The structure of scientific controversies: Thomas Kuhn’s social epistemology

Changes of theories are major events in science. Two main types of questions may be asked about them: i) how do scientists choose new theories?, and ii) how is consensus formed? Generally, philosophers do not distinguish these two questions. Kuhn, on the contrary, offers very different answers to each of these questions. Theory-choice, on the one hand, is explained through the application of epistemic criteria, such as accuracy and consistency; nonetheless, because these values do not prescribe a single choice, consensus formation, on the other hand, is explained through a series of socio-epistemic mechanisms, namely: scientific pedagogy, diffusion and production of knowledge within the community (the “wave motion”), and restructuring of the scientific field. These mechanisms are the basis of Kuhn’s social epistemology, in that they are not restricted to sociology nor epistemology, encompassing both social interactions and epistemic evaluations of theories. Keywords: Thomas Kuhn, consensus formation, social epistemology.

Chi-square Reference Meanings: a Historical-epistemological Overview

The present article shows a historical-epistemological study on the Chi-square statistic. In which theoretical-methodological notions from the Onto-Semiotic Approach (OSA) of mathematical cognition and instruction were used to identify four problems that have been key to the evolution of the Chi-square statistic: the Goodness-of-fit-test, the test of independence, the test of homogeneity and distribution. Furthermore, various meanings of the Chi-square statistic were recognized in the mathematical-statistical practices that are used to solve each of those problems. These meanings could help to establish epistemic criteria that allow, on the one hand, to propose progressive levels of inferential reasoning for the statistic (from informal to formal); and on the other hand, to design tasks oriented to promote the understanding of the diverse meanings of the Chi-square.

Historical Narratives and Understanding

This paper defends the view that narratives that bring understanding of the past need not be exhaustively analyzable as explanatory inferences, nor as causal narratives. Instead of treating historical narrative as explanations, I argue that understanding of history can be analyzed by the general epistemic criteria of understanding. I explore one such criterion, which is of chief importance for good historical narratives: potential inferential power. As a corollary, I dispute one of the distinctive features of narratives described by some philosophers: the non-aggregativity of narrative histories. Instead, I propose that historical narratives modestly aggregate and this aggregation depends on the success of the colligatory concepts they offer.

Epistemic Criteria for Designing Limit Tasks on a Real Variable Function

This article aims at presenting the results of a historical-epistemological study conducted to identify criteria for designing tasks that promote the understanding of the limit notion on a real variable function. As a theoretical framework, we used the Onto-Semiotic Approach (OSA) to mathematical knowledge and instruction, to identify the regulatory elements of mathematical practices developed throughout history, and that gave way to the emergence, evolution, and formalization of limit. As a result, we present a proposal of criteria that summarizes fundamental epistemic aspects, which could be considered when designing tasks that allow the promotion of each of the six meanings identified for the limit notion. The criteria presented allow us to highlight not only the mathematical complexity underlying the study of limit on a real variable function but also the richness of meanings that could be developed to help understand this notion.

Pre-service teachers' use of epistemic criteria in the assessment of scientific procedures for identifying microplastics in beach sand

This study addresses the use of epistemic criteria related to the scientific practice of inquiry in the context of environmental chemistry. In particular, it analyses the type of criteria that are used by pre-service teachers when assessing the adequacy of several scientific procedures for identifying microplastics in beach sand, as well as determining the ways in which these participants make use of said criteria. The participants were 22 pre-service primary teachers who were divided into small groups of 3–4 participants who were given the task of assessing the scientific quality of three different procedures before selecting which they considered to be the best option. The data collected includes audio recordings of the participants' small group conversations and their written comments. The data analysis is framed in qualitative content analysis, in which the participants' conversations were transcribed and coded using the ATLAS.ti software. The coding frameworks that were used to address each research question were developed by taking into consideration both the literature and the collected data. The main results indicate different patterns in terms of the types of criteria that were used in the participants' assessments, as well as the different uses of criteria within each of the small groups. These results could have been influenced by the participant's limited knowledge of both scientific inquiry and chemistry.

Criteria for Moral Realism

This chapter discusses the nature of moral realism, identifying desiderata that the view defended here (Compassionate Moral Realism) needs to meet. First, the general idea behind the moral realism/anti-realism distinction is described, drawing on Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s work: the issue of whether morality lives up to its apparent importance and objectivity. Several approaches to defining the distinction are described and clarified. These approaches concern paradigmatic views, the literal truth of moral claims, stance-independent moral facts, and (drawing on Sharon Street’s work) an epistemic asymmetry between virtuous and vicious agents. It is claimed that it is sufficient for moral realism to hold if these semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic criteria are jointly satisfied. Certain robust metaphysical criteria such as metaphysical fundamentality are also considered, but are rejected as necessary conditions for moral realism.