Investment in Regional Environmental Governance: A Game between the Government and the Enterprise

2013 ◽  
Vol 838-841 ◽  
pp. 2639-2642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Min Teng ◽  
Chuan Feng Han
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
The Government

The environmental governance behaviors of the government and the enterprise is analyzed by a game theoretical model. The Nash equilibrium is discussed under three different cases. If the government has a relatively large budget, it will satisfy its preference and the enterprise contribute nothing; if the government has a moderate budget, it will contribute all to the environmental governance while the enterprise still contribute nothing; if the government has a relatively small budget, it will contribute all, and the enterprise will spend part of its budget to satisfy its preference.

scholarly journals Firms, technology, training and government fiscal policies: An evolutionary approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Elvio Accinelli ◽  
Filipe Martins ◽  
Humberto Muñiz ◽  
Bruno M. P. M. Oliveira ◽  
Alberto A. Pinto
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Poverty Trap ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
Training And Education ◽  
Dynamical Interaction ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Training

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In this paper we propose and analyze a game theoretical model regarding the dynamical interaction between government fiscal policy choices toward innovation and training (I&amp;T), firm's innovation, and worker's levels of training and education. We discuss four economic scenarios corresponding to strict pure Nash equilibria: the government and I&amp;T poverty trap, the I&amp;T poverty trap, the I&amp;T high premium niche, and the I&amp;T ideal growth. The main novelty of this model is to consider the government as one of the three interacting players in the game that also allow us to analyse the I&amp;T mixed economic scenarios with a unique strictly mixed Nash equilibrium and with I&amp;T evolutionary dynamical cycles.</p>

Cooperative Optimization of Tourism Networks

2017 ◽  
pp. 348-364
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Asero ◽  
Sebastiano Patti ◽  
Stefania Skonieczny
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Business Networks ◽  
Close Collaboration ◽  
Business Goals ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
Italian Law ◽  
Common Problems

A tourism network is determined by close collaboration among various stakeholders working interactively on common problems or issues through formal and informal approaches. As many cases highlight, informal relationships contribute to the formation of formal partnerships. In this study a game theoretical model is applied to explain the decisional process of entrepreneurs about forming partnerships in formal tourism networks. The model shows that, in terms of Nash equilibrium, the cooperative optimization of a tourism network should be achieved when entrepreneurs have the same business goals and a common tourism vision The chapter presents an empirical solution that arises from the case of Business Networks in Italy, which represents an innovation in Italian Law.

Paradox of crosses in association football (soccer) – a game-theoretic explanation

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Inverse Relation ◽  
Association Football ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Abstract In association football, crosses from the wide areas of the pitch in the attacking third is a standard tactic for creating goal-scoring opportunities. But recent studies show that crosses adversely impact goals. Regression run in this paper on data from the premier soccer leagues of England, Spain, Germany, France and Italy for 2016–2017 season also found this inverse relation. However, there is no research that explains the reason for this inverse relation between crosses and goals. A game-theoretical model developed in this paper explains why crosses adversely affect goal-scoring. The model identifies a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), wherein the attacking team’s probability of playing a cross decreases with increase in their crossing accuracy, heading accuracy and probability of winning aerial balls. If the attacking team is good in terms of these parameters, the defending team’s probability of using an offside trap increases and that forces the attacking team to use crosses less frequently. In the MSNE, teams with a greater chance of scoring from crosses use the crosses less frequently than teams having a smaller chance of scoring from crosses. The theory was subsequently validated using the data of the 2016–2017 football season.

A Compensation Game: MNC vs. SME

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quan-Hoang Vuong
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
Initial Idea

What described below is a just some initial idea on how a game-theoretical model can be structured, with the purpose of considering a head-on competition for talent in the marketplace. The solutions, albeit carefully checked, are not complete either.

A Game-Theoretical Model of Investment Treaty Arbitration

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Collins ◽  
Philip Thomas ◽  
Mark Broom ◽  
Trung Hieu Vu
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

scholarly journals Corporate Profit Tax and Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility Under Foreign Acquisition

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lili Xu ◽  
Sang-Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Government Grants ◽  
Corporate Profit ◽  
Foreign Acquisition ◽  
Strategic Csr ◽  
The Government ◽  
Corporate Social

Abstract This study investigates government public policies facing competing firms’ strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and finds that the choice of CSR crucially depends on corporate profit tax. We demonstrate that strategic CSR decreases while social welfare increases with corporate tax. When the government grants uniform output subsidies, we show that bilateral CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under unilateral CSR but bilateral CSR is always beneficial to society. However, when the government grants discriminatory output subsidies which yield different levels of unilateral CSR, we show that domestic CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under foreign CSR. In an endogenous CSR choice game, domestic CSR (no CSR) is a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low (high) under the uniform subsidy, while foreign CSR could be a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low under the discriminatory subsidy.

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