An alternative account of acting from duty

2005 ◽  
pp. 72-89
Disputatio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (53) ◽  
pp. 45-62
Author(s):  
André J. Abath

Abstract Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve M. J. Janssen

People tend to recall more specific personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than from other lifetime periods, a finding known as the reminiscence bump. Several explanations have suggested that events from the reminiscence bump are especially emotional, important, or positive, but studies using cue words have not found support for these claims. An alternative account postulates that cognitive abilities function optimally in adolescence and early adulthood, which may cause more memories to be stored in those lifetime periods. Although other studies have previously discussed the cognitive abilities account as a possible explanation for the reminiscence bump, it was only recently shown that cognitive abilities are indeed related to autobiographical memory performance. When this recent finding is combined with previous findings that cognitive abilities as well as autobiographical memory function optimally in adolescence and early adulthood, they suggest that the cognitive abilities account is a promising explanation for the reminiscence bump in the temporal distribution of word-cued memories. However, because the account does not aim to explain the reminiscence bump in the distribution of highly significant events, it should be regarded as complementary to the existing accounts.


Author(s):  
Greg Anderson

To conclude the book’ s alternative account of the Athenian politeia, the chapter offers a recursive analysis of the resource flows which made this way of life possible. The result is very different from a conventional modern secular economic analysis. Instead, it treats resource transactions as the lifeblood of a cosmic ecology that united gods, land, and people in a condition of symbiotic interdependency. The most important of all these transactions were those between gods and humans, whereby the latter received secure conditions of existence in exchange for temples, sacrifices, votive treasures, and other often costly ritual offerings. The most important of the resource transactions between humans were marriages, whereby the managerial and reproductive capacities of females were transferred from one household to another, thereby perpetuating the life of the social body. Contrary to the “egalitarian” ethos which moderns believe animated “democratic Athens,” demokratia would also have been unsustainable without the innumerable contributions of resources, material and otherwise, that were made by a relatively small number of super-wealthy Athenian households. And in a polis where members typically worked only for themselves, the existence of these ecologically essential super-wealthy households would have been unsustainable without the routine exploitation of slaves.


Author(s):  
Sarah McGrath

Proponents of moral perception hold that some of our moral knowledge is perceptual knowledge. Discussions of whether moral perception is possible often seem to assume that there is some attractive alternative account of how we arrive at moral knowledge in those cases that are regarded as among the best candidates for cases of full-fledged moral perception. This chapter challenges that assumption by critically examining some alternative accounts of how we arrive at knowledge in the relevant class of cases, arguing that the more closely one examines these alternative accounts, the more implausible they seem as accounts of how we actually manage to arrive at moral knowledge. A modest version of moral perception is sketched, one that does not suffer from any similarly implausible commitments. There are some concluding reflections on why it matters whether some of our moral knowledge is perceptual.


Author(s):  
Paul Hurley

The strategy of consequentializing features that are intuitively relevant to the deontic evaluation of actions by building them into the telic evaluation of outcomes is almost as old as consequentialism itself. But the recent rejection by many consequentialists of the traditional commitment to an agent-neutral constraint on the relevant evaluation of outcomes has ushered in new consequentializing arguments for consequentialism and new consequentialist arguments for consequentializing. While the former fail, the latter ground the case for consequentializing in deeply entrenched and widely held commitments. These commitments to outcome-centered accounts of reasons, actions, and attitudes dictate that any plausible alternative account of what agents rationally and morally ought to do must be a form of consequentialism and hence must have a consequentialized form. Such outcome-centered commitments, however, all run afoul of common sense in similar ways, and a pervasive strategy for mitigating this counter-intuitiveness trades upon a conflation of two distinct senses in which we speak of actions as bringing about outcomes.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110087
Author(s):  
Lauren Aulet ◽  
Sami R Yousif ◽  
Stella Lourenco

Multiple tasks have been used to demonstrate the relation between numbers and space. The classic interpretation of these directional spatial-numerical associations (d-SNAs) is that they are the product of a mental number line (MNL), in which numerical magnitude is intrinsically associated with spatial position. The alternative account is that d-SNAs reflect task demands, such as explicit numerical judgments and/or categorical responses. In the novel ‘Where was The Number?’ task, no explicit numerical judgments were made. Participants were simply required to reproduce the location of a numeral within a rectangular space. Using a between-subject design, we found that numbers, but not letters, biased participants’ responses along the horizontal dimension, such that larger numbers were placed more rightward than smaller numbers, even when participants completed a concurrent verbal working memory task. These findings are consistent with the MNL account, such that numbers specifically are inherently left-to-right oriented in Western participants.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berta Grimau

Abstract In this article, I address the question of the semantic analysis of structured plurals, that is, expressions like these children and those children, which seem to refer to pluralities of individuals divided into groups. In the first half of the article, I describe a variety of structured plural expressions and predicates they can combine with and I point out the difficulties faced by two extant approaches to the semantics of plurals: inflationary and cover-based semantics. In the second half of the article, I propose an alternative account which combines elements from both of them. The main novelty of my proposal is that, by capitalising on the background operation of certain pragmatic principles, it correctly formalises the fact that some interpretations of ambiguous sentences involving structured plurality are more accessible than others.


Author(s):  
Claire Field

AbstractDe Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document