Businessperson Deputies and Party Cohesion: Evidence from the Russian State Duma

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110251
Author(s):  
Noah Dasanaike
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Discipline ◽  
Legislative Voting ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Russian State ◽  
Seeking Behavior ◽  
Party Cohesion ◽  
Mixed Electoral System ◽  
Executive Level ◽  
National Legislatures

Previous explorations of Russia’s mixed electoral system uncovered conflicting results on party discipline in legislative voting. The effect in recent convocations is modest, with single-member district deputies expressing slightly less factional loyalty than those elected under proportional representation. However, factors other than electoral mandate may also affect party cohesion. In particular, a definitive connection exists between holding public office in Russia and the opportunity to maximize personal profit-seeking. Using individual-level reading voting data on budgetary bills from the 7th State Duma, I examine how the profit-seeking behavior of deputies who previously held business positions at the executive level influences party cohesion. I find significant evidence that deputies with previous executive business positions defect from their party more frequently than those without. The effect is marginally greater for deputies elected from single-member districts rather than the party-list. These findings have greater implications for party cohesion and the involvement of businesspeople in national legislatures.

How the Electoral Policy of the Russian State Predetermined the Results of the 2016 State Duma Elections

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kynev
Keyword(s):  
Russian Federation ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Russian State ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Democratic Parties ◽  
Mixed Electoral System ◽  
Protest Voters ◽  
Regional Elections

The article analyses how the electoral policy of the Russian state predetermined the results of the 2016 State Duma elections. The factors leading to this predictability are described in detail. These were a combination of the introduction of a mixed electoral system, with the party of power winning in more than 90% of majoritarian districts in regional elections; gerrymandering during the establishment of electoral districts; changes to the system by which voters outside the borders of the Russian Federation were allocated to electoral districts; the change of election date (moving it to September) and the consequent reduced turnout in the cities more prone to protest votes; “rigged campaigns” and the systemic opposition’s unreadiness for serious disputation; new bans and restrictions on political competition, resulting parties and candidates capable of genuinely opposing the regime being denied access to the elections; a push among protest voters to boycott the election, de facto supported by the regime’s campaign managers; and weak campaigns by the democratic parties.

The Never-ending Story of Law and Electoral System in Lesotho

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoolo Nyane
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Legal Discourse ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Run Up ◽  
Mixed Electoral System ◽  
2012 Election

While electoral discontent has been the enduring feature of constitutional democracy in Lesotho since independence, disagreement over electoral system is a fairly recent phenomenon. When the country attained independence in 1966 from Britain, electoral system was not necessarily one of the topical issues of pre-independence constitutional negotiations. The major issues were the powers of the monarch, the office of prime minister, the command of the army and many more.  It was taken for granted that the country would use the British-based plurality electoral system.  This is the system which the country used until early 2000s when the electoral laws were reformed to anchor a new mixed electoral system.  When the new electoral laws were ultimately passed in 2001, the country transitioned from a plurality electoral system to a two-ballot mixed member proportional system. By this time, electoral system had acquired prominence in politico-legal discourse in Lesotho.  In the run-up to 2007 elections, bigger political parties orchestrated the manipulation of electoral laws which culminated in clearly distorted electoral outcomes. The manipulations motivated further reforms in the run-up to 2012 election which resulted in the single-ballot mixed member proportional system. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate how electoral laws have anchored electoral system reforms throughout the various historical epochs in Lesotho since independence. The paper contends that while the country has been courageous, unlike most of its peers, to introduce far-reaching electoral system changes, the reform of electoral laws has not been so helpful in attaining the higher objectives of political inclusivity, constitutionalism and stability in Lesotho.

Does candidate nomination in districts increase party votes of small parties? Evidence from the 2016 Taiwan legislative elections

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-473
Author(s):  
Ching-Hsing Wang ◽  
Dennis Lu-Chung Weng ◽  
Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Contamination Effect ◽  
Positive Spillover ◽  
Strategic Entry ◽  
Mixed Electoral System ◽  
Western Democracies ◽  
Legislative Election

AbstractThis study addresses why small parties nominate candidates to run in the district elections and how nomination of district candidates could influence small parties’ share of party votes in Taiwan. Previous studies on party's strategic entry in the mixed electoral system demonstrate the existence of ‘contamination effect’ in various Western democracies. While ‘contamination effect’ suggests that party would gain more proportional representation (PR) seats by increasing its number of candidate nomination in the single-member-district (SMD) races, we contend that small parties should also take the strength of nominated candidates into consideration. Nominating strong candidates in SMD competitions could generate positive ‘spillover effect’ to party's PR tier. By focusing on the 2016 Taiwan legislative election, our findings suggest that first, small parties need to fulfill the institutional requirements in order to qualify for running in the party-list election; second, the ‘contamination effect’ exists in Taiwan, but it is conditional; and finally, candidates’ strength creates positive ‘spillover effect’ on party's proportional seats.

