Comparative labor and employment law in developed market economies: Fostering market efficiencies or repairing market failures?

2015 ◽  
pp. 62-79
Author(s):  
Silvia Bonfanti ◽  
Cynthia Estlund ◽  
Nuno Garoupa
2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (12) ◽  
pp. 1571-1578
Author(s):  
Alessandro Somma

A market economy is not a product of free economic behavior but rather, of an order requiring the fulfillment of systemic tasks by market operators. Their performance needs to be guided by rules imposing competition as a political tool to functionalize their action, in such a way that market failures can be avoided. This is not only the case for coordinated market economies, typically making use of direct market regulations, but also for liberal market economies, even if these latter ones prefer an indirect regulation of economic life, by having to condition individual behavior. Different modes of regulation may be used to stabilize the same accumulation regime, which is understood as patterns of production and consumption reproducible over a long period. In other words, liberal market ideology, as well as liberalism, is anything but a theory on unlimited freedom: it “needs freedom”, but also needs to “consume” this freedom as a condition of historical and social possibilities for a free market economy. Even if differences may involve the way of assuring those possibilities, the necessity to force economic behavior into functionalizing schemes must be seen as unavoidable.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stewart J. Schwab

33 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2017)This article describes the distinctive approaches that law and economics takes to labour and employment law. The article distinguishes between ‘economic analysis of law’ and ‘law and economics’, with the former applying economic models to generally simple legal rules while the latter blends messier institutional detail with legal and economic thought. The article describes three eras of law-and-economics scholarship, recognizing that economics teaches that markets work and markets fail. Era One emphasizes that labour laws and mandatory employment rules might reduce overall social welfare by preventing a benefit or term from going to the party that values it most highly. Era Two emphasizes that labour and employment laws might enhance overall social welfare by correcting market failures arising from monopsony power, externalities, public goods, asymmetric information, information-processing heuristics, and internal labour markets. Era Three uses empirical methods to referee between markets-work and markets-fail approaches. The article argues that unequal bargaining power is not a standard market failure, because even powerful employers have a profit-maximizing motive to provide benefits, such as vacation or safety, that workers are willing to pay for.


2004 ◽  
pp. 94-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Shastitko

Various ways of state participation in the mechanisms of transaction management are considered in the article. Differences between compensation and elimination of the market failures are identified. Opportunities and risks of non-regulatory alternatives usage as a mean of market failure compensation are described. Based on classification of goods correlated to relative cost of their useful characteristics evaluation (search, experience, merit) questions of institutional alternatives in three areas (political, financial and commodity) are examined.


2018 ◽  
pp. 106-126
Author(s):  
O. V. Anchishkina

The paper deals with a special sector of public procurement — G2G, in which state organizations act as both customers and suppliers. The analysis shows the convergence between contractual and administrative relations and risks of transferring the negative factors, responsible for market failures, into the administrative system, as well as the changing nature of the state organization. Budget losses in the sector G2G are revealed and estimated. There are doubts, whether the current practice of substitution of market-based instruments for administrative requirements is able to maintain integrity of public procurement in the situation of growing strategic challenges. Measures are proposed for the adjustment and privatization of contractual relations.


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-106
Author(s):  
Emily Rose
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document