Reflecting on individual differences in young children: cognitive style and early education

2017 ◽  
pp. 217-226
Author(s):  
Bernard Spodek
1992 ◽  
Vol 37 (6) ◽  
pp. 610-610
Author(s):  
No authorship indicated

2010 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARILYN VIHMAN ◽  
TAMAR KEREN-PORTNOY

Carol Stoel-Gammon has made a real contribution in bringing together two fields that are not generally jointly addressed. Like Stoel-Gammon, we have long focused on individual differences in phonological development (e.g. Vihman, Ferguson & Elbert, 1986; Vihman, Boysson-Bardies, Durand & Sundberg, 1994; Keren-Portnoy, Majorano & Vihman, 2008). And like her, we have been closely concerned with the relationship between lexical and phonological learning. Accordingly, we will focus our discussion on two areas covered by Stoel-Gammon (this issue) on which our current work may shed some additional light.


1969 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 933-934 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert S. Dreyer ◽  
Edwin Nebelkopf ◽  
Cecily A. Dreyer

Test-retest data for the Children's Embedded-figures Test are presented for 46 children tested in kindergarten and again in Grade 1. Scores on both administrations correlated .87, indicating stability of this cognitive-style measure for these young children over a 6-mo. period.


2001 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judy Dunn ◽  
Alexandra L. Cutting

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Bastien Trémolière

People experience a strong conflict while condemning someone who brought about an accidental harm, her innocent intention exonerating her, but the harmful outcome incriminating her. In the present research (total N = 4879), we explore how reasoning ability and cognitive style relate to how people choose to resolve this conflict and judge the accidental harms. A first set of studies (1a-c) showed that individual differences in cognitive style predicted severity of judgments in fictitious accidental harms scenarios, with more able (or willing) reasoners being less harsh in their judgments. A second set of studies (2a-c) relied on experimental manipulations of cognitive load (Dot matrix, Time pressure, Mortality Salience manipulations), aiming to tax available cognitive resources to participants while evaluating third-party harmful behaviors. These manipulations, however, failed to modulate people’s moral judgments for accidental harms. We discuss the importance of individual differences in reasoning ability in the assessment of accidental harms, and we also propose potential explanations for the failure of our experimental manipulations to affect severity of moral condemnation.


1975 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 983-998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosslyn Gaines

The perceptual skills and cognitive styles of 30 master artists are compared to those of non-artist groups of different ages, beginning with 84 kindergarten children, and including an adult comparison group of 32. Criteria for master artists were first, handcrafted productions; second, major economic support derived from their art; third, shows in museums or good galleries; and fourth, positive peer evaluation. The test battery contained one intelligence test, two vision tests, three perceptual-discrimination measures, and five perceptual-cognitive style measures. Results show artists are significantly more flexible, accurate, variable, and field independent than all other groups. Artists, non-artist adults, and young children (60 high school sophomores, 60 children in Grade 5, 84 kindergarteners) each have differing cognitive styles. The relationship between cognitive style and artists' and non-artists' instrumental competency is discussed. Last, the extensive differences between artists' and children's performances are discussed in terms of developmental theory.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document