A Tripartite Game Analysis of Environmental Pollution Control Based on Complicated Intergovernmental Relations

An excellent ecological environment is conducive for improving economic benefits and social benefits. The environmental pollution control requires the cooperation of governments at all levels and a large amount of capital investment. However, under the system with Chinese characteristics, the intergovernmental relations present complex and dynamic characteristics: the central government is authoritative, the local governments are obedient and self-interested, and the environmental pollution control usually involves multiple government departments, while it has strong externality, which makes it easy to breed “free rider” behavior in the process of environmental pollution control. Therefore, the cross-regional environmental pollution control cooperation model of governments at all levels is a complex and worthwhile research problem. Based on this, the paper studies a tripartite game problem of environmental pollution control from both horizontal and vertical intergovernmental relations. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation was used to obtain the optimal effort strategy, environmental pollution control level, and environmental pollution losses under the Nash game model, the Stackelberg game model, and the Cooperative game model. The results show the following: firstly, the governments’ environmental pollution control efforts are positively related to their own execution ability and influence ability and negatively related to the cost coefficient; secondly, from the perspectives of environmental pollution control level and environmental pollution losses, the Cooperative game model is superior to the Nash game model and the Stackelberg game; thirdly, this paper analyzes the relationship between the loss-bearing ratio, the special financial funds, the effort level of government, and the environmental pollution control level; finally, the conclusions are verified by numerical analysis, which proves the validity of the models.

A cooperative game model with bankruptcy theory for Water Allocation: A case study in China Tarim River Basin

China Tarim River Basin is located in an arid area, whose rapid socioeconomic development intensifies the current water resources shortage. To allocate water resources reasonably, this paper introduces the bankruptcy theory into the cooperative game model to contract a linear function describing the degree of satisfaction of each region's declared water demand. Bankruptcy theory solves the problem of insufficient information about players in the cooperative game. From the perspective of the cooperative game's stability, the bankruptcy allocation stability index (BASI) is used to evaluate and compare water resource allocation results in the Tarim River Basin in 2025 and 2030 under different scenarios. Moreover, this paper uses the improved TOPSIS model to build the harmony index of water-economy-environment (HWEE) to evaluate the harmony of water resources, economy and environment in each region. The results show that the model is more suitable for the actual water allocation game and has a good application value than the classical bankruptcy theory. Moreover, the stability index and HWEE proposed in this paper also have better applicability, and the allocation scheme with the same game weight in each region is more stable.

Two-Stage Non-Cooperative Game Model for Vertical Handoffs in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks

In a heterogeneous wireless network (HWN) environment, performing an efficient vertical handoff requires the efficient qualitative evaluation of all stakeholders like wireless networks (WN) and mobile users (MU) and mutual selection of best WN-MU. In the literature, most of the work deals with both these requirements jointly in the techniques proposed by them for the vertical handoffs (VHO) in HWNs, leaving very little scope to manipulate the above requirements independently. This may result in inefficient vertical handoffs. Hence, this chapter proposed a generalized two-stage two players, iterative non-cooperative game model. This model presents a modular framework that separates the quantitative evaluation of WNs and MUs (at Stage 1) from the game formulation and solution (at Stage 2) for mutual selection of best WN-MU pair for VHO. The simulation results show a substantial reduction in the number of vertical handoffs with the proposed game theory-based two-stage model as compared to a single-stage non-game theory method like multiple attribute decision making.

Game-based cache allocation strategy for ICN slicing

To reduce the delay of content acquisition, this paper proposes a game-based cache allocation strategy in the Information-Centric Network (ICN) slice. The cache resource allocation of different mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) is modeled as a non-cooperative game model. The Newton iterative method is used to solve this problem, and the cache space allocated by the base station for each MVNO is obtained. Finally, the Nash equilibrium solution is obtained. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can reduce the delay.

Knowledge friction in universities, approach from game theory

In today's market economies, organizations see knowledge as one of their most valuable and strategic resources and seek to properly manage it so that it becomes a competitive advantage (Teece, 1988; Hamel and Prahalad, 1990, Drucker, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Boisot, 1998; Spender, 1996; Senge, 1990). Although many organizations make significant investments in technology and tools to promote knowledge sharing, cultural, behavioral, and structural aspects are the main determinants of success (Sharma and Bhattacharya, 2013). Organizational knowledge processes are, by their nature, generally social and complex. The behaviors related to sharing knowledge of organizational agents are full of situations of conflict of interest or dilemmas in which they receive different payments based on their strategic decisions. Such situations can be modeled as games. This article presents the approach to a particular dilemma, that of the knowledge friction in an Institution of Higher Education through Game Theory, describing a non-cooperative game model that allows showing the scope of said situation according to the decisions considered to be done by employees and employer and their related payments, exploring different decision-making scenarios.