A Note on T. G. Smith's “The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress”

Dialogue ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 678-679
Author(s):  
F. F. Centore
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Theory Of Forms

Relations and Infinite Regress in Plato

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-542
Author(s):  
Spiro Panagiotou
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Vicious Regress ◽  
Theory Of Forms

In a recent paper on “The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infiinite Regress” (Dialogue, Vol. 8 [1969–70], 116 ff.), T. G. Smith claims to have trapped Plato's theory of Forms in a vicious regress. According to Smith, the regress is “the consequence of 1) Plato's view that there are Forms for relations; 2) The view that the exemplifications of Forms are derivative and owe their lesser degree of reality to their relationship to their Form; 3) the consequence that each relation between a set of particulars and their Form must be intelligibly distinct and different from the relation holding between all other sets of particulars and their respective forms [Forms ?]” (p. 121). I have no particular quarrel with (1) and (2), but I cannot agree with (3). In what follows I hope to show that (3) not only cannot be extracted from Plato but it is patently false. In section I I shall outline Smith's argument. I shall then present in section II my case against it. I shall make some general remarks in section III.

The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress

Dialogue ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-123
Author(s):  
T. G. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
General Nature ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Half Century ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Half Century ◽  
Theory Of Forms ◽  
Past Half

Several difficulties that accompany Plato's theory of Forms have received considerable attention in the philosophical literature in the past half century. A great deal of discussion and controversy surrounds the dialogue Parmenides and the group of considerations commonly called the “Third Man Argument”. Our purpose here is to strike out in one direction suggested by this passage (Parmenides 132 a-b, 132 d), but it can in no way be thought of as an exegesis nor a logical elucidation of the “Third Man Argument” itself. While what we shall say here has an obvious affinity and connection with the Parmenides passage, the two principal questions that concern us here are of a more general nature than the specific points in the Parmenides. The first is whether Plato's theory of Forms involves a regress which is ruinous to the theory. The second is, if a self-destructive regress is a necessary consequence of the theory, what elements of Plato's theory make the regress inescapable.

The Third Man and the Coherence of the Parmenides

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Peacock
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
The Third ◽  
Internal Coherence ◽  
Theory Of Forms ◽  
Eleatic Monism

The ‘Third Man’ in the Parmenides is often reconstructed in terms of unstated background commitments of the Theory of Forms; thus it seems to threaten the internal coherence of that theory. However, the regress can be derived solely from premises explicitly stated within the dialogue, and blocked simply by giving up one candidate account of participation, leaving the central commitments of the Theory of Forms intact. Consequently, the problem highlighted by the argument is not an infinite regress of Forms, but merely the lack of an adequate account of participation. This reading facilitates a coherent account of the dialogue as a whole, using the ‘scorecard’ approach outlined by Zeno himself, and developed more recently for contemporary metaphysics by Lewis and Armstrong: Part I acknowledges non-fatal difficulties for the Forms which are then eclipsed by more serious issues for Eleatic monism in Part II.

Is all knowledge prepositional?

2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Miroslava Andjelkovic
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This paper deals with a criticism of Ryle's claim that the so called Intellectualist legend leads to an infinite regress. Critics have attempted to show that Ryle's argument cannot even get off the ground since its two basic premises cannot be true at the same time. In the paper I argue that this objection is based on a misinterpretation of Ryle's argumentation, which is complex and consists of two arguments, not of a single one as it is claimed. One of Ryle's argument attacks the thesis that an intelligent act is an indirect result of propositional knowledge, while the other, which I call the Asymmetry argument, claims that not every manifestation of knowledge that is accompanied with the manifestation of knowing how. In the paper I argue that both Ryle's arguments are valid and resistant to recent critique so it can be said that Ryle's distinction between knowledge that and knowing how is still an important distinction within contemporary epistemology.

An Argument from Contingency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Joshua L. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Plural Logic ◽  
Classic Argument

A classic argument from contingency is presented in the language of contemporary plural logic. Included are several independent supports for the principle of explanation that drives the argument. The argument is tested with the instrument of objections. Thus, historical objections from Hume and Kant are examined, and then a series of more recent objections to arguments from contingency is considered. Objections include various reasons to doubt, or hesitate to accept, the principle of explanation. Whether the argument could be sound even if there were an infinite regress of causes is carefully considered. The chapter closes by citing both strengths and weaknesses of the argument.

Core Criteria I

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Epistemic Criteria ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.

Plato’s Philosophy of Language

2019 ◽  
pp. 480-505
Author(s):  
Paolo Crivelli
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
The Third ◽  
Linguistic Dimension ◽  
Theory Of Forms

Ideas in and problems of philosophy of language surface frequently in Plato’s dialogues. Some passages briefly formulate, or presuppose, views about names, signification, truth, or falsehood; others are extended discussions of important themes of philosophy of language. This chapter focuses on three topics. The first is the linguistic dimension of the theory of Forms; the second is the discussion of names in the Cratylus, Plato’s only dialogue almost completely dedicated to linguistic themes; the third is the examination of semantic and ontological issues in the Sophist, whose linguistic section (259d9‒264b10) presents Plato’s most mature reflections on statements, truth, and falsehood.

Plato in his Time and Place

2019 ◽  
pp. 39-67
Author(s):  
Malcolm Schofield
Keyword(s):  
Historical Context ◽  
Literary Production ◽  
Chronological Sequence ◽  
Theory Of Forms

This chapter attempts to situate Plato’s philosophizing and literary production in its historical context. The evidence external to the dialogues that such an enterprise can rely on is either scrappy or suspect, or both. Thus, what is offered here is a series of snapshots that follow a chronological sequence, from Plato’s relationship with Socrates and the Athens that executed him; through his momentous first visit to Italy and Sicily and its impact on his thinking about politics and philosophy; to the founding of the Academy, Plato’s rivalry with Isocrates, and the birth of the theory of Forms; and ending with the worlds of the late dialogues.

Mathematics—Application and Applicability

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Steiner
Keyword(s):  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Major Premise ◽  
Great Books ◽  
Applicability Of Mathematics ◽  
History Of ◽  
Theory Of Forms

To an unappreciated degree, the history of Western philosophy is the history of attempts to understand why mathematics is applicable to Nature, despite apparently good reasons to believe that it should not be. A cursory look at the great books of philosophy bears this out. Plato's Republic invokes the theory of “participation” to explain why, for instance, geometry is applicable to ballistics and the practice of war, despite the Theory of Forms, which places mathematical entities in a different (higher) realm of being than that of empirical Nature. This argument is part of Plato's general claim that theoretical learning, in the end, is more useful than “practical” pursuits. John Stuart Mill's account of the applicability of mathematics to nature is unique: it is the only one of the major Western philosophies which denies the major premise upon which all other accounts are based. Mill simply asserts that mathematics itself is empirical, so there is no problem to begin with.

(Non)Issues of Infinite Regress in Modeling Motor Behavior

1998 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Kohl ◽  
Haim A. Ben-David
Keyword(s):  
Motor Behavior ◽  
Infinite Regress
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