Data Protection in EU Law

Author(s):  
Maria Tzanou

This chapter aims to discuss the possibilities and limitations of the EU to provide for an effective and comprehensive data protection regime. In this respect, it presents an analysis of the data protection rules in EU law by examining the relevant constitutional and secondary law framework. It analyzes the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on data protection issues, and argues that the European Court of Justice has interpreted an internal market measure (the Data Protection Directive) in such a way so as to foster the protection of fundamental rights. However, when it comes to the balancing between fundamental rights the Court leaves the question to be resolved by national courts. Finally, the contribution assesses the transborder data flows regime established by the Data Protection Directive and attempts to draw some conclusions on whether the ‘adequate protection’ test ensures a high protection in such flows.

2021 ◽  
Vol 106 (6) ◽  
pp. 144-154
Author(s):  
Vadim Voynikov ◽  

Mutual trust is one of the central principles of the area of freedom, security and justice and the whole EU. Despite the fact, that mutual trust is not stipulated in founding treaties, this principle has been widely developed by the European Court of Justice. The purpose of this article is to identify the legal and political components of mutual trust in the EU, as well as the approaches to its implementation. The author comes to the conclusion that the principle of mutual trust originated from the internal market, however its development is mostly associated with the area of freedom, security and justice. Mutual trust in the EU presupposes that a member state does not need additional verification that another member state respects Union law and fundamental rights. Initially, the principle of mutual trust was given the absolute character, but in the post-Lisbon period, “blind trust” was replaced by the “earned trust”, which implies the possibility, in exceptional cases, to refuse mutual trust to another member state if the latter violates fundamental rights. Despite the development of the concept of mutual trust by the European Court of Justice and other EU institutions, recently there has been a serious deficit of interstate trust within the Union. In this regard, the principle of mutual trust is becoming declarative.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, which was developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) based on its conception of the ‘new legal order’. The ECJ ruled that the aim of creating a uniform common market between different states would be undermined if EU law could be made subordinate to national law of the various states. The validity of EU law can therefore, according to the ECJ, never be assessed by reference to national law. National courts are required to give immediate effect to EU law, of whatever rank, in cases that arise before them, and to ignore or to set aside any national law, of whatever rank, which could impede the application of EU law. Thus, according to the ECJ, any norm of EU law takes precedence over any provision of national law, including the national constitutions. This broad assertion of the supremacy of EU law has not however been accepted without qualification by national courts, and the chapter examines the nature of the qualifications that have been imposed by some national courts.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaos Lavranos

AbstractWith its Kadi-judgment, the European Court of Justice firmly rejected the Kadi/Yusuf-judgments of the Court of First Instance. The Court of Justice made unambiguously clear that Community law, in particular its basic, core fundamental rights values prevail over any international law obligations of the EC and its Member States, including UN Security Council Resolutions and the UN Charter. As a consequence thereof, individuals targeted by UN sanctions must have access to full judicial review in order to be able to ensure the effective protection of their fundamental rights, including procedural rights as guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). As a result, the Court of Justice proved that the Community is indeed based on the rule of law and that the fight against terrorism – how important it may be – cannot be used as a justification for completely abrogating European constitutional law values as guaranteed within the Community and its Member States.


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 303-352
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, which was developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) based on its conception of the ‘new legal order’. The ECJ ruled that the aim of creating a uniform common market between different states would be undermined if EU law could be made subordinate to national law of the various states. The validity of EU law can therefore, according to the ECJ, never be assessed by reference to national law. National courts are required to give immediate effect to EU law, of whatever rank, in cases that arise before them, and to ignore or to set aside any national law, of whatever rank, which could impede the application of EU law. Thus, according to the ECJ, any norm of EU law takes precedence over any provision of national law, including the national constitutions. This broad assertion of the supremacy of EU law has not however been accepted without qualification by national courts, and the chapter examines the nature of the qualifications that have been imposed by some national courts. The UK version contains a further section analysing the relevance of the supremacy of EU law in relation to the UK post-Brexit.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catharina Voß

This book examines allowing the legal force of national judgements to be overturned in favour of the priority law of the European Union, which has been relevant for both procedural practice and academic discourse since the ‘Klausner-Holz’ ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2015. In addition to an overview of the state of the current jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the book also offers solutions to the effective enforcement of European priority law through an autonomous concept of the matter in dispute which is in line with EU law, the creation of an additional reason for restitution or a larger submission in practice by national courts. Judges, lawyers, academics and politicians who have to deal with the application or further development of national procedural law in connection with legal fields relevant to EU law, such as the EU’s state aid and public procurement law, antitrust law or competition law, will benefit enormously from reading this book.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Martín Rodríguez

The principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations as a legal tool for individuals in EU law – the mixed nature of EU emergency law: the ‘conferral principle’ limitation and the ways to expand executive powers in the EU response to the crisis (Pringle,ESMA,BPP,OMT) – the existence of legal certainty failures in that response: unpredictable and disjointed legislation and adjudication – arguments blurring legal certainty as the standard of review for EU emergency law: conditionality, international law and indirect legislation – the self-restraint attitude of the European Court of Justice and the risks of leaving litigation under the sole remit of national courts: normalising emergency powers and EU law autonomy at stake


Author(s):  
Encarnación Roca Trías ◽  
Susana García Couso

Es de sobra conocida la tensión existente entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a raíz del planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales ante el TJUE en supuestos en los que, aunque el asunto se plantee como una cuestión interpretativa del derecho de la Unión, comprende, además, un problema de derechos fundamentales susceptibles de ser controlados, también, constitucionalmente. Ambos procedimientos terminan con una decisión de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales. Este artículo pretende hacer una reflexión acerca de los problemas que suscita el hecho de que dos Tribunales —TJUE y TC— competentes en materia de protección de derechos fundamentales, y, al mismo tiempo, interpretadores de un mismo ordenamiento jurídico, puedan emitir juicios paralelos sobre una misma norma que ha sido sometida a su control y con parámetros diferentes de control: la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y la Constitución.This paper purports to reflect on the complex issues that arise from the fact that both the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional court have the power to adjudicate on fundamental rights and that, therefore, on the basis of the application of different rules — the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the national Constitution — they can occasionally arrive at different decisions. National courts are more and more aware of this dual avenue to challenge national regulations, through the preliminary reference to the ECJ and through the reference to the Constitutional Court of constitutional doubts with regard to national legislation. In consequence, national Constitutional Courts must accommodate into this new scenario.


2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Tzanou

“Any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve neither and lose both.”On 3 September 2008, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down its long-awaited decision on the Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation where, setting aside the relevant judgments of the European Court of First Instance (CFI), the Court held that the Community judicature must ensure the full review of the lawfulness of all Community acts. This included those deriving from UN Security Council's resolutions, in the light of the fundamental rights as protected by Community law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jaś-Nowopolska ◽  
Daniel Mengeler

The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the precedence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system. Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described in greater detail. The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which contains the preliminary ruling procedure. Article 267 has been of seminal importance for the development of EU law. It is through preliminary rulings that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed concepts such as direct effect and supremacy. Individuals assert in national courts that the Member State has broken a Union provision, which gives them rights that they can enforce in their national courts. The national court seeks a ruling from the ECJ whether the particular EU provision has direct effect, and the ECJ is thereby able to develop the concept. Article 267 has been the mechanism through which national courts and the ECJ have engaged in a discourse on the appropriate reach of EU law when it has come into conflict with national legal norms.


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