A second correspondence principle In A.D. Woodland, ed., Economic Theory and International Trade. Chapters in Honour of Murray C. Kemp, 37–56

2008 ◽  
pp. 108-124
2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Down

A prominent variant of the compensation hypothesis rests on the premise that increased trade exposure heightens domestic economic volatility, prompting demands for compensation via generous systems of transfers and services. Economic theory suggests that because the expansion of international trade entails integration into larger, deeper, more stable markets, and may entail risk diversification, it may actually promote rather than reduce stability. By the same token, however, economic theory also suggests that smaller economies should experience greater levels of volatility than larger economies, and thus also greater levels of insecurity. The evidence presented here suggests that the level of domestic economic volatility in the developed economies, during the latter half of the twentieth century, may indeed have been driven by the size and depth of markets. And critically, for these countries international trade integration may have eased rather than accentuated domestic economic volatility.


2002 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Bagwell ◽  
Robert W. Staiger

Over the past 50 years, a remarkable degree of trade liberalization has been achieved through GATT/WTO negotiations. In this paper, we describe work that provides a theoretical interpretation of this institution. We emphasize two key features of GATT/WTO: reciprocity and enforcement. We also identify important areas for future research. The work described here contributes to the fields of International Trade and Applied Game Theory.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Risse ◽  
Gabriel Wollner

AbstractEconomic theory teaches that it is in every country’s interest to trade. Trade is a voluntary activity among consenting parties. On this view, considerations of justice have little bearing on trade, and political philosophers concerned with global justice should stay largely silent on trade. According to a very different view that has recently gained prominence, international trade can only occur before the background of an international market reliance practice shaped by states. Trade is a shared activity among states, and all participating states have in principle equal claims to gains from trade. Trade then becomes a central topic for political philosophers. Both views are problematic. A third view about the role of trade in a theory of global justice is then presented, which gives pride of place to a (non-Marxian) notion of exploitation. The other two views should be abandoned.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 199
Author(s):  
Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin

Economic theory says all countries benefit from free international trade. However, does this belief tell the whole story? Can all countries indeed benefit from free trade? For instance, is it any good for developing countries? In the literature, there are many studies and some of them present ideas against free trade. In this paper, we strive to provide a brief of the literature on developing economies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip L. Martin

International migration involves the movement of people over national borders, while international trade deals with the production of goods or services in one country and their consumption in another. Economic theory assumes that migration and trade are substitutes, so that freer trade between countries with different wage levels should reduce voluntary migration as trade leads to convergence in wages. However, free-trade agreements can produce a migration hump as the pace of change accelerates and economies adjust, as migration increases before investment creates enough jobs to generate stay-at-home development despite remittances from migrants abroad. Efforts to deal with the root causes of migration must be aware of potential migration humps.


1991 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas A Irwin

The recent theoretical literature on strategic trade policy suggests that government intervention in international trade has the potential to be welfare improving. Government promotion of exports from imperfectly competitive industries, for example, may enable domestic firms to capture economic rents from foreign firms, thereby increasing national welfare. In addition, active responses to foreign protection, by a policy of reciprocity, may be required to prevent a loss of domestic welfare. Although these findings may bring into question the traditional economic case for free trade, many economists doubt that these theories provide sound guidance for trade policy. Economists in the nineteenth century also argued about whether theoretical justifications for tariffs compromised the case for free trade. This paper discusses two older debates somewhat related to the current focus on strategic industries and reciprocity, and concludes with an observation about how developments in economic theory affect economists' view of policy.


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