Prior research has identified two different sources of strategic imitation—through perceived organizational cluster similarity (cluster effects) and direct social connections (tied-to effects). In the research on tied-to effects, top executives’ social ties, such as outside directorships, have long been studied as a mechanism through which strategic imitation develops. However, are all ties the same? There has been little examination of whether some social ties have more influence than others. Using the attention-based view of the firm, we argue that certain social ties garner more attention by being salient to top executives. We empirically test this assertion by examining the effects of CEO outside directorships on R&D spending. Using panel data from large U.S. manufacturing firms, we find that CEOs imitate the R&D intensity of tied-to firms (i.e., a firm in which the CEO serves as an outside board member) in their own firm’s R&D decisions. Consistent with attention-based arguments, our results show evidence of selective imitation, as imitating relationships are stronger when the CEO has longer tenure as a director of a tied-to firm and the tied-to firm is performing well. In contrast to conventional institutional theory, our findings also show that CEOs imitate relatively smaller tied-to firms when they make R&D investment decisions. Not all social ties have equal influence on imitative strategic decision making; thus, they have different strategic implications.
Debt, R&D Investment and Technological Progress: A Panel Study of Japanese Manufacturing Firms in the 90s