Party Cohesion and Party Discipline in German Parliaments

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Godbout ◽  
Bjørn Høyland

What explains the development of legislative party voting unity? Evidence from the United States and Britain indicate that partisan sorting, cohort replacement effects, electoral incentives, and agenda control contributed to enhancing party cohesion during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Here, these mechanisms are evaluated by analysing a dataset containing all the recorded votes from the Canadian House of Commons, 1867–2011. Overall, we find that partisan sorting and the government’s ability to control the agenda are central to the consolidation of parties over time. Our results underscore the need to integrate institutional rules and legislative agendas into models of parliamentary voting behaviour and suggest that strict party discipline can lead to the development of a multi-party system in the legislative arena.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110251
Author(s):  
Noah Dasanaike

Previous explorations of Russia’s mixed electoral system uncovered conflicting results on party discipline in legislative voting. The effect in recent convocations is modest, with single-member district deputies expressing slightly less factional loyalty than those elected under proportional representation. However, factors other than electoral mandate may also affect party cohesion. In particular, a definitive connection exists between holding public office in Russia and the opportunity to maximize personal profit-seeking. Using individual-level reading voting data on budgetary bills from the 7th State Duma, I examine how the profit-seeking behavior of deputies who previously held business positions at the executive level influences party cohesion. I find significant evidence that deputies with previous executive business positions defect from their party more frequently than those without. The effect is marginally greater for deputies elected from single-member districts rather than the party-list. These findings have greater implications for party cohesion and the involvement of businesspeople in national legislatures.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 795-815 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheryl N. Collier ◽  
Tracey Raney

AbstractIn 2015, the Canadian House of Commons passed a new code of conduct governing non-criminal sexual harassment between members of Parliament becoming the first of its kind in any Westminster system in the world. Using a feminist institutional and violence-against-women-in-politics approach, we assess how the code challenges, legitimizes and upholds traditionally gendered norms and institutionalized sexism within Canada's parliamentary system including parliamentary privilege, party cohesion and party discipline. Despite its novelty, we argue this code fails to enact positive gender-friendly institutional change and may do more harm than good in its efforts to curb sexual harassment.


2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
KUNIAKI NEMOTO ◽  
ELLIS KRAUSS ◽  
ROBERT PEKKANEN

This article examines party discipline and party cohesion or defection, offering as an illustration the rebellion over postal privatization in 2005 by members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It explores the importance of party rules – especially the seniority rule and policy specialization for district rewards – as intervening variables between election rules and party defection in a decentralized and diverse party. It is argued that in such cases, party rules like seniority can help prevent defection. When these rules are changed, as in the postal case of 2005, defection is more probable, but it is found that the relationship between defection and seniority is likely to be curvilinear, and also that the curvilinearity is conditional upon each legislator's having different incentives for vote, policy and office.


Author(s):  
Shaun Bowler ◽  
David M. Farrell ◽  
Richard S. Katz

Author(s):  
Meg Russell ◽  
Daniel Gover

This chapter explores how government backbench parliamentarians in both chambers at Westminster influence the content of government legislation and the dynamics of politics. Government backbenchers are often thought to be Westminster’s most influential policy actors, operating through the ‘intraparty mode’. As summarized here, governments have recently become less able to rely on their votes, thanks to declining party cohesion. Yet governments are rarely defeated as a result of rebellious votes. This chapter analyses government backbenchers’ amendments proposed to the 12 case study bills—some of which served purposes other than immediate policy change—and their role as ‘pivotal voters’ in resolving legislative disputes with other (particularly opposition) actors. It also emphasizes their influence on legislation before it is introduced, and the importance of ‘anticipated reactions’. For example, ministers introduced the Corporate Manslaughter Bill only reluctantly, following backbench pressure. Backbenchers hence have subtle, and often hidden, influence in the legislative process.


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