scholarly journals I think, therefore I forgive: The role of reasoning in forgiving accidental harms

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Bastien Trémolière
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Time Pressure ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Cognitive Resources ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Condemnation

People experience a strong conflict while condemning someone who brought about an accidental harm, her innocent intention exonerating her, but the harmful outcome incriminating her. In the present research (total N = 4879), we explore how reasoning ability and cognitive style relate to how people choose to resolve this conflict and judge the accidental harms. A first set of studies (1a-c) showed that individual differences in cognitive style predicted severity of judgments in fictitious accidental harms scenarios, with more able (or willing) reasoners being less harsh in their judgments. A second set of studies (2a-c) relied on experimental manipulations of cognitive load (Dot matrix, Time pressure, Mortality Salience manipulations), aiming to tax available cognitive resources to participants while evaluating third-party harmful behaviors. These manipulations, however, failed to modulate people’s moral judgments for accidental harms. We discuss the importance of individual differences in reasoning ability in the assessment of accidental harms, and we also propose potential explanations for the failure of our experimental manipulations to affect severity of moral condemnation.

scholarly journals Signaling when no one is watching: A reputation heuristics account of outrage and punishment in one-shot anonymous interactions

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jillian Jordan ◽  
David Gertler Rand
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Mechanical Turk ◽  
Amazon Mechanical Turk ◽  
Moral Outrage ◽  
Total N ◽  
Mediation Analyses ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Using Data

Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. But why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation concerns can shape moral outrage and punishment even in one-shot anonymous interactions. We then support this account using data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In anonymous experiments, subjects (total n = 8440) report more outrage in response to others’ selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing with a third party)—such that if the interaction were not anonymous, punishment would have greater signaling value. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by decreasing reputation concerns. Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. And importantly, moderation analyses provide some evidence that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy towards selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, we support the specific role of heuristics by investigating individual differences in deliberateness. Less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in our anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (total n = 3422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues nonetheless can shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.

scholarly journals I Think, Therefore I Forgive: The Role of Reasoning in Forgiving Accidental Harms

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Bastien Trémolière
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
The Way

Abstract People experience a strong conflict while evaluating actors who unintentionally harmed someone - her innocent intention exonerating her, while the harmful outcome incriminating her. Different people solve this conflict differently, suggesting the presence of dispositional moderators of the way the conflict is processed. In the present research, we explore how reasoning ability and cognitive style relate to how people choose to resolve this conflict and judge accidental harms. We conducted three studies in which we made vary the reasoning measures and the population. The results showed that individual differences in reasoning ability and cognitive style predicted severity of judgments in fictitious accidental harms scenarios, with better reasoners being less harsh in their judgments. Internal meta-analysis confirmed that this effect was robust only for accidental harms. We discuss the importance of individual differences in reasoning ability in the assessment of accidental harms.

scholarly journals Disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity: The role of transgression weirdness

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fieke Maria Antoinet Wagemans ◽  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Marcel Zeelenberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Moral Transgressions ◽  
The Relationship

Disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to moral judgments in the purity domain than to moral judgments in other moral domains. While this finding highlights the distinctiveness of moral domains, anti-modularity accounts suggest that the relationship is caused by the relative weirdness of purity transgressions and come to the conclusion that moral domains do not represent distinct mechanisms. In two studies (total N = 2,307), we test whether transgression weirdness accounts for disgust sensitivity’s stronger association with moral judgments of the purity as compared to other moral domains, but find little evidence for this claim. The relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity even remains when taking into account both (perceived) weirdness and (perceived) harmfulness of moral transgressions. These studies show that transgression weirdness and harmfulness cannot explain the disgust sensitivity–purity link, contradicting predictions following from popular anti-modularity accounts.

scholarly journals Priming intuition disfavors instrumental harm but not impartial beneficence

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Brian D. Earp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
Total N ◽  
Two Dimensional Model ◽  
Do So

Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgment is one of most pressing problems in psychological science. Some highly-cited studies suggest that reliance on intuition decreases utilitarian (expected welfare maximizing) judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas in which one has to decide whether to instrumentally harm (IH) one person to save a greater number of people. However, recent work suggests that such dilemmas are limited in that they fail to capture the positive, defining core of utilitarianism: commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). Accordingly, a new two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment has been proposed that distinguishes IH and IB components. The role of intuition on this new model has not been studied. Does relying on intuition disfavor utilitarian choices only along the dimension of instrumental harm or does it also do so along the dimension of impartial beneficence? To answer this question, we conducted three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) using conceptual priming of intuition versus deliberation on moral judgments. Our evidence converges on an interaction effect, with intuition decreasing utilitarian judgments in IH—as suggested by previous work—but failing to do so in IB. These findings bolster the recently proposed two-dimensional model of utilitarian moral judgment, and point to new avenues for future research.

scholarly journals Disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with purity-based moral judgments

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fieke Maria Antoinet Wagemans ◽  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Marcel Zeelenberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Personality Characteristics ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Foundations Theory ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Moral Condemnation

Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (purity, authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and liberty). Other perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with judgments of specific moral domains (e.g., primarily purity). However, no study has systematically tested if disgust sensitivity is associated with moral judgments of the purity domain specifically, more generally to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, or to moral judgments of all of the moral domains equally. Across five studies (total N = 1104), we find consistent evidence for the notion that disgust sensitivity relates more strongly to moral condemnation of purity-based transgression (meta-analytic r = .40) than to moral condemnation of transgressions of any of the other domains (range meta-analytic r’s: .07 ̶ .27). Our findings are in line with predictions from Moral Foundations Theory, which predicts that personality characteristics like disgust sensitivity make people more sensitive to a certain set of moral issues.

scholarly journals Elevated moral condemnation of third-party violations in multiple sclerosis patients

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Liane Young ◽  
Vladimiro Sinay ◽  
Ezequiel Gleichgerrcht
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Sclerosis ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Severe Punishment ◽  
Multiple Sclerosis Patients ◽  
Judg Ments

Recent research has demonstrated impairments in social cognition associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). The present work asks whether these impairments are associated with atypical moral judgment. Specifically, we assessed whether MS patients are able to integrate information about intentions and outcomes for moral judgment (i.e., appropriateness and punishment judg- ments) in the case of third-party acts. We found a complex pattern of moral judgments in MS patients: although their moral judgments were comparable to controls’ for specific types of acts (e.g., accidental or intentional harms), they nevertheless judged behaviors to be less appropriate and endorsed more severe punishment across the board, and they were also more likely to report that others’ responses would be congruent with theirs. Further analyses suggested that elevated levels of externally oriented cognition in MS (due to co-occurring alexithymia) explain these effects. Additionally, we found that the distinction between appropriateness and punishment judgments, whereby harmful outcomes influence punishment judgments to a greater extent than appropriateness judgments, was preserved in MS despite the observed disruptions in the affective and motivational components of empathy. The current results inform the two-process model for intent-based moral judgments as well as possible strategies for improving the quality of life in MS patients.

The Motivation for Facebook Use – Is it a Matter of Bonding or Control Over Others?

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rayna Sariyska ◽  
Bernd Lachmann ◽  
Cecilia Cheng ◽  
Augusto Gnisci ◽  
Ida Sergi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Motivational Factors ◽  
Motivation Theory ◽  
Total N ◽  
Frequency Of Use ◽  
Facebook Use ◽  
Two Factors

Abstract. In the present study, we investigated individual differences in the motivation for Facebook use. In total N = 736 participants from Europe and Asia took part in the study. They filled in the Facebook questionnaire (FQ), including the two factors Attitude toward Facebook and Online Sociability, and the Unified Motive Scale (UMS-3), measuring the motives Achievement, Affiliation, Intimacy, Power, and Fear. The results showed that the Attitude toward Facebook was more positive in the subsample from Asia, but no differences could be found between the Asian and European sample with respect to the frequency of use of different activities on Facebook. The motives Fear, Power, Affiliation, and Intimacy significantly predicted the FQ factor Attitudes. Furthermore, the Attitude toward Facebook mediated the associations between the motives Power/Affiliation and Online Sociability. However, these results were only found for the European sample. The associations found suggest the important role of different motives such as Power/Affiliation for the study of Facebook use. The present work shows the possibility of motivational factors for Facebook use to differ depending on the culture. The study adds to the literature by investigating a classic motivation theory in the context of Facebook use.

The Role of Individual Differences in Determining Interaction Strategies and Performance on Computer Based Tasks

1995 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 248-252
Author(s):  
Jennifer A. Bohan ◽  
Rafael Marshall ◽  
Deborah A. Boehm-Davis ◽  
Astrid Schmidt-Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
Noun Pair ◽  
Field Dependency ◽  
Reasoning Abilities ◽  
Cognitive Reasoning ◽  
Computer Based ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Computer Tasks

In completing any given task, whether it be driving or a computer task, indviduals have a wide array of strategies available to them. Investigations of computer tasks have shown that individual differences of cognitive styles and abilites are related to the types of strategies individuals use to complete the task (Schmidt-Nielsen and Ackerman, 1993). Typically, those who have higher reasoning abilities use more sophisticated strategies for performing the task than those with a lower level of ability. Further, it has been demonstrated that these strategies tend to hold over a variety of tasks. For example, performance on a computer graphing task was shown to be correlated to cognitive reasoning ability. The current study extended the work of Schmidt-Nielsen and Ackerman and found that there were a wide variety of performance strategies and these strategies were correlated with reasoning ability, field dependency, and performance on the noun pair task.

Field Dependence and the Role of Visual Frameworks in the Perception of Size

Perception ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 661-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Sigman ◽  
Philip K Oltman
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Field Dependence ◽  
Large Range ◽  
Apparent Size ◽  
Target Figure ◽  
Field Independent ◽  
Field Dependent

The extent to which apparent size is relationally determined has been studied by Rock and Ebenholtz and by Wenderoth, who came to widely differing conclusions as to the magnitude of this phenomenon. In both studies, a large range of individual differences was observed. In the present study, an attempt was made to account for variations in the influence of visual contexts on the perception of size by relating them to the cognitive style dimension of field dependence/independence. In two situations, relatively field-dependent observers made size judgments which were influenced by a frame surrounding the target figure, while relatively field-independent observers tended to be less influenced by the frame, making their judgments approximate the retinal size of the target. The results suggest that assessment of the magnitude of the relational determination of apparent size must consider the cognitive style of the observers as well as situational variations.

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