The Politics of Defense Contracting

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Adams
Keyword(s):  
2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 949-969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annie S. McGowan ◽  
Valaria P. Vendrzyk

We test the conjecture from prior research that defense contractors' excess profitability in the 1980s stemmed from their ability to shift common overhead costs to government contracts that typically allow cost reimbursement or price renegotiation (Rogerson 1992; Thomas and Tung 1992; Lichtenberg 1992). Although we confirm prior evidence that defense contractors enjoyed abnormally high profitability on their government work in the 1984–1989 period (a period of relatively low competition for defense contracts), we find no evidence that this excess profitability is attributable to cost shifting. In addition, we find no evidence that the Top 100 defense contractors (firms that likely wield above-average market power) are able to use cost shifting to exploit a lack of competition in the industry. Our results suggest that, contrary to the conjectures in prior research, the unusually high profitability reported on government contracts in 1984–1989 is more likely attributable to nonaccounting explanations than to cost shifting.


1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Reid

Recently there has been great interest in the re-organization of work and its effects on labor relations during the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, particularly in the metal-working and machine industries. Studies of this issue have generally been framed in terms of technological advances in the steel industry in the second half of the nineteenth century, the exigencies of the market during and after the Great Depression of the late nineteenth century, and the efforts of skilled labor to defend its position on the shopfloor. In France and elsewhere the importance of national and international arms sales before 1914 made the armaments industry one of the main arenas of these developments. Until mid-century the defense industry and the business of defense had been under state control in France. Largely for economic reasons, however, the Third Republic turned over increasing amounts of defense contracting, especially in shipbuilding, to private industry. The Etablissements Schneider at Le Creusot, the Compagnie des Aciéries de la Marine at Saint-Chamond and other large private firms established themselves as profitable arms manufacturers. National and foreign government contracts for weaponry encouraged these companies to make large capital investments, to rationalize work to permit greater managerial control, and to develop authoritarian paternalist systems of labor management.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl DeRouen ◽  
Uk Heo
Keyword(s):  

2000 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 753
Author(s):  
Karl Derouen ◽  
Uk Heo

Author(s):  
K. T. Wallenius ◽  
N. K. Womer
Keyword(s):  

2000 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 753-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Derouen ◽  
U K Heo
Keyword(s):  

2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micky Tripathi

This paper examines the political activity of US defense contractors over the years 1980–1994. Using econometric techniques to account for both fixed-effects and selection, I examine the industry determinants and distribution patterns of political action committee (PAC) contributions to the US House of Representatives. The analysis finds that the size of the defense budget is a primary factor explaining political activity across the industry as well as within individual firms; firm size, dependency on defense, and defense contract awards explain much less. I also find that firms appeared to change their political strategies in the face of large exogenous shifts in the US defense budget. While defense expenditures were on the rise, defense firms spread their contributions relatively broadly over the defense committee system; when the budget fell, however, the firms switched strategies and targeted committee leaders. An incidental contribution of the paper is an empirical application of the trimmed least absolute deviations estimator for fixed-effects models with selection.


2010 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 708-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sally Wang

The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, a post-Civil War law inspired by cases of defense contracting fraud, was revitalized in 1986. Since then it has been used to sue both manufacturers and providers of pharmaceuticals. In some cases, these suits were meant to target offlabel marketing of pharmaceuticals. In 2009, the 11th Circuit rendered a decision in Hopper v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals that dramatically limits the ability of private plaintiff whistle-blowers to bring qui tam suits under the FCA for such marketing. In June 2010, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, making the Circuit court decision final. The Solvay decision creates a significant barrier to certain kinds of qui tam suits, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the intent to market off-label, including by showing specific prescriptions that were written as a result of efforts to do so.


1969 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-62
Author(s):  
A. E. Lieberman

To connote a somewhat sinister relationship, or worse, between the Department of Defense and its industrial suppliers, the phrase “military-industry complex” may he invoked. However, all of industry has a role in supplying defense requirements, whether as an active participant or on call. Rather than conspiratorial gain, the element of indenture in industry's responsibility suggests that major companies engaged in defense contracting may soon alter their business emphasis in favor of civilian markets and that the industry stake in DOD as a market may become relatively smaller.


1983 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 333
Author(s):  
Thomas L. McNaugher ◽  
Gordon Adams

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