MARKETING DATA IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR: A COMPETITION LAW CONSIDERATION

2019 ◽  
pp. 733-760
Author(s):  
Pedro Callol
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Pharmaceutical Sector ◽  
Marketing Data

scholarly journals Public Interest and EU Competition Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 256-281
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Public Utilities ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Pharmaceutical Sector ◽  
Public Interest Law ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Key Sectors

While European Union (EU) competition law has long been understood as a variety of public interest law, the extent to which the rules can be applied directly to advance noneconomic public interest-oriented goals is more contentious. This contribution considers whether and how such concerns can be accommodated within the framework of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It considers both the conventional approach to addressing public interest concerns within the analytical structure of the antitrust rules and also how broader public interest objectives have shaped recent EU-level enforcement efforts in three key sectors: the liberalizing public utilities markets, the pharmaceutical sector, and the digital economy.

Exclusionary Abuses

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-112
Author(s):  
Renato Nazzini
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Pharmaceutical Sector ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Third ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 deals with exclusionary abuses under the Competition Act 1998, covering both public and private enforcement cases. The analysis concerns the approach to dominance as well as tests for abuse, focusing on retroactive rebates and bundled discounts, exclusion in multi-market settings, exclusivity, most favoured nation and equivalent clauses, discrimination, and exclusionary abuses in the pharmaceutical sector. This chapter argues that, in its second decade, modern UK competition law continued a trend that was already clear in the first decade: the prohibition of abuse of dominance is applied in a more economically robust and commercially reasonable way than it is by the EU institutions - the Commission and the EU courts - and in certain other Member States. The chapter notes that the third decade of the Competition Act 1998 will see the UK develop its competition policy free from the constraints of EU law and may allow for some divergence in the approach to exclusionary abuses in the future.

Pay-for-Delay Agreements in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Towards a Coherent EU Approach?`

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Barazza
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Generic Manufacturer ◽  
Clear Indication ◽  
Pharmaceutical Sector ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Eu And Us ◽  
Monitoring Activity ◽  
The Eu

This Report examines the competition law issues that arise, in the EU pharmaceutical sector, from pay-for-delay agreements concluded between an originator company and a generic manufacturer. The Commission's approach to these agreements is reviewed evaluating the findings of the on-going monitoring activity of patent settlements, the outcome of recent investigations, and the legislative proposals specifically aimed at dealing with the phenomenon. Finally, a comparison of the EU and US approaches provides a clear indication of the challenges that still lie ahead.

Pay for Delay Agreements: Antitrust Watch Intensifies

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-39
Author(s):  
Twinkle Chawla ◽  
Ruchi Verma
Keyword(s):  
Cross Section ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Patent Law ◽  
Pharmaceutical Sector ◽  
Competition Commission ◽  
Settlement Agreements ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
The Cross ◽  
Dual Objectives ◽  
State Of Art

The pharmaceutical sector has constantly endeavoured to balance its dual objectives of promoting state-of-art innovation and achieving affordable healthcare for all. The contrasting aims are also germane to the inevitable conflict between the competition law and the patent law with respect to this sector. Reverse payment settlement is one such concept that lies at the cross-section of these two legislations and strangely offers an uncanny mechanism where extreme partisans (i.e., innovator and generics) become comrades, thereby prodding genuine concerns and exposing legal vulnerabilities of such agreements. Against this backdrop, this article seeks to examine the growing undercurrent re reverse payment settlement agreements from a competition law perspective. In an attempt to harmonize the conflicting policy objectives, it will study the interplay between patent law and competition law by placing reliance on the approach followed by other jurisdictions. Further, this article will also assess whether reverse payment settlement agreements fall within the statutory construct of the Competition Act, 2002 and whether the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) can assert its jurisdiction over such agreements. An attempt is also made to outline the approach which the CCI could adopt, bearing in mind the importance of ensuring exclusivity as an incentive for innovation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document