In recent decades, the United Nations (UN) has directed its peacekeeping operations to be practice-driven. This has led to an alternative approach to state-military contacts, such as those provided by the United States and other nations; the UN is more inclined to consolidate and strengthen its liaisons through Intervention Brigades. The efficacy of these brigades lies in providing military assistance to UN operations and catering to logistics, training, and advice. Advocates of peace, the UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) are based on consent, impartiality, and non-utilization of force (excluding times of civilian protection and self-defense). However, as Intervention Brigades gain momentum, 'robust' peacekeeping is becoming more regulated; thus, promoting 'force' against rebel groups and/or militias. When aligned with robust Intervention Brigades, which utilizes more force than lawfully permitted, UN peacekeeping (UNPK) missions question these operations' credibility, thus blurring the conceptual difference between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Conspicuously, this exploits the traditional principle of impartiality using hard power and violates the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Exemplifying through the case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), this paper aims to discuss the abovementioned discrepancy resulting in complications for the discipline of Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS). As the discipline promotes achieving peace through „soft‟ means, the paper reviews the subject under Chapter VI & VII of the UN charter and highlights the grey areas of IHL applicability in UN peacekeeping and Intervention Brigades.
Participation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in UN peacekeeping operations (1945-1992)