Figure 3.1: main sources of English law One factor which may seem difficult at first is getting to grips with these various legal rules. To competently handle primary texts of law, there is a need to: (a) locate and understand the various sources of the rules; (b) learn how they can be used to provide a resolution to disputes of a legal nature; (c) learn how to engage in applying and interpreting the rules; (d) understand the interconnections between the main sources of English law and in particular the relationship between cases and legislation. In order to give a context for the reading and analysing techniques that enable primary texts of law to be properly understood, it is necessary to describe briefly each of the main sources of law. These important sources of law are of course studied in more detail in courses on constitutional and administrative law (or public law), English legal system and European law and human rights. 3.3.1 The common law The phrase ‘common law’ has several meanings which vary according to context but as used in this text it means no more and no less than:

2012 ◽  
pp. 44-44
1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-564
Author(s):  
Dawn Oliver

First, I want to express my gratitude and sense of honour in being invited to deliver the Lionel Cohen lecture for 1995. The relationship between the Israeli and the British legal systems is a close and mutually beneficial one, and we in Britain in particular owe large debts to the legal community in Israel. This is especially the case in my field, public law, where distinguished academics have enriched our academic literature, notably Justice Zamir, whose work on the declaratory judgment has been so influential. Israeli courts, too, have made major contributions to the development of the common law generally and judicial review very notably.In this lecture I want to discuss the process of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom, and to explore some of the difficulties that lie in the way of reform. Some quite radical reforms to our system of government — the introduction of executive agencies in the British civil service, for instance—have been introduced without resort to legislation. There has been a spate of reform to local government and the National Health Service.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-155
Author(s):  
Justin Friedrich Krahé

This article examines the doctrinal foundation and potential for harmonisation of horizontal effect in German and English law against the common legal background of the echr and eu law. It compares direct horizontal effect with two models of indirect horizontal effect, based either on objective constitutional values (indirect Model A), or subjective public law rights (indirect Model B). It is contended that indirect horizontal effect based on subjective public law rights, particularly those corresponding to the state’s obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, provides a coherent and predictable solution to most problems arising in horizontal effect cases.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 


Author(s):  
Timothy Endicott

Administrative Law explains the constitutional principles of the subject and their application across the range of twenty-first-century administrative law. The focus on constitutional principles is meant to bring some order to the very diverse topics with which you need to deal if you are to understand this very complex branch of public law. The common law courts, government agencies, and Parliament have developed a wide variety of techniques for controlling the enormously diverse activities of twenty-first-century government. Underlying all that variety is a set of constitutional principles. This book uses the law of judicial review to identify and to explain these principles, and then shows how they ought to be worked out in the private law of tort and contract, in the tribunals system, and in non-judicial techniques such as investigations by ombudsmen, auditors, and other government agencies. The aim is to equip the reader to take a principled approach to the controversial problems of administrative law.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, House of Lords. This case considered whether a blanket policy excluding prisoners from cell searches was a proportionate response that was necessary to achieve the aim of that policy. There is also discussion of whether the common law could provide an alternative system of rights protection to that under the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Meagher

The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) (‘the Act’) has established a new model of pre-legislative rights scrutiny of proposed Commonwealth laws. This is undertaken by the political arms of government and involves: (1) the requirement that a statement of (human rights) compatibility must accompany proposed laws and certain legislative instruments when introduced into Parliament; and (2) the establishment of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (‘PJCHR’) which regularly reports to the Parliament on the compatibility of its proposed laws with human rights. This article looks at the relationship between the Act – and these two new mechanisms – and the interpretive role of the courts. It does so by first considering the (possible) direct use of statements of compatibility and PJCHR reports by Australian courts in the interpretation of Commonwealth laws that engage human rights. It then assesses whether the Act may exert an indirect influence on the content and scope of the common law interpretive presumptions that protect human rights.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] QB 575, High Court (Queen’s Bench Division). This case concerns the constitutionality of fees payable to access court processes where the applicant’s limited financial means render them unable to pay those fees. More generally it concerns the capacity of the common law to provide rights protections, notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Author(s):  
Jack Beatson

This chapter assesses changes in judicial approach and technique since the enactment of the Human Rights Act (HRA), and whether they are irreversible. It considers the language of analysis; the significance of terms such as ‘deference’, ‘institutional competence’, and ‘weight’; and the interpretative obligation in s.3 HRA enabling radical re-interpretation, and its relationship with the s.4 power to make declarations of incompatibility. It asks whether the ‘no less, but certainly no more’ than Strasbourg approach, with its need to predict outcomes in Strasbourg, reflects a ‘domestic remedy for breach of international obligations’ view of the HRA, or is an indication of the courts' understanding of their constitutional role and its limits. Finally, it suggests it is important not to sideline or forget the potential of the common law and the continued relevance and importance of traditional common law public law techniques.


1929 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-364
Author(s):  
Achille Mestre

A French jurist who seeks to explain to the English public the principles governing administrative law as they are understood in France, is beset at the same moment by conflicting feelings of uneasiness and confidence. He recollects at the outset that, according to a classical doctrine which has been true for a considerable time and which is expressed in Dicey's works in the most brilliant formula, England does not possess to any extent in its legal organization a system of ideas which could have any claim to be compared to the French droit administratif or indeed could be regarded as parallel to it with any exactness. Is it not therefore presumptuous for a Frenchman to attempt to explain to English lawyers the leading characteristics of an institution which might certainly appear to them unusual, if not grotesque? And yet when a traveller has stayed a short time in Great Britain, has talked with the recognized authorities of that country, has asked questions, has made notes, has dipped into the recent works on English law, has glanced with an unprejudiced eye at the whole trend of legal institutions at the present day, he cannot help being struck by a certain lack of harmony between the official doctrine, which for such a long time has had good reason to say that there is no administrative law in England, and the judicial practice which, owing to the creation of new jurisdictions, to the introduction of new forms of procedure, and to the needs originating in ihe obvious inadequacy of inherited views, seems to pave the way for the introduction into England of a droit administratif and the recognition of principles derogatory to the common law—principles which are adapted to playing in English law the part which droit administratif played in the French common law chiring the nineteenth century, and still plays.


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