Party Linkage, Public Justification and Mixed Electoral Systems

2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172097833
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Mixed Electoral Systems ◽  
Democratic Life ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

In recent years, a number of political theorists have aimed to restore the central role of parties in democratic life. These theorists have especially highlighted two key normative functions of parties: linkage and public justification. In this article, I argue that these two functions are often in tension. First, I illustrate how this tension manifests itself in liberal democracies. Second, I explain that parties’ ability to fulfil each of the two functions is strongly affected by the electoral system under which they operate: while first-past-the-post encourages party linkage but hinders public justification, the opposite is true of proportional representation. Third, I argue that a mixed electoral system can best guarantee the balance between parties’ linkage and justificatory functions. Fourth, I suggest a number of proposals for party reforms that could help mixed electoral systems to balance party linkage and public justification while preventing the re-emergence of the tension between them within parties.

scholarly journals Creativity Versus Innovativeness: Exploring the Differences between the Two Constructs May Lead to Greater Innovation in Large Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 83 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cocco ◽  
Majdi Quttainah
Keyword(s):  
Motivational Orientation ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Sustained Competitive Advantage ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Seeking Behavior ◽  
Study Support ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Primary Focus ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

<p>Several individuals from top management seem to be confused about the difference between creativity and innovativeness. Amabile (1997) suggests that while innovation begins with creative ideas, creativity by individuals and teams is only a starting point for innovation. Individual creativity is necessary but not sufficient to yield breakthrough innovation in organizations. This can sometimes cause confusion in employee development efforts and actions taken by management. Companies often look for ways to hire and retain creative employees and at the same time they are also interested in establishing a creative environment for knowledge workers… but should creativity be the primary focus? These firms hope that creativity enhancing steps will eventually lead to greater innovation and therefore help it to achieve sustained competitive advantage. This paper attempts to demonstrate that there are potentially other dimensions beyond creativity related to innovativeness, which should be considered at the individual level in order to foster innovation in firms. Empirical results in this study support the idea that intrinsic motivational orientation, sociability and political astuteness are enhancers to employee innovativeness while perfection seeking behavior detracts employee innovativeness. These findings may serve to extend Amabile’s (1997) componential framework to center on the “innovativeness” construct versus creativity to help explain how firms need to hire, cultivate and retain the right talent.</p>

scholarly journals Electoral incentives, policy compromise, and coalition durability: Japan's LDP–Komeito Government in a mixed electoral system

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam P. Liff ◽  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

AbstractPolitical parties’ behavior in coalition formation is commonly explained by their policy-, vote-, and office-seeking incentives. From these perspectives, the 20-year partnership of Japan's ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its pacifistic Komeito junior coalition partner is an anomalous case. The longevity, closeness, and nature of their unlikely partnership challenges core assumptions in existing theories of coalition politics. LDP–Komeito cooperation has sustained for two decades despite vastly different support bases and ideological differences on fundamental policy issues. LDP leaders also show no signs of abandoning the much smaller Komeito despite enjoying a single-party majority. We argue that the remarkable durability of this puzzling partnership results primarily from the two parties’ electoral incentives and what has effectively become codependence under Japan's mixed electoral system. Our analysis also demonstrates that being in a coalition can induce significant policy compromises, even from a much larger senior partner. Beyond theoretical implications, these phenomena yield important real-world consequences for Japanese politics: especially, a far less dominant LDP than the party's Diet seat total suggests, and Komeito's remarkable ability to punch significantly above its weight and constrain its far larger senior partner, even on the latter's major national security policy priorities.

scholarly journals Unity in Diversity? The Development of Political Parties in the Parliament of Canada, 1867–2011

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Godbout ◽  
Bjørn Høyland
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
The United States ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Party Discipline ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Unity In Diversity ◽  
Nineteenth And Twentieth Centuries ◽  
Party Cohesion ◽  
Party Voting

What explains the development of legislative party voting unity? Evidence from the United States and Britain indicate that partisan sorting, cohort replacement effects, electoral incentives, and agenda control contributed to enhancing party cohesion during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Here, these mechanisms are evaluated by analysing a dataset containing all the recorded votes from the Canadian House of Commons, 1867–2011. Overall, we find that partisan sorting and the government’s ability to control the agenda are central to the consolidation of parties over time. Our results underscore the need to integrate institutional rules and legislative agendas into models of parliamentary voting behaviour and suggest that strict party discipline can lead to the development of a multi-party system in the legislative arena.

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