scholarly journals The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) and the Courts

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Meagher

The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) (‘the Act’) has established a new model of pre-legislative rights scrutiny of proposed Commonwealth laws. This is undertaken by the political arms of government and involves: (1) the requirement that a statement of (human rights) compatibility must accompany proposed laws and certain legislative instruments when introduced into Parliament; and (2) the establishment of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (‘PJCHR’) which regularly reports to the Parliament on the compatibility of its proposed laws with human rights. This article looks at the relationship between the Act – and these two new mechanisms – and the interpretive role of the courts. It does so by first considering the (possible) direct use of statements of compatibility and PJCHR reports by Australian courts in the interpretation of Commonwealth laws that engage human rights. It then assesses whether the Act may exert an indirect influence on the content and scope of the common law interpretive presumptions that protect human rights.

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J Keith

The Right Honourable Sir Kenneth Keith was the fourth speaker at the NZ Institute of International Affairs Seminar. In this article he describes and reflects upon the role of courts and judges in relation to the advancement of human rights, an issue covered in K J Keith (ed) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 1968). The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses international lawmakers attempting to protect individual groups of people from 1648 to 1948, including religious minorities and foreign traders, slaves, aboriginal natives, victims of armed conflict, and workers. The second part discusses how from 1945 to 1948, there was a shift in international law to universal protection. The author notes that while treaties are not part of domestic law, they may have a constitutional role, be relevant in determining the common law, give content to the words of a statute, help interpret legislation which is in line with a treaty, help interpret legislation which is designed to give general effect to a treaty (but which is silent on the particular matter), and help interpret and affect the operation of legislation to which the international text has no apparent direct relation. 


Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington

This chapter explores the relationship between disability quota schemes and non-discrimination law in Europe. While at first sight they seem to sit uneasily beside each other, the chapter reveals how, in some instances, quota schemes can serve to facilitate compliance with non-discrimination legislation. At the same time, the chapter explores seeming incompatibilities between the two approaches and considers whether there are differences between common and civil law jurisdictions in this respect. Tentative conclusions suggest that there is a greater willingness to establish quota schemes through legislation in civil law jurisdictions compared to common law jurisdictions, and that quota schemes in civil law jurisdictions are more likely to provide for the imposition of a levy in the case that employers fail to meet their quota obligations through employing the required number of people with disabilities. There also seems to be some indication that there is greater awareness of the potential for conflict or tension, in various forms, between non-discrimination law and quota schemes in common law jurisdictions than in civil law jurisdictions. Finally, the two schemes operating in the common law states are only applicable to the public sector—whilst in civil law states quotas are generally applied to both public and private sector employers. This may indicate different perceptions regarding the role of public sector employers and the legitimacy of imposing quota requirements.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD HARRIS

Abstract H. Meyer‐Laurin has claimed that the Athenian courts took a stricti iuris approach to the law and did not take extenuating circumstances into account. Other scholars (Mirhady, Todd) have claimed that the courts sometimes ignored the law and took extra‐legal considerations into account, which was called ‘fairness’ (epieikeia). The essay begins with a careful reading of Aristotle's analysis of ‘fairness’ (epieikeia) in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric and draws on an important essay by J. Brunschwig. Fairness was not a doctrine that attempted to undermine the authority of the law or placed the law of the city in opposition to the unwritten laws or the common law of mankind. Nor did the application of fairness introduce non‐legal factors into adjudication. Rather, fairness dealt with the problem of treating exceptions to the general rule contained in a specific written law. The essay then shows how litigants used arguments based on fairness and how the courts sometimes took extenuating circumstances into account. When Athenian judges swore to decide according to the laws of Athens, they did not just consider the law under which the accuser had brought his case. They could also take into account general principles of justice implicit in the laws of Athens as a whole. In this way, they avoided a rigid positivist approach to law. Finally, the essay sheds some light on the relationship between Aristotle's Rhetoric and the arguments used in the Athenian courts.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 


2020 ◽  
pp. 3-16
Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey ◽  
Pamela McCormick ◽  
Clare Ovey

This chapter examines the history and institutions associated with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It discusses the political context in which the European Convention was drafted and both the political developments and philosophies which shaped its content. It also examines the system of protection provided by the different organs of the Council of Europe; the relationship between those organs and other international courts and tribunals, including the European Union; and the role of the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, the Commissioner for Human Rights, and the other human rights instruments of the Council of Europe in the enforcement of the human rights provisions.


