Cooperative Optimization of Tourism Networks

Author(s):  
Vincenzo Asero ◽  
Sebastiano Patti ◽  
Stefania Skonieczny

A tourism network is determined by close collaboration among various stakeholders working interactively on common problems or issues through formal and informal approaches. As many cases highlight, informal relationships contribute to the formation of formal partnerships. In this study a game theoretical model is applied to explain the decisional process of entrepreneurs about forming partnerships in formal tourism networks. The model shows that, in terms of Nash equilibrium, the cooperative optimization of a tourism network should be achieved when entrepreneurs have the same business goals and a common tourism vision The chapter presents an empirical solution that arises from the case of Business Networks in Italy, which represents an innovation in Italian Law.

2013 ◽  
Vol 838-841 ◽  
pp. 2639-2642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Min Teng ◽  
Chuan Feng Han

The environmental governance behaviors of the government and the enterprise is analyzed by a game theoretical model. The Nash equilibrium is discussed under three different cases. If the government has a relatively large budget, it will satisfy its preference and the enterprise contribute nothing; if the government has a moderate budget, it will contribute all to the environmental governance while the enterprise still contribute nothing; if the government has a relatively small budget, it will contribute all, and the enterprise will spend part of its budget to satisfy its preference.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Sarkar

Abstract In association football, crosses from the wide areas of the pitch in the attacking third is a standard tactic for creating goal-scoring opportunities. But recent studies show that crosses adversely impact goals. Regression run in this paper on data from the premier soccer leagues of England, Spain, Germany, France and Italy for 2016–2017 season also found this inverse relation. However, there is no research that explains the reason for this inverse relation between crosses and goals. A game-theoretical model developed in this paper explains why crosses adversely affect goal-scoring. The model identifies a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), wherein the attacking team’s probability of playing a cross decreases with increase in their crossing accuracy, heading accuracy and probability of winning aerial balls. If the attacking team is good in terms of these parameters, the defending team’s probability of using an offside trap increases and that forces the attacking team to use crosses less frequently. In the MSNE, teams with a greater chance of scoring from crosses use the crosses less frequently than teams having a smaller chance of scoring from crosses. The theory was subsequently validated using the data of the 2016–2017 football season.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quan-Hoang Vuong

What described below is a just some initial idea on how a game-theoretical model can be structured, with the purpose of considering a head-on competition for talent in the marketplace. The solutions, albeit carefully checked, are not complete either.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Collins ◽  
Philip Thomas ◽  
Mark Broom ◽  
Trung Hieu Vu

1983 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans J. Bremermann ◽  
John Pickering

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