Determinism and Infinite Regress

Is all knowledge prepositional?

Theoria Beograd ◽

10.2298/theo0502007a ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 48 (1-2) ◽

pp. 7-19

Author(s):

Miroslava Andjelkovic

Keyword(s):

Propositional Knowledge ◽

The Other ◽

Infinite Regress ◽

Important Distinction ◽

Knowing How ◽

The Asymmetry ◽

Contemporary Epistemology

This paper deals with a criticism of Ryle's claim that the so called Intellectualist legend leads to an infinite regress. Critics have attempted to show that Ryle's argument cannot even get off the ground since its two basic premises cannot be true at the same time. In the paper I argue that this objection is based on a misinterpretation of Ryle's argumentation, which is complex and consists of two arguments, not of a single one as it is claimed. One of Ryle's argument attacks the thesis that an intelligent act is an indirect result of propositional knowledge, while the other, which I call the Asymmetry argument, claims that not every manifestation of knowledge that is accompanied with the manifestation of knowing how. In the paper I argue that both Ryle's arguments are valid and resistant to recent critique so it can be said that Ryle's distinction between knowledge that and knowing how is still an important distinction within contemporary epistemology.

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An Argument from Contingency

10.1093/oso/9780198746898.003.0003 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Alexander R. Pruss ◽

Joshua L. Rasmussen

Keyword(s):

Infinite Regress ◽

Plural Logic ◽

Classic Argument

A classic argument from contingency is presented in the language of contemporary plural logic. Included are several independent supports for the principle of explanation that drives the argument. The argument is tested with the instrument of objections. Thus, historical objections from Hume and Kant are examined, and then a series of more recent objections to arguments from contingency is considered. Objections include various reasons to doubt, or hesitate to accept, the principle of explanation. Whether the argument could be sound even if there were an infinite regress of causes is carefully considered. The chapter closes by citing both strengths and weaknesses of the argument.

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Core Criteria I

10.1093/oso/9780198793670.003.0004 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Sanford C. Goldberg

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Processes ◽

Point Of View ◽

Infinite Regress ◽

Belief Formation ◽

Forming Process ◽

Epistemic Criteria ◽

Problem Of The Criterion

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.

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A Note on T. G. Smith's “The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress”

Dialogue ◽

10.1017/s0012217300050563 ◽

1970 ◽

Vol 8 (4) ◽

pp. 678-679

Author(s):

F. F. Centore

Keyword(s):

Infinite Regress ◽

Theory Of Forms

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(Non)Issues of Infinite Regress in Modeling Motor Behavior

Journal of Motor Behavior ◽

10.1080/00222899809601326 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 30 (1) ◽

pp. 94-96 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Robert M. Kohl ◽

Haim A. Ben-David

Keyword(s):

Motor Behavior ◽

Infinite Regress

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Locations

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1979.10716253 ◽

1979 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

pp. 323-333 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

William J. Edgar

Keyword(s):

Infinite Divisibility ◽

Infinite Regress ◽

Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽

Ontological Analysis

Zeno's challenge to the usual mathematical characterization of extension is still with us. Butchvarov, considering the limits of ontological analysis, writes, “I shall not explore [the decision to accept the infinite regress in which the pursuit of the analytical ideal is involved], beyond noting that the infinite divisibility of space is the reductio ad absurdum of any attempt to understand space in terms of its ultimate, simple parts.” Grünbaum states this problem, commonly known as the Measure Paradox, concisely, “[How can one conceive] of an extended continuum as an aggregate of unextended elements ?”

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