Author(s):  
Tina Kotzé ◽  
Zsa-Zsa Boggenpoel

The Covid-19 pandemic, with its concomitant "stay at home" catchphrase, has certainly made living together as neighbours in a constitutional dispensation more tangible. Conflicts between neighbours will inevitably increase, especially in a time when citizens from different social, cultural, customary or religious backgrounds and with different rights and interests are restricted to the boundaries of their properties as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic has provided us with the impetus to reflect upon the notion of "reasonableness" in neighbour law, particularly nuisance law in the narrow sense. In this context the role of neighbour law is ordinarily to regulate the relationship between neighbours. Therefore, neighbour law is crucial in that it resolves conflicts that arise between neighbours due to their everyday use of their properties. Whether the nuisance is objectively reasonable or goes beyond that which can be reasonably tolerable under the circumstances requires weighing up various factors dependant on the prevailing circumstances, rights, interests, values and obligations of the neighbours and the community. In the constitutional dispensation, based on the values of human dignity, equality, and freedom, this may inadvertently require courts to balance out and reconcile often opposing constitutional rights. To this end the underlying principle of nuisance law encapsulated in the phrases "give and take" and "live and let live" arguably already encapsulates the notion of balancing respective rights (constitutional or otherwise) and interests given the context of each case. However, courts do not always correctly apply the reasonableness test in a principled and coherent fashion, as illustrated in Ellaurie v Madrasah Taleemuddeen Islamic Institute 2021 2 SA 163 (KZD). This may lead to the conclusion that constitutional rights are ignored when the reasonableness test for nuisance law is applied. It is necessary to reconceptualise the reasonableness test in order to ensure that the common law is infused with constitutional values. There are numerous ways in which the ideals and values of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (and even specific constitutional rights other than property rights) could be advanced if courts were more willing (not being held back by conservatism) and able (equipped with the necessary vocabulary) to apply the common law in line with the Constitution. It is pivotal that courts apply the reasonableness test correctly, considering all the relevant circumstances of the case, including the broader constitutional values and ideals such as ubuntu. It is arguable that if this were done, nuisance law would have a greater potential to incorporate a wider range of rights, interests and values so that the outcomes would be fairer and more equitable, which is, after all, the goal of the reasonableness standard in neighbour law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 547
Author(s):  
Claudia Geiringer

In Attorney-General v Taylor, New Zealand's Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's recognition, and exercise, of an implied jurisdiction to make (non-binding) declarations of legislative inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the NZ Bill of Rights). Recognition of this novel jurisdiction says something important about the evolution of judicial-legislative relations under the NZ Bill of Rights. The question is: what exactly? This article suggests that a close analysis of the Court of Appeal's decision in Taylor in fact discloses three interwoven narratives that speak to the constitutional role of the courts in enforcing the NZ Bill of Rights: the NZ Bill of Rights as "legal benchmark"; the NZ Bill of Rights as "facilitator of inter-branch dialogue"; and the "common law-fuelled bill of rights". The article unpicks these narratives, explores the relationship between them and discusses the extent to which they succeed in accommodating or justifying the new declaratory remedy.


Legal Studies ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Grear

This paper examines the interplay between discourses of exclusion and inclusion in the relationship between land law and human rights. It explores the common law conception of property in land and its relationship with the conceptual structure of property before suggesting that the particular form the conception takes in the English common law is problematic as a discourse of exclusion in the light of inclusive human rights considerations. However, further submerged exclusions in law are also explored, suggesting a problematic ideological continuity between land law and human rights law, notwithstanding identifiable surface tensions between them as contrasting discourses. Once the continuity of hidden exclusions is identified, the paper explores the theoretical unity between the deep structure of property as ‘propriety’ and human rights as ‘what is due’, and suggests their mutual potential for embracing more inclusive concerns. Finally, two modest proposals for future theoretical reform are offered: the need for a more anthropologically adequate and inclusive construct of the human being as legal actor, and the need for a more differentiated, context-sensitive formulation of the common law1 property conception, one capable of reconciling conceptually necessary elements of excludability with inclusive human rights impulses.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 1069-1078
Author(s):  
Elsa Davidson ◽  
Julian Brash

This article serves as an introduction to the special section on Sensorial Politics, which includes articles by Nicholas Caverly, Elsa Davidson, Susan Falls and Ali Kenner. The introduction outlines the arguments of the articles before proceeding to a discussion of the common themes they illuminate as a whole. In particular, they address four key issues: the relationship between the sensorial and the political; the role of sensorial disruption and its political effects; the issue of labor; and the issue of knowledge. We conclude that while these pieces advance our understanding of the relationships between the sensorium and politics, they also open up avenues for ongoing research and theorization, particularly in our contemporary situation, in which the Covid-19 pandemic has recast sensorial politics in new ways.


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