Sheltered Housing — The Conventional Wisdom

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-51
Author(s):  
Alan Butler ◽  
Christine Oldman ◽  
John Greve
Author(s):  
Dawn Langan Teele

In the 1880s, women were barred from voting in all national-level elections, but by 1920 they were going to the polls in nearly thirty countries. What caused this massive change? Contrary to conventional wisdom, it was not because of progressive ideas about women or suffragists' pluck. In most countries, elected politicians fiercely resisted enfranchising women, preferring to extend such rights only when it seemed electorally prudent and necessary to do so. This book demonstrates that the formation of a broad movement across social divides, and strategic alliances with political parties in competitive electoral conditions, provided the leverage that ultimately transformed women into voters. As the book shows, in competitive environments, politicians had incentives to seek out new sources of electoral influence. A broad-based suffrage movement could reinforce those incentives by providing information about women's preferences, and an infrastructure with which to mobilize future female voters. At the same time that politicians wanted to enfranchise women who were likely to support their party, suffragists also wanted to enfranchise women whose political preferences were similar to theirs. In contexts where political rifts were too deep, suffragists who were in favor of the vote in principle mobilized against their own political emancipation. Exploring tensions between elected leaders and suffragists and the uncertainty surrounding women as an electoral group, the book sheds new light on the strategic reasons behind women's enfranchisement.


Author(s):  
Alastair Stark

This chapter examines the logics for action that inquiry actors bring into a lesson-learning episode. Logics for action is a term that describes the knowledge-related preferences that actors use in inquiries to make decisions. Analysis of the logics in these cases leads to three specific arguments. First, that political logics for action do not compromise inquiries in the ways which inquiry research currently suggests. Second, that public-managerial logics are essential to inquiry success in terms of policy learning. Finally, that legal-judicial logics need not necessarily lead to blaming and adversarial proceedings, which derail the lesson-learning function. These three arguments once again suggest that we need to rethink much of the conventional wisdom surrounding inquiries.


Organization ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 135050842097209
Author(s):  
Hugh Willmott

The paper reflects on the experience of preparing a ‘From the Editors’ (FTE) editorial for The Academy of Management Review that went through a process of editorial evaluation prior to its rejection. It provides a detailed example of an encounter between orthodox and heterodox forms of scholarship, illuminating their distinctive value-orientations and forms of engagement. Its specific focus is upon evaluative criteria applied, accountability of decision-making and the mobilization of scholarly aspirations and ethical principles in the preparation and assessment of the FTE. Its intent is to stimulate debate on what it means to ‘challenge conventional wisdom’ – an aim that is broadly shared by ‘top’ journals in the field of management and organization.


Author(s):  
Jacob R. Gunderson

Scholars have long been concerned with the implications of income inequality for democracy. Conventional wisdom suggests that high income inequality is associated with political parties taking polarized positions as the left advocates for increased redistribution while the right aims to entrench the position of economic elites. This article argues that the connection between party positions and income inequality depends on how party bases are sorted by income and the issue content of national elections. It uses data from European national elections from 1996 to 2016 to show that income inequality has a positive relationship with party polarization on economic issues when partisans are sorted with respect to income and when economic issues are relatively salient in elections. When these factors are weak, however, the author finds no relationship between income inequality and polarization.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402199717
Author(s):  
Charles T. McClean

How can incumbent governments benefit when they control the timing of elections? The conventional wisdom is that incumbents gain an advantage by timing elections to coincide with favorable economic conditions. An alternative mechanism that has received less attention is the element of surprise: the incumbent’s ability to exploit the opposition’s lack of election preparedness. I theorize and empirically test this surprise mechanism using candidate-level data from Japanese House of Representatives elections (1955–2017). The results show that in surprise elections, opposition parties recruit fewer, lower-quality candidates, spend less money campaigning, coordinate their candidates less effectively, and ultimately receive fewer votes and seats. Evidence from fixed effects models and exogenously timed by-elections further suggest that surprise matters more in shorter, competitive election campaigns and helps incumbents more with confronting inter-party as opposed to intra-party electoral competition. These findings add to our understanding of how strategic election timing can undermine electoral accountability.


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