Research on Strategies of Pricing and Coordinating in Reverse Supply Chain for Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 203 ◽  
pp. 459-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhan Feng Zhou

Based on the remanufacturing reverse supply chain consisted of single retailer and single manufacturer, this paper applied game theory to establish a non-cooperative game and cooperative game model and got optimal pricing strategy by solving this two kinds of game model. By comparing the total profits of reverse supply chain in every game model, a conclusion was draw that non-cooperative game model led to profit loss and double marginal effect. In order to solve the problems, revenue sharing contract was used to coordinate the reverse supply chain and coordinating strategy was got. The results show that revenue sharing contract can increase the total profits of the reverse supply chain, while at the same time meet the respective interests of retailer and manufacturer and coordinate the reverse supply chain.

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.


2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 971-975
Author(s):  
Xin Ma

Benefits assignment in the construction machinery supply chain business cooperation is the crucial and the most prominent conflicts issue, it plays a decisive role on sustained and stable development of cooperative relations. In this paper, the cooperative game theory and methods applied to the benefit assignment in the construction machinery supply chain management, and on this basis, the benefits of various cooperative enterprises are assigned by a comprehensive cooperative game model with the Shapley value model including risk of correction factor and the investment weight correction factor according to investment in the construction machinery supply chain, while a numerical example to demonstrate the method of science and rationality.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53
Author(s):  
Chunxiang Guo ◽  
Hong Zhou

Abstract The experience of consumers for products has great effect on the pre-sale strategy. Based on this, the paper studies the selection and pricing of multi-channel marketing models consisting of a brewer, an electronic retailer and a traditional retailer, constructing the non-cooperative game model of brewers and retailers with equal status in four contexts. Finally, the result shows that the introduction of direct channel is beneficial to increase the brewer’s revenue. When the pre-sale marginal revenue is greater than two times the average spot-sale marginal revenue, the total profit of supply chain will achieve the best under mode I. i.e. both the brewer and e-retailer adopt pre-sale strategy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 003685042091632
Author(s):  
Xiuzi Hao ◽  
Baizhou Li

Considering the multiple effects of product greenness and carbon emission trading, this article constructs a differential game model to study the collaborative innovation between enterprises in a green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one supplier. This article examines the optimal green technology innovation strategies, optimal revenues of manufacturers and suppliers as well as the overall green supply chain revenues in the Nash non-cooperative game model, the Stackelberg master–slave game model, and cooperative game model, respectively. Through the comparative analysis of equilibrium results, it is found that the optimal strategies of suppliers and manufacturers as well as the total revenue of the green supply chain in the cooperative games are better than those in the non-cooperative game scenario. Meanwhile, undertaking part of suppliers’ green innovation cost by manufacturers is the Pareto optimization mechanism that increases the total revenue of the green supply chain and their respective revenues. The research results of this article provide theoretical support for green supply chain enterprises to formulate incentive mechanisms for scientific strategy-making and reasonable revenue distribution.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document