflation floor would affect the timing of liftoff.


Author(s):  
Tricia Coxwell Snyder ◽  
Donald Bruce

<p class="MsoBlockText" style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Can expansionary fiscal or monetary policy stimulate the U.S. economy in light of recent events?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Using an Error-Correction-Vectorautoregression, we examine the relative effectiveness of both types of governmental stabilization policy. Unlike previous studies, we use a more general error correction vectorautoregression (ECM) approach.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Our focus is on determining the relative explanatory power of measures of monetary policy (M2 and the Federal Funds Rate) and fiscal policy (marginal income tax rates and government spending) in explaining movements in consumption, investment, and output.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Results suggest that monetary policy is relatively more powerful than fiscal policy. </span></span></span></p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (9) ◽  
pp. 2899-2934 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt G. Lunsford

I show that the nature of the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) forward guidance language shapes the private sector’s responses to monetary policy statements. From February 2000 to June 2003, the FOMC only gave forward guidance about economic outlook risks, and a decrease in the expected federal funds rate path caused stock prices to fall, GDP growth forecasts to fall, and the unemployment rate to rise. From August 2003 to May 2006, the FOMC added forward guidance about policy inclinations, and a decrease in the expected federal funds rate path had the opposite effects. These results suggest that forward guidance that emphasizes economic outlook risks causes stronger information effects than forward guidance that emphasizes policy inclinations. (JEL D83, E52, E58, E66)


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Robert C. Hockett ◽  
Saule T. Omarova

Abstract Some prices and indices in domestic or global markets take on particular market-wide importance. This can occur either because (i) they are associated with ubiquitous inputs to production, (ii) they are associated with highly popular asset classes, (iii) by convention they tend to be used as benchmarks in determining other prices, or (iv) some combination of the above.  Examples include prevailing wage and salary rates, certain energy and commodity prices, and such indices and borrowing rates as the Standard & Poor’s 500, the Federal Funds Rate, and the Libor and Euribor interbank lending rate benchmarks. We call such prices and indices ‘systemically important’ prices and indices, or ‘SIPIs’. Over the long term, these prices and indices tend towards certain statistical mean values that reflect determinants that can plausibly be treated as ‘fundamentals’, be these demographic, technological, or global-quantity-rooted in character.  At times, however, SIPIs can move out of alignment with mean values and associated fundamentals owing to distortions stemming from missing information, recursive collective action problems (including ‘noise’ trading and ‘herd’ behaviour), or even deliberately manipulative behaviour on the part of influential or colluding market actors.  We develop a general account of systemically important prices and indices as well as of the market vulnerabilities to which they can give rise. We then develop a menu of regulatory strategies for addressing these vulnerabilities in manners that protect markets’ capacities to translate fundamental values into (more) accurate prices or indices when such prices or indices are systemically important.  Key to the effort is recognizing that what we propose is in some cases what regulators are committed to doing already in maintaining market integrity, and in other cases is what central banks do already in determining appropriate money rental (‘interest‘) rates and securing them through open market operations.


Author(s):  
Edward S. Knotek

This Commentary estimates the implied parameters of simple monetary policy rules using the median paths for the federal funds rate and other economic variables provided in the Federal Open Market Committee's Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). The implied policy rule parameters appear to have changed over time, as the federal funds rate projections have become less responsive to the unemployment gap. This finding could reflect changes in policymakers' preferences, uncertainty over other aspects of the policy rule, or limitations of estimating simple monetary policy rules from the median SEP paths.


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