Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological Disjunctivism

BackgroundPatients with higher health literacy enjoy better health outcomes and are more compliant with treatment. Health literacy is a product of memory, reason and imagination. Patients who can access their records have potentially more memory (knowledge) and make less phone calls to and have less consultations with their GP, practice nurse, HCA and other professionals.AimThe study aims to measure the knowledge that twenty Bangladeshi patients with poor English have of their medical history before and after access to their electronic record.Method55% of patients at Thornley House have access to their medical records. A simple questionnaire was given to 20 Bangladeshi patients before and 5 months after access to their electronic record. The questionnaires recorded the patients’ knowledge of their medical histories. The scores of the completed before and after questionnaires were compared to see if record access had increased patients’ knowledge.ResultsFive patients completed before and after questionnaires. Each achieved a higher score after record access. The differences in scores for the five patients were 2, 5, 1, 10, and 1, respectively.ConclusionHealth literacy for patients is similar to medical literacy for doctors. It requires knowledge, skills and attitudes. We will see whether record access can increase knowledge. Further studies might measure whether that increased knowledge improves skills and attitudes.

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Reflective Knowledge

10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0010 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Chienkuo Mi ◽

Shane Ryan

Keyword(s):

Extended Cognition ◽

Dual Process ◽

Dual Process Theory ◽

Process Theory ◽

Reflective Knowledge ◽

Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽

Recent Account

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.

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The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge: a new solution to the basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism

Synthese ◽

10.1007/s11229-017-1590-x ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 196 (7) ◽

pp. 2871-2884

Author(s):

Kegan J. Shaw

Keyword(s):

Perceptual Knowledge ◽

Basis Problem ◽

Epistemological Disjunctivism

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Stranded Runners

Logos & Episteme ◽

10.5840/logos-episteme202112210 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 145-152

Author(s):

Christopher T. Buford ◽

Keyword(s):

Epistemological Disjunctivism

Those who endorse a knowledge-first program in epistemology claim that rather than attempting to understand knowledge in terms of more fundamental notions or relations such as belief and justification, we should instead understand knowledge as being in some sense prior to such concepts and/or relations. If we suppose that this is the correct approach to theorizing about knowledge, we are left with a residual question about the nature of those concepts or relations, such as justification, that were thought to be first but are now second. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has recently proposed that we understand justification in terms of potential knowledge. Ichikawa combines his view of knowledge and justification with what initially seems to be a natural complement, epistemological disjunctivism. While Ichikawa focuses on hallucination, I shift the focus to illusion. I argue that the combination of justification as potential knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism entails that perceptual beliefs that arise from illusions are not justified.

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