The Hungarian Revolution (1848–49): Unexpected Defeats and Nagging Commitment Problems

2016 ◽  
pp. 61-77
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Marie-Christine THAIZE CHALLIER

This paper is an empirical analysis to explore the relationships between urban conflict and both rent seeking and corruption. It examines social disturbances in medieval France through a sample of twelve towns examined over the period 1270-1399 in a real context of informational asymmetries, commitment problems, and issues indivisibilities. As regards the economic corruption class, it is found that townspeople rebel more often and more intensely against the extortion of funds carried out by policy makers than against the embezzlement of a part of these funds. As to the political corruption class, the findings highlight that abuse of power against municipalities is identified in more social unrest than influence peddling against these local institutions. Furthermore, it is shown that rent-seeking-related policies (like arbitrary actions limiting property rights, economic rules-based policies, and targeted political measures) have less influence on urban conflict than corrupt policies do. These findings produce insights that apply beyond the historical context and analysis of the paper. Situations presenting over-indebted towns despite overtaxed people disturb also modern democracies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0309524X2199244
Author(s):  
Vineet Kumar ◽  
Ram Naresh ◽  
Amita Singh

The Unit Commitment (UC) is a significant act of optimization in day-to-day operational planning of modern power systems. After load forecasting, UC is the subsequent step in the planning process. The electric utilities decide in advance which units are to start-up, when to connect them to the network, the sequence in which the generating units should be shut down and for how long. In view of the above, this paper attempts on presenting a thorough and precise review of the recent approaches applied in optimizing UC problems, incorporating both stochastic and deterministic loads, based on various peer reviewed published research papers of reputed journals. It emphasizes on non-conventional energy and distributed power generating systems along with deregulated and regulated environment. Along with an overview, a comprehensive analysis of the UC algorithms reported in the recent past since 2015 has been discussed for the assistance of new researchers concerned with this domain.


1975 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 113-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Péter Hanák

By abolishing feudalism, the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 helped to create the economic preconditions and the legal-political framework necessary for capitalistic development. This made it possible for Hungary to adapt her economy to the market possibilities offered by the Industrial Revolution in western and central Europe and to share in the agrarian boom of the period between 1850 and 1873. The previously existing division of labor between western and eastern Europe and between the western and eastern parts of the Habsburg monarchy continued on a scale larger than before, with the significant difference, however, that this practice now speeded up rather than retarded the development of preconditions for capitalism. During the first half of the nineteenth century the preconditions for capitalism had come into existence in the Cisleithanian provinces at considerable expense to the Hungarian economy.


2010 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Nalepa

How can outgoing autocrats enforce promises of amnesty once they have left power? Why would incoming opposition parties honor their prior promises of amnesty once they have assumed power and face no independent mechanisms of enforcement? In 1989 autocrats in a number of communist countries offered their respective oppositions free elections in exchange for promises of amnesty. The communists' decision appears irrational given the lack of institutions to enforce these promises of amnesty. What is further puzzling is that the former opposition parties that won elections in many countries actually refrained from implementing transitional justice measures. Their decision to honor their prior agreements to grant amnesty seems as irrational as the autocrats' decisions to place themselves at the mercy of their opponents. Using an analytic narrative approach, the author explains this paradox by modeling pacted transitions not as simple commitment problems but as games of incomplete information where the uninformed party has “skeletons in its closet”—that is, embarrassing information that provides insurance against the commitments being broken. The author identifies the conditions under which autocrats step down even though they can be punished with transitional justice and illustrates the results with case studies from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.


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