scholarly journals Panpsychism and Russellian Monism

2019 ◽  
pp. 230-242
Author(s):  
Torin Alter ◽  
Sam Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Russellian Monism

Panpsychism versus Panprotopsychism and the Subject-Summing Problem

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Goff
Keyword(s):  
Macro Level ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Combination Problem ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Russellian Monism ◽  
Nature Of Matter

This is the first of two chapters discussing the most notorious problem facing Russellian monism: the combination problem. This is actually a family of difficulties, each reflecting the challenge of how to make sense of everyday human and animal experience intelligibly arising from more fundamental conscious or protoconscious features of reality. Key challenges facing panpsychist and panpsychist forms of Russellian monism are considered. With respect to panprotopsychism, there is the worry that it collapses into noumenalism: the view that human beings, by their very nature, are unable to understand the concrete, categorical nature of matter. With respect to panpsychism, there is the subject-summing problem: the difficulty making sense of how micro-level conscious subjects combine to produce macro-level conscious subjects. A solution to the subject-summing problem is proposed, and it is ultimately argued that panpsychist forms of the Russellian monism are to be preferred on grounds of simplicity and elegance.

Russellian Monism and Structuralism About Physics

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torin Alter ◽  
Derk Pereboom
Keyword(s):  
Russellian Monism

Russellian Monism

2020 ◽  
pp. 300-327
Author(s):  
Philip Goff ◽  
Sam Coleman
Keyword(s):  
What Is Said ◽  
Categorical Properties ◽  
Russellian Monism

Russellian monism is a quite general approach to the problem of consciousness, which comes in a variety of forms depending on what is said about the categorical properties of basic physical entities. We can usefully distinguish between panpsychist and panprotopsychist forms. Panpsychist Russellian monists hold that the categorical properties of basic physical entities are experiential properties. Panprotopsychist Russellian monists hold that the categorical properties of basic physical entities are proto-experiential, where proto-experiential properties are not themselves experiential properties but are crucial ingredients in facts that explain the production of consciousness. The first half of this chapter will discuss panpsychist forms of Russellian monism, the second half will discuss panprotopsychist forms.

scholarly journals Russellian monism and mental causation

Noûs ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torin Alter ◽  
Sam Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Russellian Monism

Top–Down Combination Problems

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Goff
Keyword(s):  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Top Down ◽  
The Third ◽  
Mismatch Problem ◽  
Combination Problem ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Russellian Monism

This chapter discusses three forms of the combination problem for Russellian monism: the palette problem, the structural mismatch problem, and the subject irreducibility problem. These are grouped together as “top–down combination problems,” meaning that they start from reflection on the nature of ordinary human consciousness/conscious subjects. Top–down combination problems provide challenges both to panpsychist and to panprotopsychist forms of Russellian monism. Responses to the palette problem and the structural mismatch problem are proposed. The third problem, subject irreducibility, is argued to be the most profound challenge for the Russellian monist, and its resolution is postponed to the next chapter.

Consciousness and Fundamental Reality

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Goff
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Knowledge Argument ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Conceivability Argument ◽  
Animal Consciousness ◽  
Fundamental Nature ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
The World ◽  
Philosophical Project ◽  
Russellian Monism

A core philosophical project is the attempt to uncover the fundamental nature of reality, the limited set of facts upon which all other facts depend. Perhaps the most popular theory of fundamental reality in contemporary analytic philosophy is physicalism: the view that the world is fundamentally physical in nature. The first half of this book argues that physicalist views cannot account for the evident reality of conscious experience and hence that physicalism cannot be true. However, the book also tries to show that familiar arguments to this conclusion—Frank Jackson’s form of the knowledge argument and David Chalmers’ two-dimensional conceivability argument—are not wholly adequate. The second half of the book explores and defends a radical alternative to physicalism known as “Russellian monism.” Russellian monists believe that (i) physics tells us nothing about the concrete, categorical nature of material entities, and that (ii) it is this “hidden” nature of matter that explains human and animal consciousness. Throughout the second half of the book various forms of Russellian monism are surveyed, and the key challenges facing it are discussed. Ultimately the book defends a cosmopsychist form of Russellian monism, according to which all facts are grounded in facts about the conscious universe.

scholarly journals Russellian physicalism and protophenomenal properties

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-417
Author(s):  
Torin Alter ◽  
Sam Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Structural Properties ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Fundamental Physics ◽  
Phenomenal Properties ◽  
Consciousness Studies ◽  
Russellian Monism ◽  
Dispositional Properties

Abstract According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Morris and Brown (Journal of Consciousness Studies 2016, 2017) argue that protophenomenal properties cannot serve this purpose, given assumptions Russellian monists typically make about the modal profile of such properties. Those assumptions, it is argued, entail that protophenomenal properties are ‘experience specific’, that is, they are individuated by their potential to constitute phenomenal properties, and are thus not genuinely physical. However, we argue, that reasoning assumes that physical inscrutables must be individuated in terms of their (actual or possible) grounding roles. Not only is that assumption questionable: it is antithetical to Russellian monism.

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